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ABSTRACT
Poverty eradication is a common fundamental goal of the
human rights agenda and the sustainable development agenda.
International human rights law considers poverty to be a denial of
human rights and acknowledges shared global obligations to
alleviate poverty and realize socio-economic rights indispensable
for leading a decent life universally. In unison with the human
rights agenda, sustainable development instruments declare healing
the planet from poverty and freeing people from the tyranny of want
as a primary goal of the contemporary globalized world. This was
reaffirmed by a recent important document—Transforming our
World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. That Agenda
declares that “eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions,
including extreme poverty, is the greatest global challenge and an
indispensable requirement for sustainable development.” This
Article represents a systematic analysis of the global obligations to
eradicate poverty and ensure a decent standard of living universally
embedded in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It
provides a general outline of the conception of global obligations for
sustainable development and opens a novel understanding of their
nature, status, content, scope, and duty-bearers, as well as the
mechanisms necessary for their implementation. This Article also
examines special features, strengths and limitations, and the
interrelation between commitments for sustainable development
and global obligations in the area of socio-economic rights. Based
on that analysis, this Article puts forward suggestions for how the
contemporary sustainable development agenda might be further
improved in order to realize global obligations for sustainable
development. Additionally, this Article explores modes of global
governance and accountability that are necessary to realize human
rights and reach the Sustainable Development Goals. It concludes
by suggesting how the human rights and sustainable development
agendas should be harmonized in a way that enriches both agendas
at normative and institutional levels, in the service of realizing their
common goals of combating poverty and ensuring a decent
standard of living universally.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Poverty eradication is one of the most significant and pressing
contemporary problems. There is a universal consensus that
poverty represents a severe socio-economic deprivation, a form of
unfreedom, and a deadly social disease.1 We can identify four major
features of this deprivation, each with its own caveat. First, the
deprivation is caused by social practices and institutions—although
there are debates on which particular institutions and practices
cause poverty. Second, it is curable through the correction of these
practices and institutions—although the set of most relevant and
effective measures is uncertain. Third, we have an aspiration and
sufficient aggregate resources to heal it in all of its manifestations—
yet, even if the aspiration has found expression in numerous
international documents, the resources call for urgent mobilization
and efficient usage. Fourth, many global actors, experts, and
empathic people all over the world are involved in the current fight
against poverty—though the voices of poor individuals and
developing societies are still rarely heard and anti-poverty
programs are often uncoordinated, inefficient, and even violative of
human rights.
The focus of this Article is the human rights agenda and the
sustainable development agenda, which share the same
fundamental goal of global poverty eradication. International
human rights law considers poverty to be a denial of human rights2
1
Approximately one third of all human deaths have poverty-related causes.
Thomas Pogge & Mitu Sengupta, Assessing the Sustainable Development Goals from a
Human Rights Perspective, 32(2) J. INT’L & COMP. SOC. POL’Y 83, 86 (2016). In 2018, 6.2
million children under fifteen years, out of which 5.3 million children were under
five, died from mostly preventable or treatable poverty-related causes. This means
that one child dies every five seconds. U.N. Inter-Agency Group for Child
Mortality Estimation, Levels & Trends in Child Mortality, at 4 (2019).
2
See World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme
of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23, para. 14 (July 12, 1993) [hereinafter Vienna
Declaration]; Third U.N. Conference on the Least Developed Countries, Substantive
Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.191/BP/7, para. 1 (May 13, 2001). Human
rights theory and practice interpret poverty as a violation of human rights in case it
is the result of a failure of responsible actors to fulfill their negative or positive
obligations. See Thomas Pogge, Severe Poverty as a Human Rights Violation, in
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and acknowledges shared global obligations to alleviate poverty
and realize socio-economic rights indispensable for leading a decent
life universally. 3 In unison with the human rights agenda,
sustainable development instruments declare healing the planet
from poverty and freeing people from the tyranny of want as the
primary goal of the contemporary globalized world; this was
reaffirmed by a recent important document—Transforming our
World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (hereinafter the
2030 Agenda).4 The 2030 Agenda declares that “eradicating poverty
in all its forms and dimensions, including extreme poverty, is the
greatest global challenge and an indispensable requirement for
sustainable development.”5
Global obligations to eradicate poverty and ensure a decent
standard of living universally derived from the 2030 Agenda form
the subject of this Article. The main objectives of this Article are, first,
to analyze the nature, status, content, and scope of global
commitments to combat poverty and secure access to a decent
standard of living embedded in the 2030 Agenda; second, to examine
their relation with global obligations in the area of socio-economic
rights; third, to explore how the sustainable development agenda
and human rights agenda should interact and enrich one another at
normative and institutional levels in order to achieve their common
goal of poverty eradication; and, finally, to suggest ways in which
the contemporary sustainable development agenda might be further
improved, including the international organizational structure that
is necessary to realize global obligations for sustainable
development.

FREEDOM FROM POVERTY AS A HUMAN RIGHT: WHO OWES WHAT TO THE VERY POOR?
(Thomas Pogge ed., 2007); CTR. FOR ECON. & SOC. RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
POVERTY: IS POVERTY A VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS? 3-4 (Dec. 2009),
http://www.cesr.org/sites/default/files/CESR_Briefing__Human_Rights_and_Poverty_-_Draft_December_2009.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WCJ3-MQTF].
3
See Elena Pribytkova, Global Human Rights Obligations Relating to a Decent
Standard of Living (2019) (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Columbia University).
4
G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, pmbl. (Sept. 25, 2015) [hereinafter 2030 Agenda].
5 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 2.
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Since the 2030 Agenda is quite a new document,6 there is still no
comprehensive research on global commitments to combat poverty
and secure the decent standard of living it enshrines.7 A few legal
studies addressing different types of global commitments 8
presupposed by the sustainable development agenda focus
primarily on commitments of conduct (i.e., duties of development
cooperation and assistance)9 rather than on commitments of result
(i.e., duties to create and maintain a just and sustainable global
institutional scheme10 and to provide for minimum socio-economic
guarantees indispensable for leading a decent life). 11 The same
6
The elaboration of the SDGs’ indicators is still an ongoing process. See infra
Section IV.C.
7
For some significant studies on the topic, see Pogge & Sengupta, supra note
1; MARKUS KALTENBORN, SOCIAL RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: GLOBAL
LEGAL STANDARDS FOR THE POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA (2015); TAHMINA
KARIMOVA, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016).
8
For a classification of global obligations, see infra Section III.A.
9
See, e.g., PHILIPP DANN, THE LAW OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE WORLD BANK, THE EU AND GERMANY (Andrew
Hammel trans., 2013); Philipp Dann, Accountability in Development Aid Law: The
World Bank, UNDP and Emerging Structures of Transnational Oversight, 44 ARCHIV DES
VÖLKERRECHTS 381 (2006); André Frankovits, Rejoinder: The Rights Way to
Development, 21 FOOD POL’Y. 123 (1996); Hanne Lund Madsen, Development
Assistance and Human Rights Concerns, 61/62 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 129 (1994); Wouter
Vandenhole, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the CRC: Is There a Legal
Obligation to Cooperate Internationally for Development?, 17 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 23
(2009).
10
For an analysis of global institutional obligations implied by the sustainable
development agenda, see, e.g., MARGOT E. SALOMON, GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS: WORLD POVERTY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2007); CELINE TAN, GOVERNANCE THROUGH DEVELOPMENT: POVERTY REDUCTION
STRATEGIES, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE DISCIPLINING OF THIRD WORLD STATES
(2011); Arne Vandenbogaerde, The Right to Development in International Human
Rights Law: A Call for Its Dissolution, 31 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 187 (2013).
11
On various sustainable development commitments indispensable for a
decent standard of living, see, e.g., PEDI CHIEMENA OBANI, STRENGTHENING THE
HUMAN RIGHT TO SANITATION AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT (2018);
Audrey R. Chapman, Evaluating the Health-Related Targets in the Sustainable
Development Goals from a Human Rights Perspective, 21 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1098 (2017);
Ricard Gine et al., Monitoring Sanitation and Hygiene in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development: A Review through the Lens of Human Rights, 580 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 1108
(2016); Owen McIntyre, International Water Law and SDG 6: Mutually Reinforcing
Paradigms, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS: LAW, THEORY AND IMPLEMENTATION
(Duncan French & Louis J. Kotzé eds., 2018); Jose Luis Vivero Pol & Claudio
Schuftan, No Right to Food and Nutrition in the SDGs: Mistake or Success?, 1 B.M.J.
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tendency can be traced in economic, 12 political, 13 philosophical, 14
development,15 and interdisciplinary16 studies on commitments for
sustainable development. A number of important studies explore
global interactional and institutional obligations corresponding to

GLOBAL HEALTH (2016); Carmel Williams & Paul Hunt, Neglecting Human Rights:
Accountability, Data and Sustainable Development Goal 3, 21 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1114
(2017).
12
See, e.g., PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES
ARE FAILING AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2007); WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE
WHITE MAN’S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST’S EFFORTS TO AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO
MUCH ILL AND SO LITTLE GOOD (2006); DAMBISA MOYO, DEAD AID: WHY AID IS NOT
WORKING AND HOW THERE IS A BETTER WAY FOR AFRICA (2009); JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE
AGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2015); JEFFREY D. SACHS ET AL., CLOSING THE SDG
BUDGET GAP (2018); José Antonio Alonso, From Aid to Global Development Policy
(U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Working Paper No. 121, 2012).
13
See, e.g., JOACHIM MONKELBAAN, GOVERNANCE FOR THE SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT GOALS: EXPLORING AN INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK OF THEORIES, TOOLS,
AND COMPETENCIES (2019); ELHAM SEYEDSAYAMDOST, A WORLD WITHOUT POVERTY:
NEGOTIATING THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AGENDA (2015) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Columbia University); Bob Deacon, Assessing the SDGs from the Point of
View of Global Social Governance, 32(2) J. INT’L COMP. SOC. POL’Y 116 (2016); Pogge &
Sengupta, supra note 1; Thomas Pogge & Mitu Sengupta, Rethinking the Post-2015
Development Agenda: Eight Ways to End Poverty Now, 7 GLOBAL JUST.: THEORY PRAC.
RHETORIC 3 (2014); Thomas Pogge & Mitu Sengupta, The Sustainable Development
Goals: A Plan for Building a Better World? 11(1) J. GLOBAL ETHICS 56 (2015); Thomas
Pogge & Mitu Sengupta, The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as Drafted: Nice
Idea, Poor Execution, 24(3) WASH. INT’L L. J. 571 (2015); Mitu Sengupta,
Transformational Change or Tenuous Wish List? A Critique of SDG-1 (‘End Poverty in
All Its Forms Everywhere’) 37(1) SOC. ALTERNATIVES 12 (2018).
14
See, e.g., DIETER BIRNBACHER & MAY THORSETH, THE POLITICS OF
SUSTAINABILITY: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (2015); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (2011); THOMAS
POGGE, POLITICS AS USUAL: WHAT LIES BEHIND THE PRO-POOR RHETORIC (2010);
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).
15
See, e.g., DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: CHALLENGES OF THE NEW AID
ARCHITECTURE (Stephan Klingebiel ed., 2014); OLAV STOKKE, THE U.N. AND
DEVELOPMENT: FROM AID TO COOPERATION (2009); Deborah Eade, Capacity Building:
Who Builds Whose Capacity?, 17 DEV. IN PRAC. 630 (2007); Paolo de Renzio & Jurek
Seifert, South-South Cooperation and the Future of Development Assistance: Mapping
Actors and Options, 35 THIRD WORLD Q. 1860 (Nov. 26, 2014); Anup Shah, Foreign Aid
ISSUES
(Sep.
28,
2014),
for
Development
Assistance,
GLOBAL
http://www.globalissues.org/article/35/foreign-aid-development-assistance
[https://perma.cc/S3LV-RQXX].
16
See, e.g., ANDY SUMNER & TOM KIRK, THE DONORS’ DILEMMA: EMERGENCE,
CONVERGENCE AND THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN AID (2014); THE FRAGMENTATION OF AID:
CONCEPTS, MEASUREMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
(Stephan Klingebiel et al. eds., 2016).
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the right to development. 17 A significant part of research is
concentrated on commitments for global partnership proclaimed in
Millennium Development Goal (hereinafter MDG) 8. 18 That
research, however, does not examine the 2030 Agenda’s substantial
transformations of the MDGs’ stipulations.
This Article seeks to fill the existing gaps and suggest answers
to a set of vital questions about which there is still no consensus in
literature and practice. First, what are the strengths and weaknesses
of the MDGs’ and Sustainable Development Goals’ (hereinafter
SDGs) approaches to determining global commitments to combat
poverty and secure a decent standard of living universally? Second,
how do sustainable development commitments and global
obligations in the area of socio-economic rights interrelate? Third,
to what extent do the right to development and corresponding
obligations serve as tools for harmonizing the human rights agenda
and the sustainable development agenda? Fourth, what types of
17
See, e.g., REFLECTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT (Arjun Sengupta et al.
eds., 2005); ISABELLA D. BUNN, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW: LEGAL AND MORAL DIMENSIONS (2012); DEVELOPMENT AS A HUMAN
RIGHT: LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS (Bård A. Andreassen &
Stephen P. Marks eds., 2007); Arjun K. Sengupta, Conceptualizing the Right to
Development for the Twenty-First Century, in UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE
OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, REALIZING THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS IN
COMMEMORATION OF 25 YEARS OF THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHT
TO DEVELOPMENT 67 (2013); Stephen Marks, The Human Right to Development: Between
Rhetoric and Reality, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 137 (2004); Arjun Sengupta, Realizing the
Right to Development, 31 DEV. & CHANGE 553 (2000); Vandenbogaerde, supra note 10;
Wouter Vandenhole, The Human Right to Development as a Paradox, 36(3) VERFASSUNG
UND RECHT IN ÜBERSEE (LAW AND POLITICS IN AFRICA, ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA) 377
(2003).
18
See, e.g., THE MDGS, CAPABILITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE POWER OF
NUMBERS TO SHAPE AGENDAS (Sakiko Fukuda-Parr & Alicia Ely Yamin eds., 2015);
POGGE, supra note 14; CASTING THE NET WIDER: HUMAN RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT AND
NEW DUTY BEARERS (Margot E. Salomon et al. eds., 2007); SALOMON, supra note 10;
Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, The Obligations of ‘International Assistance and
Cooperation’ under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
A Possible Entry Point to a Human Rights Based Approach to Millennium Development
Goal 8, 13(1) INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 86 (2009); Sakiko Fukuda-Parr & David Hulme,
International Norm Dynamics and the “End of Poverty”: Understanding the Millennium
Development Goals, 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 17 (2011); Sakiko Fukuda-Parr,
Millennium Development Goal 8: Indicators for International Human Rights Obligations?,
28 HUM. RTS. Q. 966 (2006); Sakiko Fukuda-Parr et al., The Power of Numbers: A
Critical Review of Millennium Development Goal Targets for Human Development and
Human Rights, 15(2-3) J. HUM. DEV. & CAPABILITIES 105 (2014); SEYEDSAYAMDOST,
supra note 13.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/4

2020]

Global Obligations for Sustainable Development

1039

global obligations for sustainable development are embodied in the
2030 Agenda? Fifth, how do the SDGs define institutional obligations
to create and maintain a just and sustainable global order? Sixth,
what is the status, content and scope of global obligations to ensure
a decent and sustainable standard of living enshrined in the 2030
Agenda? Seventh, what global actors are bound by shared
obligations to cooperate for sustainable development? Eighth, how
should global obligations of development assistance be interpreted?
Finally, what institutional guarantees are necessary to promote
global partnership for sustainable development?
It goes without saying that an article of this scope cannot hope
to comprehensively answer all these momentous questions. This
Article is aimed instead at providing a general outline of the
conception of global obligations for sustainable development
relating to poverty eradication and ensuring a decent standard of
living. The specification of the exact content and scope of various
global obligations for sustainable development, as well as rules and
methods of attributing them to particular actors, goes beyond its
scope and requires further careful and critical research.
This Article intends to elaborate an appealing coherent
framework for global obligations for sustainable development based
on well-defended principles of global justice, many of which are also
embedded in existing international human rights and sustainable
development instruments. On this ground, the study suggests ways
to reform and bring into sync both the contemporary human rights
and sustainable development agendas. This interdisciplinary
research involves normative and descriptive components and
addresses contemporary legal and political discourses and practices
relating to global obligations for sustainable development. It
engages principles developed in moral, legal and political
philosophy and compelling empirical studies concerning various
types of commitments for sustainable development.
This Article’s structure is designed to probe the most contentious
questions enumerated above. It contains three parts. Following this
introduction, the second part examines the interrelation between the
human rights agenda and the sustainable development agenda. In
particular, it focuses on the evolution of the sustainable
development movement from the United Nations Millennium
Declaration (hereinafter the Millennium Declaration) to the 2030
Agenda (Section II.A), on the correlation between human rights
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obligations and sustainable development commitments (Section
II.B), and on the role of a human rights-based approach and the right
to development in bringing the sustainable development agenda in
line with the international human rights agenda and on ways of
mutually enriching both agendas (Section II.C).
The third part provides a general overview and classification of
global obligations, explores which global obligations for sustainable
development are presupposed by the 2030 Agenda (Section III.A),
and analyzes global obligations of result—that is, obligations to
create and maintain a just and sustainable global order (Section III.B)
and obligations to ensure a decent and sustainable standard of living
universally (Section III.C).
The fourth part of this Article addresses global obligations of
conduct—obligations to cooperate for sustainable development
(Section IV.A) and obligations to assist those in poverty (Section
IV.B)—and discusses institutional guarantees of global partnership
for sustainable development (Section IV.C).
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA
A. Sustainable Development Agenda: From Millennium Development
Goals to Sustainable Development Goals
Sustainable development implies “meet[ing] the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs.”19 It is proclaimed (along with human rights
and international peace and security) as one of the three main pillars
of the United Nations.20 The Declaration on the Right to Development
(hereinafter DRD) defines sustainable development as “a
comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process,
which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the
19
United Nations, Report of the World Commission on Environment and
Development: Our Common Future, ch. 2, para. 1 (1987); see G.A. Res. 42/187, Report
of the World Commission on Environment and Development, pmbl. (Dec. 11, 1987).
20
United Nations, The Three Pillars of the United Nations,
https://www.un.org/un70/en/content/videos/three-pillars
[https://perma.cc/99XH-PABP].
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entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their active,
free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair
distribution of benefits resulting therefrom.” 21 Similar to the
concept of human rights, the concept of sustainable development is
quite general, multi-faceted and capable of accommodating multiple
normative meanings and expectations, which most likely
contributed to its worldwide acceptance.22
One can distinguish four interrelated basic dimensions of
sustainable development: social development, economic
development,
environmental development,
and
political
23
development.
For instance, the Report to the U.N. SecretaryGeneral Realizing the Future We Want for All (2012) describes these
four core aspects of sustainable development and their “enablers”
as follows. 24 Inclusive social development calls for guarantees of
social security; a decent standard of living, including secure access
to adequate food, water, sanitation, housing, clothing, and health;
social and gender equality; quality education and cultural diversity;
as well as guarantees of demographic dynamics and migration. 25
Inclusive economic development embraces guarantees of income
poverty eradication, reduction in economic inequality, decent work
and productive employment, green economic growth, fair and
stable global trade and financial systems, sustainable energy, and
affordable access to knowledge and technology.26 Environmental
sustainability encompasses biodiversity protection, a stable climate,
the sustainable use of natural resources and waste management, and
21
G.A. Res. 41/128, Declaration on the Right to Development, pmbl. (Dec. 4,
1986) [hereinafter DRD].
22
See MONKELBAAN, supra note 13, at 9-10; THE POLITICS OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: THEORY, POLICY AND PRACTICE WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION 5 (Susan
Baker et al. eds., 1997).
23
There is also an alternative approach to classifying three dimensions of
sustainability—social, economic, and environmental sustainability—that was
expressed in the U.N. Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20)
Outcome Document, “The Future We Want,” and the 2030 Agenda. The latter,
however, also incorporates the SDGs related to political sustainability. See infra
notes 49-50. As shown above, the DRD also determines four fundamental aspects
of development—that is, economic, social, cultural, and political development.
DRD, supra note 21, pmbl., art. 1.
24
U.N. System Task Team on the Post-2015 U.N. Development Agenda,
Realizing the Future We Want for All: Report to the U.N. Secretary-General, 24-32 (2012).
25
Id.
26
Id.
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resilience to natural hazards. 27 Political sustainability (peace and
security) emphasizes the necessity to ensure human rights; the rule
of law; democratic and fair global and local governance and
institution-building; freedom from violence, conflicts and abuses;
global partnership for development; and equal access to justice and
public services.28
These four dimensions of development were manifested in the
Millennium Declaration adopted on September 8th, 2000. 29 193 U.N.
member states agreed to achieve eight MDGs by the year 2015. It is
important to note that the Millennium Declaration stressed that
achieving the MDGs depends not only on good territorial
governance, but also on good global governance.30 It acknowledged
that states possess “a collective responsibility to uphold the
principles of human dignity, equality and equity” not only
territorially but also “at the global level.” States are therefore bound
by shared global duties towards “all the world’s people, especially
the most vulnerable and, in particular, the children of the world, to
whom the future belongs.”31 They promised to “spare no effort to
free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and
dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty, to which more than a
billion of them are currently subjected.” 32 The Millennium
Declaration also expressed the commitment to make “the right to
development a reality for everyone and to freeing the entire human
race from want.”33
The Millennium Declaration recognized not only interactional,
but also institutional global commitments to build and maintain a
sustainable global order:
“We resolve . . . to create an
environment—at the national and global levels alike—which is
Id.
Id.
29
G.A. Res. 55/2, United Nations Millennium Declaration (Sept. 8, 2000)
[hereinafter Millennium Declaration]. The MDGs are as follows: first, to eradicate
extreme poverty and hunger; second, to achieve universal primary education; third,
to promote gender equality and empowering women; fourth, to reduce child
mortality rates; fifth, to improve maternal health; sixth, to combat HIV/AIDS,
malaria, and other diseases; seventh, to ensure environmental sustainability; and
eighth, to develop a global partnership for development.
30 Id. para. 13.
31 Id. para. 2.
32 Id. para. 11.
33
Id.
27
28
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conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty.” 34
Institutional guarantees, however, had not crystallized into specific
MDGs. While focusing predominantly on states’ commitments in
the area of sustainable development, the Millennium Declaration also
called for developing “strong partnerships with the private sector
and with civil society organizations in pursuit of development and
poverty eradication.”35
The Millennium Declaration and the MDGs were widely criticized
for the way in which they were drafted: first, through a decisionmaking process behind closed doors that involved only developed
states, and, second, through a top-down procedure without
consultations with global/local civil society. 36 Additionally, the
majority of developing countries did not agree with the document
issued by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (hereinafter OECD), Shaping the 21st Century: The
Contribution of Development Co-operation (1996), that contained six
development goals, on the basis of which the MDGs were
formulated, 37 and in particular, with the definition of poverty
Id. para. 12.
Id. para. 20.
36
As Elham Seyedsayamdost notes, for the very first time, a significant
document of this level was elaborated without preliminary consultations with other
global actors, including global civil society. See SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at
197, 207; YASH GHAI & JILL COTTRELL, THE MILLENNIUM DECLARATION, RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTIONS 70 (2011). For an excellent overview of approaches to MDGs’
critique, see Philip Alston, Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human
Rights and Development Debate Seen through the Lens of the Millennium Development
Goals, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 755, 762-66 (2005); see also Maya Fehling et al., Limitations of
the Millennium Development Goals: A Literature Review, 8 GLOBAL PUB. HEALTH 1109
(2013).
37
Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation
includes the following six development goals combined into three groups: (1)
economic well-being: the proportion of people living in extreme poverty in
developing countries should be reduced by at least half by 2015; (2) social
development: there should be substantial progress in primary education, gender
equality, basic health care and family planning, as follows: (a) there should be
universal primary education in all countries by 2015; (b) progress toward gender
equality and the empowerment of women should be demonstrated by eliminating
gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005; (c) the death rate for
infants and children under the age of five years should be reduced in each
developing country by two-thirds of the 1990 level by 2015; the rate of maternal
mortality should be reduced by three-quarters during this same period; (d) access
should be available through the primary health-care system to reproductive health
34
35
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enshrined in it.38 For these reasons, the MDGs are often believed to
be the product of the North and to not correspond to interests of the
South and especially poor societies.39
According to the U.N.’s official position, the MDGs were just a
summary of previous commitments by the international
community.40 It is not clear, however, why many obligations, both
in terms of human rights and development, were not embodied in
the MDGs.41 Civil society representatives claimed that the MDGs
substantially deviated from sustainable development and
international law agreements that were already in place. 42 It has
been widely argued that if the MDGs had been drafted under
conditions of active, full-fledged and meaningful participation by
developing states, consultation with global civil society, and

services for all individuals of appropriate ages, including safe and reliable family
planning methods, as soon as possible and no later than the year 2015; and (3)
environmental sustainability and regeneration: there should be a current national
strategy for sustainable development, in the process of implementation, in every
country by 2005, so as to ensure that current trends in the loss of environmental
resources forests, fisheries, fresh water, climate, soils, biodiversity, stratospheric
ozone, the accumulation of hazardous substances and other major indicators are
effectively reversed at both global and national levels by 2015. On the basis of these
six goals, the first seven MDGs were formulated, while goal 2(c) included two subgoals, that is, to reduce the death rate for infants and children under the age of five
and to reduce the rate of maternal mortality. A development goal concerning
reproductive health was replaced with MDG 6 to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and
other diseases. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., SHAPING THE 21ST
CENTURY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION 9-11 (1996)
[hereinafter SHAPING THE 21ST CENTURY].
38
As later MDGs, Shaping the 21st Century referred to the World Bank’s
extreme poverty threshold, defined as $1 income per capita per day, or $370 annual
income. See SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 79 n.13.
39
See POGGE, supra note 14, at 57-74; William Easterly, How the Millennium
Development Goals Are Unfair to Africa, 37 WORLD DEV. 26 (2009); SEYEDSAYAMDOST,
supra note 13, at 197.
40
See SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 153; see also Michael W. Doyle,
Dialectics of a Global Constitution: The Struggle Over the UN Charter, 18 EUR. J. INT’L
REL. 601 (2011); Richard Manning, Using Indicators to Encourage Development: Lessons
from the Millennium Development Goals, Report for Danish Institute for International
Studies 2009:01 (2009); Jan Vandemoortele, The MDG Story: Intention Denied, 42 DEV.
& CHANGE 1 (2011); David Hulme, The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): A
Short History of the World’s Biggest Promise (Brooks World Poverty Inst., Working
Paper No. 100, 2009).
41
For a critique, see Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1.
42
For an overview, see Fehling et al., supra note 36.
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adequate representation of the global poor, they would have been
formulated differently.43
The first seven MDGs inherited from the OECD development
goals focused on states’ territorial commitments. The inclusion of
commitments for global partnership (MDG 8)44 pursued two major
objectives. First, it was a way to convince developing countries,
which rejected the OECD development goals, to accept the MDGs,
rather than a way to reflect the genuine intention to establish a
global institutional framework for equal partnership and
developing states’ empowerment. The lack of actual desire to
implement the commitment of global partnership is also confirmed
by the fact that MDG 8 was much less concrete than other MDGs,
providing for quite vague targets. 45 The second objective for
introducing MDG 8 was to legitimize to the “donor club” countries’
citizens that they have duties to provide development aid.46 Hence,
the MDGs are rightly considered to be not poor-oriented or
developing
societies-oriented
but
rather
donor-oriented
commitments.47
On September 25, 2015, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a
significant new document—the 2030 Agenda—which formulated
43
See Peggy Antrobus, Critiquing the MDGs from a Caribbean Perspective, 13
GENDER & DEV. 94 (2005); Ashwani Saith, From Universal Values to Millennium
Development Goals: Lost in Translation, 37 DEV. & CHANGE 1167 (2006);
SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 170 (recounting Seyedsayamdost’s interview
with Richard Manning from Mar. 7, 2013).
44
UNITED NATIONS, GOAL 8: DEVELOP A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR
DEVELOPMENT,
https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/global.shtml
[https://perma.cc/VH2G-MACT].
45
U.N. Development Programme experts stressed that MDG 8 “provided no
timetable for policy change; targets and indicators were general statements of
objectives rather than policy changes; and it was silent on the need to increase the
voices of poor countries in international decision-making.” High-Level Task Force
on the Right to Development, Report of the High-Level Task Force on the Implementation
of the Right to Development on its Second Meeting, E/CN.4/2005/WG.18/TF/3, para.
23 (Dec. 8, 2005); see also Fukuda-Parr, supra note 18.
46
Seyedsayamdost defends the idea that the MDGs were “initially a construct
of the donor community, who looked for ways to make aid relevant and to justify
development assistance to their domestic constituents.” SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra
note 13, at 150.
47
See Saskia Hollander & Pearl Heinemans, An Unfinished Symphony—The
Road Towards the Post-2015 Global Development Agenda, BROKER (Sept. 27, 2013),
https://www.thebrokeronline.eu/an-unfinished-symphony-d13/
[https://perma.cc/2LVF-74CJ]; SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 32.
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seventeen SDGs48 and 169 targets.49 The 2030 Agenda emphasizes
the SDGs’ continuity with the MDGs: the former “seek to build on
the Millennium Development Goals and complete what they did not
achieve.”50 Among “continuing development priorities,” the 2030
Agenda lists “poverty eradication, health, education and food
security and nutrition.”51 It reaffirms the primary commitment “to
free the human race from the tyranny of poverty and want” which
binds “[a]ll countries and all stakeholders, acting in collaborative
partnership.”52
At the same time, there are several important differences
between the MDGs and SDGs: First, though the adoption of the
MDGs was a top-down and donors-oriented process, which
excluded the active and meaningful participation of developing
48
The SDGs are as follows: first, to end poverty in all its forms everywhere;
second, to end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote
sustainable agriculture; third, to ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for
all at all ages; fourth, to ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and
promote lifelong learning opportunities for all; fifth, to achieve gender equality and
empower all women and girls; sixth, to ensure availability and sustainable
management of water and sanitation for all; seventh, to ensure access to affordable,
reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all; eighth, to promote sustained,
inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and
decent work for all; ninth, to build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and
sustainable industrialization and foster innovation; tenth, to reduce inequality
within and among countries; eleventh, to make cities and human settlements
inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable; twelfth, to ensure sustainable consumption
and production patterns; thirteenth, to take urgent action to combat climate change
and its impacts; fourteenth, to conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and
marine resources for sustainable development; fifteenth, to protect, restore and
promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests,
combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity
loss; sixteenth, to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable
development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and
inclusive institutions at all levels; and, seventeenth, to strengthen the means of
implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development.
2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 1-17.
49
2030 Agenda, supra note 4. Though the 2030 Agenda documents the
commitment of “achieving sustainable development in its three dimensions—
economic, social and environmental—in a balanced and integrated manner,” it
includes also goals and targets related to political sustainability, such as democracy,
good governance, the rule of law, respect for civil and political rights, equality and
non-discrimination, equal access to justice for all. Id. paras. 2, 8-9, 18-19, SDG 16.3.
50 Id. pmbl.
51 Id. para. 17.
52 Id. pmbl.
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states and (global) civil society, during the elaboration of the SDGs,
a serious attempt to organize the collaboration of states,
intergovernmental organizations, non-state entities and individuals,
including those from poor communities, was made.53 Second, while
the MDGs addressed only developing countries,54 the 2030 Agenda
applies universally—i.e., to all rich and poor societies. 55 This is
crucial because, according to recent convincing studies, a significant
proportion of the poor live in middle-income states. 56 Those in
poverty from developed states should be provided with secure
access to a decent and sustainable standard of living; and
governments of developed states should be held accountable for
53
During my internship with the Rule of Law Unit in the Executive Office of
the U.N. Secretary-General, I was involved in discussions of the Post-2015 Agenda,
which included consultations with multiple stakeholders guided by the U.N. See
also Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, From the Millennium Development Goals to the Sustainable
Development Goals: Shifts in Purpose, Concept, and Politics of Global Goal Setting for
Development, 24 GENDER & DEV. 43, 45-47 (2016).
54
For instance, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr calls the MDGs “a North-South aid
agenda.” Fukuda-Parr, supra note 53, at 44. By Ashwani Saith’s apt comment, the
MDGs’ approach was “insufficiently global” and tended “to ghettoize the problem
of development and locate[d] it firmly in the third world—as if development is
fundamentally and exclusively an issue of absolute levels of living.” Saith, supra
note 43, at 1184. MDG 8 “effectively polarizes and stereotypes the rich and
powerful developed countries against the poor and corrupt developing countries.”
Joy Paton & Elisabeth Valiente-Riedl, Re-evaluating the MDG Framework in Papua
New Guinea, in THE CAPABILITY APPROACH: DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 168, 176 (Francesca Panzironi & Katharine
Gelber eds., 2012).
55
“The Sustainable Development Goals and targets are integrated and
indivisible, global in nature and universally applicable, taking into account
different national realities, capacities and levels of development and respecting
national policies and priorities.” 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 55.
56
Currently, approximately 60% of those in extreme poverty live in middleincome countries. MARCUS MANUEL ET AL., FINANCING THE END OF EXTREME
POVERTY,
OVERSEAS
DEVELOPMENT
INSTITUTE
42
(Sept.
2018),
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/12411.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XZ9H-RFW8]; see Joe DeCapua, Where Do the World’s Poor Live?,
VOA (Aug. 28, 2012, 07:33 AM), https://www.voanews.com/a/povertyprojections-28aug12/1496954.html [https://perma.cc/FH5T-P7NM]; see also
United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Statement on Visit
to the United Kingdom, by Professor Philip Alston, United Nations Special Rapporteur on
Extreme Poverty and Human Rights (Nov. 16, 2018); United Nations Human Rights
Office of the High Commissioner, Statement on Visit to the USA, by Professor Philip
Alston, United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights (Dec.
15, 2017) (demonstrating that the poverty rate is very high in the world’s richest
countries).
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non-compliance with their human rights and sustainable
development obligations towards their poor populations.57 Third,
the SDGs are more comprehensive than the MDGs and better
interlinked.58 Many SDGs are so-called “zero goals” requiring not
just reduction, but full (though progressive) eradication of extreme
poverty and poverty-related severe socio-economic deprivations,
such as hunger59 and the preventable deaths of children.60 Fourth,
one can draw a clear line between the seven MDGs that are
presumed to be exclusively local, and only one global goal, MDG 8.
In the 2030 Agenda, international collaboration is recognized not
only as one of the development goals61 but also as an important tool
for achieving all of the other SDGs.62 Fifth, the MDGs and SDGs
interpret global partnership differently: although the former see it
as bilateral donor-recipient relations, in which developed countries
should play a pivotal role, 63 the latter call for a multilateral and
multilevel partnership inclusive of all stakeholders (“no one will be
left behind”)64 and put emphasis on guarantees of equal and fullfledged agency of developing societies and poor individuals in the
process of poverty eradication.65
These differences demonstrate that the 2030 Agenda represents a
partial, positive response to the critique voiced against the MDGs.66
Nevertheless, the 2030 Agenda does not resolve some essential
problems. The MDGs and SDGs are fairly criticized for several
reasons: First, though they both declare their application of a human
rights-based approach, the MDGs and SDGs, in fact, do not pay
sufficient attention to human rights and the corresponding
obligations. The progressive commitments for development do not
have the status of human rights and, as will be shown, conflict with
human rights-based obligations that should be fulfilled
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

See Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 88-89; Saith, supra note 43, at 1184.
See MONKELBAAN, supra note 13, at 4.
2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 2.
Id. SDG 3; see infra Section III.C.
Id. SDG 17.
See infra Section IV.A.
See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 44.
2030 Agenda, supra note 4, pmbl.
Id. SDG 17.
See, e.g., Fukuda-Parr, supra note 53.
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immediately.67 Second, the MDGs and SDGs bypass the issue of
developed states’ and other powerful actors’ remedial
extraterritorial responsibilities to compensate for the harm caused
by them and often substitute the former with duties of development
assistance. 68 Third, though they recognize the injustice of the
international institutional structure, the MDGs and SDGs
concentrate predominantly on territorial measures rather than
global institutional reforms that are necessary to reduce poverty and
create a just and sustainable global order.69 Fourth, they both use
the World Bank’s inadequate and much-criticized definition of
poverty.70 Fifth, despite the acknowledgement that non-state actors,
including transnational corporations, individuals and global civil
society, also have sustainable development commitments, the
Millennium Declaration and the 2030 Agenda remain state-centered
and do not focus on obligations of actors other than states.71 Sixth,
the MDGs and SDGs assume that development assistance
obligations are interactional and do not call for their
institutionalization. 72 Finally, they are often rightly criticized for
their lack of independent monitoring and accountability
mechanisms to assess the progress of development goals’ realization
and hold multiple actors responsible. 73 The rest of this Article
explores ways to fill these gaps.

See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section III.A.
69
See infra Section III.B. The MDGs and SDGs interpret poverty
predominantly as a territorial problem that should be solved through good
domestic governance and not as an extraterritorial issue that calls for global
governance solutions. See Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 89.
70
See infra Section III.C.
71
See infra Section IV.A; see also Kathleen Sexsmith & Philip McMichael,
Formulating the SDGs: Reproducing or Reimagining State-Centered Development?, 12
GLOBALIZATIONS 581 (2015).
72
See infra Section IV.B.
73
See infra Section IV.C.
67
68
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B. Human Rights Obligations and Sustainable Development
Commitments
The 2030 Agenda expresses global commitments with respect to
certain socio-economic guarantees, in the first instance to eradicate
extreme poverty and inequality, that are, at the same time, objects of
internationally recognized socio-economic rights. 74 This Section
examines the main distinctions between human rights obligations
and sustainable development commitments. This analysis will
enable us to assess the strengths and limitations of the human rights
and sustainable development agendas.75
The contrast between human rights-based obligations and
sustainable development commitments may be explained through
the parallel with the distinction between perfect duties of justice and
imperfect humanitarian duties, which was proposed by Kant. 76
Perfect duties of justice are assigned, specified, claimable and
enforceable human rights obligations. In comparison to them,
imperfect humanitarian (beneficence) duties do not determine
concrete content and scope, holders and duty-bears but are rather
aimed at establishing a normative framework giving various dutybearers reasons to act.77
The main differences between human rights obligations and
sustainable development commitments may be formulated as
follows (see infra Table No. 1): First, while human rights obligations
74
For a critique of the position that human rights are aimed to and capable of
guaranteeing equality, see SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN
UNEQUAL WORLD (2018).
75
On various interpretations of the interrelation between the human rights
agenda and the sustainable development agenda, see Stephen P. Marks, The Human
Rights Framework for Development: Seven Approaches, in REFLECTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO
DEVELOPMENT 23 (Arjun Sengupta et al. eds., 2005); Alston, supra note 36.
76
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 29 (Mary Gregor trans. & ed.,
1996). This distinction between perfect and imperfect obligations was employed
and developed by many contemporary researches and practitioners. See ONORA
O’NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT’S PRACTICAL
PHILOSOPHY 191 (1989); Stefan Gosepath, Deprivation and Institutionally Based Duties
to Aid, in DOMINATION AND GLOBAL POLITICAL JUSTICE: CONCEPTUAL, HISTORICAL,
AND INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES 251, 254 (Barbara Buckinx et al. eds., 2015); Marks,
supra note 75, at 20-21.
77
See CHARLES R. BEITZ, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 167 (2009); Gosepath, supra
note 76, at 254; O’NEILL, supra note 76, at 191.
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refer to international legal framework, sustainable development
commitments appeal to political agreements that have no status of
legally binding human rights instruments. 78 Second, whereas
human rights obligations are grounded in and correspond to
internationally recognized human rights, the 2030 Agenda records
unilateral humanitarian self-obligations of actors. 79 Third, rightholders are entitled to claim the performance of human rights
obligations from certain duty-bearers. As humanitarian selfobligations, sustainable development commitments are not owed to
any particular right-holders and are, therefore, not claimable.
Nonetheless, in contrast to acts of charity, sustainable development
commitments are not optional. 80 Fourth, while human rights
obligations should be assigned to concrete duty-bearers, the 2030
Agenda does not specify actors responsible for the implementation
of sustainable development commitments.
Fifth, the U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter
CESCR) formulates general and specific criteria of adequacy for
determining the scope of socio-economic rights obligations. 81
Though the 2030 Agenda refers to some of these criteria of adequacy,
it operates mainly with its own set of indicators. Sixth, although
socio-economic rights obligations are of both progressive and
immediate character, sustainable development commitments are to
be implemented only progressively within a certain timeframe (by
2020, 2025, or 2030).82 Finally, human rights require the creation of
special legal monitoring and accountability mechanisms, 83
78
Some researchers consider that the MDGs and SDGs form customary
international law, which means that development commitments have a status of
legal obligations, even if they do not derive from binding legal instruments. See
Philip Alston (Special Adviser to the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights
on the Millennium Development Goals), A Human Rights Perspective on the
Millennium Development Goals, para. 48; Alston, supra note 36, at 758; ANDREW
CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 86-87 (2006).
79
The 2030 Agenda represents a set of “commitments” to implement the SDGs.
The word “obligations” is used only twice in the 2030 Agenda, meaning obligations
under international law. 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 18, SDG 15.1.
80
Alston, supra note 36, at 758.
81
See infra Section III.C.
82 See infra Section III.C.
83
In Alston’s important note, “accountability mechanisms are the sine qua non
of a human rights approach.” Alston, supra note 78, at 51; see Alston, supra note 36,
at 813.
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including judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. The 2030 Agenda relies
on periodic monitoring and political pressure as major tools for
holding actors accountable. It uses targets and indicators for
evaluating actors’ efforts in achieving the SDGs and political
pressure to influence their conduct.84
TABLE NO. 1

Human Rights
Obligations

Sustainable
Development
Commitments

Normative Basis

Legal
Instruments

Political
Agreements

2

Nature

Human RightsBased
Obligations

Humanitarian
Self-Obligations

3

Claimability

Claimable

Non-Claimable

4

Duty-Bearers

Concrete Actors

Not Specified

5

Scope

Criteria of
Adequacy
(AAAQ)

SDGs Indicators

6

Urgency of
Realization

Immediate &
Progressive

Progressive

7

Accountability

Legal
(Justiciable)

Political (Periodic
Monitoring)

No.

Aspects

1

The human rights agenda has several important interrelated
strengths regarding obligations when compared to the sustainable
84

See infra Section IV.C.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/4

2020]

Global Obligations for Sustainable Development

1053

development agenda. First, as universal legitimate entitlements that
individuals have against relevant others,85 human rights ground the
corresponding obligations of particular actors and give rightholders a certain level of control over the objects of their rights and
the behavior of the obliged actors.86 Second, human rights imply an
opportunity to hold perpetrators accountable for their violations.
The sustainable development agenda is therefore marred by
identifiable weaknesses. Without being rooted in human rights,
sustainable development commitments are entirely at the disposal
of self-obliging global actors. In other words, without enjoying the
status of right-holders, poor individuals and developing societies
cannot demand the fulfillment of SDGs from their states, the
international community and concrete global entities and hold these
actors accountable for their non-compliance with sustainable
development commitments. For these reasons, the 2030 Agenda is
compared with “a long list of Sustainable Development Wishes.”87
In order to be more than just a promise of development
improvements, the SDGs should specify responsible global actors,
principles of distributing shared sustainable development
commitments among them, means for their implementation, as well
as monitoring and accountability mechanisms.
According to Philip Alston’s persuasive argument, one should
not unreasonably extol the legal framework and practice of human
rights and belittle the normative framework and practice of
sustainable development.88 Traditional points of critique directed at
socio-economic rights to a large extent coincide with the above listed
characteristics of the SDGs. Obligations corresponding to socioeconomic rights are often accused of being non-binding,
programmatic (or political), progressive, non-claimable, nonenforceable, and non-justiciable commitments that are neither

85
See JEFF KING, JUDGING SOCIAL RIGHTS 20-21 (2012); JAMES W. NICKEL, MAKING
SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 13-15 (2nd ed. 2007); HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS:
SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 13 (2nd ed. 1996).
86 See LEON PETRAZYCKI, LAW AND MORALITY 45-48 (2011); Joseph Raz, Human
Rights in the Emerging World Order, 1 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 31, 35 (2010).
87
Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 90; see Thomas Pogge & Mitu Sengupta,
New Millennium Development Goals: A New Version, An Old Wish List, 48 ECON. & POL.
WKLY. 23 (Sept. 28, 2013); Sengupta, supra note 13.
88
Alston, supra note 36, at 767.
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specified nor assigned to concrete actors. 89 Thus, socio-economic
rights obligations face the same criticisms as do sustainable
development commitments. As shown by many researchers and
practitioners, this critique regarding socio-economic rights is
refutable.90 Means and strategies to overcome the skepticism about
socio-economic rights obligations and sustainable development
commitments partly overlap and may mutually enrich each other.
One of the ways to overcome the above-mentioned criticism of
sustainable development commitments, which is also often applied
to socio-economic human rights obligations, is to justify imperfect
duties as obligatory, claimable and enforceable legal duties. Charles
Beitz, for example, argues against a “modern prejudice” to consider
imperfect humanitarian self-obligations to be discretionary and
generate less serious grounds for action. He develops the concept
of “strong beneficence” obligations conditional on three factors:
first, the interest requiring protection should be “maximally
urgent”; second, there should be actors capable of implementing
their shared obligations/commitments; and third, the realization of
these obligations/commitments demand only minor or moderate
sacrifice from these actors.91 Beitz comes to the conclusion that “in
some cases of severe poverty considerations of (‘strong’) beneficence
may be enough” to give actors “strong reasons” to contribute to the
realization of shared global obligations.92 Sustainable development
commitments to eradicate poverty and ensure a decent standard of
living satisfy the “strong beneficence” criteria. First, saving the lives
of those in extreme poverty is a demand of extraordinary urgency.
Second, many global actors are capable of implementing sustainable
development commitments. Although contemporary studies assess
various amounts of resources needed to end poverty universally,
they agree that cumulative efforts would be sufficient to implement
relevant SDGs. 93 Finally, the burdens of the realization of these
commitments are quite moderate, provided they are fairly

89
90
91
92
93

1-2.

See, e.g., Marks, supra note 75, at 3.
See, e.g., id.; SHUE, supra note 83.
BEITZ, supra note 77, at 167.
Id. at 169.
See, e.g., Manuel et al., supra note 56, at 42-43; SACHS ET AL., supra note 12, at
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distributed among all members of the international community.94
As Pogge and Sengupta assert, “[n]ever in human history has severe
poverty been so easily and completely eradicable as in the present
period.”95
Strong beneficence obligations have a potential to become legal
obligations through their legal recognition, specification of rightholders and duty-bearers, and institutionalization. 96 Individuals
may, therefore, assert claims that sustainable development
commitments be performed by concrete actors on the basis of
international instruments and agreements specifying and assigning
these commitments to concrete actors.97 Arjun Sengupta, the former
Independent Expert on the Right to Development for the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights, pursues a similar logic in
addressing the problem of perfect and imperfect obligations
corresponding to the right to development. He maintains that since
a development program clearly attributes obligations to various
actors—states, intergovernmental organizations, and non-state
actors, including transnational corporations and agencies of global
civil society, and the international community as a whole—the right
to development “becomes a complete right; having all the
justification of a human right with fully identified duties and
obligations.”98
94
See, e.g., THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
COSMOPOLITAN RESPONSIBILITIES AND REFORMS ch. 8 (2nd ed. 2008); POGGE, supra note
14, at 21-24; SACHS ET AL., supra note 12, at 1-2; Oxfam International, Public Good or
Private
Wealth?
60-71
(Briefing
paper,
2019),
https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620599/bppublic-good-or-private-wealth-210119-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JCK-DVBD].
95
Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 86.
96
See BEITZ, supra note 77, at 169; O’NEILL, supra note 76, at 191; Gosepath,
supra note 76, at 285.
97
William Easterly also argues that global actors should be held individually
responsible for their impact on sustainable development, since unallocated shared
responsibilities are not efficient. EASTERLY, supra note 12, at 205.
98
Arjun Sengupta, Fourth Report of the Independent Expert on the Right to
Development, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/WG.18/2, para. 16 (Dec. 20, 2001). Arjun
Sengupta draws a parallel between the right to development and the concept of a
“metaright” formulated by Sen: “A metaright to something x can be defined as the
right to have policies p (x) that genuinely pursue the objective of making the right to
x realizable.” See Amartya Sen, The Right Not to Be Hungry, in THE RIGHT TO FOOD
70 (Philip Alston & Katarina Tomasevski eds., 1984). Following Sen, Sengupta
concludes: “Even if the right to x remains unfulfilled or immediately unrealizable,
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As shown in this Section, obligations corresponding to and
arising from human rights differ significantly from humanitarian
(beneficence) commitments. Though the former call for legal
recognition and implementation, the latter may, only under certain
conditions, enjoy them as well. In this respect, the application of a
human rights-based approach seems to be the most efficient way of
overcoming the criticism of sustainable development commitments
and harmonizing the human rights and sustainable development
agendas. This idea will be defended in the next Section.
C. From Commitments to Obligations: A Human Rights-Based
Approach to Sustainable Development
Alston compares the sustainable development agenda and the
human rights agenda with ships passing in the night unaware of
each other, though they are directed towards similar goals. 99 He
analyzes several interpretations of the relationship between human
rights and development goals: “(i) they are entirely consistent with
one another; (ii) they are potentially complementary; (iii) they are
not necessarily inconsistent; (iv) they are duplicative; or (v) they
actually represent competing alternatives.” 100 From the previous
Section, it is clear that options (i) and (iv) are incorrect as the SDGs
display many differences and inconsistencies with internationally
recognized human rights. The question, then, is, which of the other
three alternatives are valid?
Though human rights and the SDGs are often seen as competing
alternatives (v),101 an adequate understanding of their nature does
the metaright to x, p (x), can be a fully valid right if all the obligations associated
with p (x) can be clearly specified.” Arjun Sengupta, Fourth Report of the Independent
Expert on the Right to Development, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/WG.18/2, para. 16 (Dec.
20, 2001). According to Stephen Marks’ important observation, both perfect and
imperfect human rights obligations should be recognized as legal obligations.
Marks, supra note 75, at 17-21.
99
Alston, supra note 36, at 755, 825.
100
Id. at 759. Though Alston focuses on the links between the MDGs and
human rights, his analysis is also relevant for the 2030 Agenda.
101
To this category of criticism, one can attribute a position which refuses the
SDGs’ potential to realize or advance human rights. See, e.g., Pogge & Sengupta,
supra note 1; Thomas Pogge, The Sustainable Development Goals: Brilliant Propaganda?,
2 ANALELE UNIVERSITĂŢII DIN BUCUREŞTI 25 (2015).
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not provide reasons for this conclusion. This idea was put forward
in a human rights-based approach to development encapsulated in
the 2030 Agenda. The very idea of a human rights-based approach
indicates that (v) is wrong, while (ii) and (iii) remain potentially
correct. According to a human rights-based approach, human rights
and the SDGs are potentially complementary (ii) and the latter
should be brought in accordance with the former by eliminating
unnecessary discrepancies (iii). The 2030 Agenda itself expressed the
intention to synchronize the human rights and sustainable
development agendas:
“we reaffirm our commitment to
international law and emphasize that the Agenda is to be
implemented in a manner that is consistent with the rights and
obligations of States under international law.”102 Alston comes to
the conclusion that the development agenda only partly expresses
internationally recognized human rights and “a clear challenge
exists to ensure that there is full mutual compatibility.”103 In his
compelling opinion, there are ways to create a “human rights
friendly” development strategy within which both agendas can
“reinforce one another” and create “a win-win outcome.”104
Hence, the agendas have ample potential for complementarity,
and sustainable development commitments should be harmonized
with human rights obligations. It should be stressed, however, that
there cannot be complete parity between them. Human rights are
high-priority entitlements giving rise to obligations that “trump” all
other commitments and designate priorities in allocating resources
by duty-bearers.105 Human rights should, therefore, be considered
an essential part of the sustainable development framework and
corresponding human rights obligations should be integrated into
global obligations for sustainable development.
While declaring the application of a human rights-based
approach, the 2030 Agenda stipulates an international commitment
“to realize the human rights of all:” 106 “We envisage a world of
2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 18.
Alston, supra note 36, at 760; Alston, supra note 78, para. 4.
104
Alston, supra note 36, at 766-7; Alston, supra note 78, paras. 4, 24-25.
105
See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977). For a critique of
this position, see Joseph Raz, Professor Dworkin’s Theory of Rights, 26 POL. STUD. 123
(1978); András Sajó, Socioeconomic Rights and the International Economic Order, 35
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 221, 223-24 (2002).
106 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, pmbl.
102
103
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universal respect for human rights and human dignity, the rule of
law, justice, equality and non-discrimination.”107 The 2030 Agenda
stresses the significance of international human rights instruments,
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter
UDHR) and the DRD, and reaffirms obligations derived from the
Charter of the United Nations (hereinafter U.N. Charter).108 It does not,
however, appeal to specific human rights (apart from the human
right to safe drinking water and sanitation) even when it expresses
commitments to guarantee secure access to the objects of these
human rights. 109 The DRD proceeds from the assumption that
development in all its forms and directions presupposes the
realization of fundamental rights: “All States should co-operate
with a view to promoting, encouraging and strengthening universal
respect for and observance of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without any distinction as to race, sex, language or
religion.”110
What, in this context, does the requirement of making the
sustainable development agenda consistent with international
human rights law imply? It entails several important measures:111
Id. para. 8.
Id. paras. 10, 19. Cf. DRD, supra note 21, art. 3, para. 2 (“The realization of
the right to development requires full respect for the principles of international law
concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations.”)
109
See infra Section III.C. Alston asserts that even if sustainable development
instruments “do not address human rights per se, they do address issues that are
in fact the subject of human rights even if discussed in a different terminology.”
Alston, supra note 36, at 796. According to the Danish Institute for Human Rights,
92 % of the SDGs targets are linked to core international human rights instruments.
THE DANISH INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 2030 AGENDA FOR
SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
9,
https://www.humanrights.dk/sites/humanrights.dk/files/media/dokumenter/
udgivelser/sdg/hr_and_2030_agenda-web_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2CNMY6L]; see also THE DANISH INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE HUMAN RIGHTS GUIDE TO
SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
GOALS,
http://sdg.humanrights.dk
THE
[https://perma.cc/L88F-QN2J].
110
DRD, supra note 21, art. 6, para. 1.
111
The listed measures are consonant with the three (ii, i, and iv) “key
elements in a new approach to ensuring effective complementarity between human
rights and the MDGs” delineated by Alston: “(i) overt recognition of the relevance
of human rights obligations; (ii) ensuring an appropriate legal framework; (iii)
encouraging community participation but doing so in a realistic and targeted way;
and (iv) promoting MDG accountability mechanisms.” Alston, supra note 36, at 827.
107
108
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First, the recognition that the human rights framework is a
normative basis for certain global obligations for sustainable
development, the objects of which coincide with the objects of
internationally recognized human rights, including socio-economic
rights. A serious obstacle to synchronizing the human rights and
sustainable development agendas is connected to the fact that it
presumes the recognition of socio-economic rights and
corresponding territorial and extraterritorial obligations in national
legal orders for which some developed states are not ready.112
Second, the acknowledgement that certain sustainable
development commitments are, at the same time, claimable human
rights obligations to which global obligations of certain actors
correspond. This does not mean that sustainable development
commitments should be formulated in the language of human rights
obligations.113 It does, however, mean that sustainable development
commitments should not be in conflict with human rights
obligations in their content and scope, as well as in the urgency of
their implementation. This implies that the SDGs should in no case
be interpreted as a basis for exemption from human rights
obligations.114
Third, the creation of monitoring and accountability
mechanisms or using the existing human rights accountability
mechanisms 115 (with respect to sustainable development
commitments overlapping with human rights obligations) is
necessary for evaluating the progress of the realization of global
obligations for sustainable development and holding global actors
responsible.116

See Sengupta, supra note 98, para. 46.
An opposite position is expressed by Arjun Sengupta: “[f]rom a human
rights perspective the objectives of development are to be regarded as entitlements, or as
rights that can be legitimately claimed by individuals, as right holders, against
corresponding duty holders, such as the State and the international community, which
may have specified obligations to enable those rights to be enjoyed.” Sengupta,
supra note 98, para. 22 (emphasis added).
114 See infra Section III.C.
115
Alston, supra note 36, at 814-25; Alston, supra note 78, pt. 7.
116
See infra Section IV.C. As Arjun Sengupta notes, implementing
development objectives as human rights implies “accountability and, where
possible, the culpability for not realizing those rights clearly established, leading to
the adoption of remedial measures.” Sengupta, supra note 98, para. 22.
112
113
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The right to development is a legal embodiment of a human
rights-based approach to development.117 This right, standing at the
intersection of the sustainable development agenda and the human
rights agenda, carries the potential to reconcile the agendas.
Although it was pronounced in the DRD more than thirty years ago,
the status, content, and scope of the right to development are highly
debatable in legal literature and in practice.118 The DRD stipulates
that the right to development is “an inalienable human right by
virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to
participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and
political development, in which all human rights and fundamental
freedoms can be fully realized.”119 The right to development is both an
individual and collective right. According to the DRD, the right to
development is a claim-right to the creation and implementation of
programs and institutions for the progressive realization of
development goals, which should lead to their full achievement.
The same impulse motivated Arjun Sengupta to define the right to
development as the right to a “process of development.” 120
However, the right to development is also the right to the results of
development. 121 Thus, the DRD calls for ensuring both “the full
exercise and progressive enhancement of the right to development,
including the formulation, adoption and implementation of policy,
legislative and other measures at the national and international
levels.”122
The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action reaffirmed that
the right to development is a “universal and inalienable right and an

117
According to Arjun Sengupta, “the process of realizing the right to
development” should be interpreted “as a method of implementing and designing”
the sustainable development agenda. Sengupta, supra note 98, para. 42.
118
See, e.g., Vandenbogaerde, supra note 10, at 188; Vandenhole, supra note 17,
at 378.
119
DRD, supra note 21, art. 1, para. 1 (emphasis added). The African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights first acknowledged the right to development. African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Organization. of Afr. Unity [OAU], art. 22,
para. 1 (June 27, 1981).
120
See Sengupta (2013), supra note 17, at 68; Sengupta (2000), supra note 17, at
563; see also Vandenbogaerde, supra note 10, at 197-98.
121 See infra Part III.
122
DRD, supra note 21, art. 10 (emphasis added).
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integral part of fundamental human rights.” 123 The Millennium
Declaration defined the enjoyment of the right to development as an
important development target.124 As demonstrated, the 2030 Agenda
also expresses the commitment to respect human rights, including
the right to development.125
The right to development is aimed at converting development
goals “into rights of individuals and identifies the responsibility of
all the duty holders, in accordance with human rights standards.”126
The right to development serves, therefore, as a normative basis for
claimable human rights obligations in the area of sustainable
development. Giving rise to global human rights obligations for
sustainable development—i.e., obligations to create and maintain a
just and sustainable global order,127 obligations to ensure a decent
and sustainable standard of living universally,128 and obligations of
development cooperation 129 and assistance 130 —the right to
development is key for understanding their nature.
To what extent do the human rights-based approach to
development and the right to development as its embodiment
contribute to bringing the sustainable development agenda in line
with the international human rights agenda? As shown, they entail
two interrelated demands: on the one hand, certain sustainable
development commitments, the objects of which coincide with the
objects of international human rights, should be acknowledged as
human rights obligations for sustainable development;131 and on the
other hand, territorial and extraterritorial human rights obligations
123
Vienna Declaration, supra note 2, para. 10; see also G.A. Res. 61/295, United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 23 (Sept. 13, 2007);
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. 1), princ. 3 (Aug.
12, 1992); World Summit for Social Development, Copenhagen Declaration on Social
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.166/9, para. 26, commitments 1, 6 (Mar. 14, 1995).
124
Millennium Declaration, supra note 29, paras. 11-12.
125
2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 35.
126
Sengupta, supra note 98, paras. 8-9.
127 See infra Section III.B.
128 See infra Section III.C.
129 See infra Section IV.A.
130 See infra Section IV.B.
131
The DRD does not specify, however, which monitoring and accountability
mechanisms are necessary for the realization of human rights obligations for
sustainable development. See DRD, supra note 21.
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relating to sustainable development should be integrated into the
contemporary sustainable development agenda.
Moreover,
obligations corresponding to basic human rights, including basic
socio-economic rights, form a minimum core of sustainable
development commitments. In other words, local and global human
rights obligations to combat poverty and ensure a decent standard
of living delineate the lower threshold below which the sustainable
development commitments should not fall.
Whereas the human rights agenda is capable of expressing only
minimum ethical demands,132 the sustainable development agenda
may set goals that go beyond these basic ethical requirements. The
sustainable development agenda should, therefore, include not only
human rights obligations, but also more comprehensive ethical (as
well as economic, social, and political) commitments aimed at “the
constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and
of all individuals.”133 The sustainable development commitments
that transcend human rights obligations represent beneficence
commitments.134 As Amartya Sen notes, sustainable development
should mirror “the richness of human life.”135 Additionally, the idea
of sustainability itself calls for going beyond the brackets of social
relationships and implies principles and commitments ensuring that
“humanity lives in harmony with nature and in which wildlife and
other living species are protected.”136

132
Following proponents of the ethical minimum theory, such as Georg
Jellinek, Eduard von Hartmann, Vladimir Solov’ev, Jacques Maritain, Henry Shue,
David Miller, Charles Beitz, and Joshua Cohen, I develop an idea that human rights
give protection only to minimum ethical demands.
133
DRD, supra note 21, pmbl.
134 As demonstrated in Section II.B, the most urgent human rights obligations
for sustainable development aimed at eradicating poverty and ensuring a decent
standard of living (minimum core obligations for sustainable development) may
also be interpreted as “strong beneficence” obligations.
135
Amartya Sen: A More Human Theory of Development, Interview by Nermeen
Shaikh with Amartya Sen, ASIA SOC’Y (Dec. 6, 2004), https://asiasociety.org/
business/development/amartya-sen-more-human-theory-development
[https://perma.cc/TB7Q-KHHD].
136
2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 9; see also id. SDG 13-15 (demanding to
combat climate change and its impacts, conserve and sustainably use the oceans,
seas and marine resources as well as to “[p]rotect, restore and promote sustainable
use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification,
and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss”).
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Since some commitments undertaken in the 2030 Agenda are
substantially narrower than basic socio-economic rights
obligations, 137 this creates a task to further evolve the sustainable
development agenda. The achievement of this task may be
facilitated through the successful implementation of the 2030
Agenda, particularly the SDGs relating to poverty and extreme
inequality eradication and securing access to a decent standard of
living, which overlap with basic human rights obligations.
It is important to point out some essential virtues of the
sustainable development agenda, through which it can enrich the
human rights agenda. First, it is legitimized through a more
inclusive political consensus, involving not only states but also nonstate actors, in particular representatives of global civil society.138
Second, the key principle of the sustainable development agenda—
sustainability—allows for a rethink of the content and scope of
human rights obligations.
Arjun Sengupta emphasizes the
significance of sustainability measures for the human rights agenda:
“a better way of using the existing resources, i.e., more efficiently
and less wastefully, may have a much greater impact on realizing
the rights than increasing the supply of resources.” 139 Moreover,
sustainability is recognized as an important element of the criterion
of adequacy, which is used to assess socio-economic rights.140 Third,
the SDGs’ indicators allow the progressive realization of global
obligations for sustainable development to be monitored and may
complement the human rights agenda, in which these firm
benchmarks are lacking. 141 Fourth, comprehensive sustainable
development commitments based on solidarity should supply
sharply determined and narrower human rights-based obligations.
Fifth, while recognizing individuals as central subjects, major
participants and beneficiaries of development, the sustainable
development agenda may play a crucial role in promoting the shift
from a state-centered to human-centered global order and the
See infra Sections III.B-III.C.
See supra Section II.A.
139
Arjun Sengupta, On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development, 24
HUM. RTS. Q. 837, 866 (2002).
140
See infra Section III.C.
141
See infra Section IV.C. As Alston notes, development goals are designed in
such a way that their progressive realization is to be measured and should provide
a basis for accountability. Alston, supra note 36, at 756.
137
138
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rooting of this idea in contemporary international law. 142 Sixth,
taking commitments towards the natural world and other species
seriously, should lead to reconceptualizing obligations towards
human beings, as well as the practices of their implementation.
Finally, the sustainable development agenda calls for designing
alternative modes of global governance capable of overcoming statecentrism in the world institutional order.143
In view of their significant potential to enrich one another and
further the achievement of their common goal to fight poverty, the
sustainable development agenda and human rights agenda should
be brought into sync. This implies the recognition of global
obligations corresponding to basic socio-economic rights as
minimum core obligations for sustainable development.
D. Summary
The second part of this Article analyzed relations between the
human rights agenda and the sustainable development agenda and
argued that they should be brought into harmony. Focusing on the
evolution of the sustainable development agenda from the
Millennium Declaration to the 2030 Agenda, Section II.A noted its
significant achievements as well as the urgent necessity of filling its
substantial gaps. Section II.B further explored the similarities and
differences, the strengths and weaknesses, of human right
obligations and sustainable development commitments. Section
II.C examined special features of the human rights-based approach
to development and the right to development as its embodiment, as
well as their role in harmonizing international human rights law and
the sustainable development agenda. It defended the idea that
global obligations corresponding to socio-economic rights
indispensable for leading a decent life should be recognized as
minimum core obligations for sustainable development.

142
143

See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.C.
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III. GLOBAL OBLIGATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
A. Extraterritorial Obligations Presupposed by the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development
Extraterritorial obligations are neither horizontal obligations of
equal (non-subordinate to one another) actors such as states,
intergovernmental organizations, and non-state entities, nor vertical
obligations towards actors at different levels of a hierarchy, such as
governments and citizens, or an organization’s or enterprise’s
governing bodies and its ordinary members or employees. Rather,
extraterritorial obligations are diagonal obligations of global actors
towards individuals.144
In legal literature and practice, the major criterion for
distinguishing among various types of extraterritorial obligations is
the possibility of identifying a causal link between acts/omissions
of actors and human rights violations. On this basis, it is possible to
classify remedial responsibilities for negative effects on the
enjoyment of socio-economic rights (hereinafter remedial
extraterritorial obligations) and global human rights obligations
(hereinafter global obligations) arising when socio-economic
deprivations, which amount to human rights violations, cannot be
attributed to any particular global actors or institutions.145
To what extent are extraterritorial obligations presupposed by
the 2030 Agenda? First, the 2030 Agenda does not provide a
framework for remedial extraterritorial obligations. The DRD
enshrines obligations of states to “eliminate obstacles to
144
See Elena Pribytkova, What Global Human Rights Obligations Do We Have?,
20 CHI. J. INT’L L. 384, 407-412 (2020).
145
In this respect, the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of
States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [hereinafter Maastricht
Principles] distinguish between two types of extraterritorial obligations: first,
“obligations relating to the acts and omissions of a State, within or beyond its
territory, that have effects on the enjoyment of human rights outside of that State’s
territory”; and, second, “obligations of a global character that are set out in the
Charter of the United Nations and human rights instruments to take action,
separately, and jointly through international cooperation, to realize human rights
universally.” ETO CONSORTIUM, MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES ON EXTRATERRITORIAL
OBLIGATIONS OF STATES IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
princ. 8 (Jan. 2013).
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development resulting from failure to observe civil and political
rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights,”146 especially
“the massive and flagrant” human right violations “resulting from
apartheid, all forms of racism and racial discrimination, colonialism,
foreign domination and occupation, aggression, foreign interference
and threats against national sovereignty, national unity and
territorial integrity, threats of war and refusal to recognize the
fundamental right of peoples to self-determination.” 147 The 2030
Agenda reaffirms states’ commitments “to remove the obstacles to
the full realization of the right of self-determination of peoples living
under colonial and foreign occupation, which continue to adversely
affect their economic and social development as well as their
environment.”148
Thus, both documents recognize the injustice of the global order
and the role of developed states and other powerful actors in
creating and maintaining it, as well as obligations to remove
obstacles for development. The DRD and the 2030 Agenda, however,
do not address the issue of remedial extraterritorial obligations of
responsible actors to compensate the victims for the harm149 caused
by them or international institutions under their control. 150 This
explains why, in the SDGs, the language of assistance prevails over
the language of compensation for severe extraterritorial human
rights violations caused by global actors.151
DRD, supra note 21, art. 6, para. 3.
Id. art. 5; see also Economic and Social Council, Study on the Current State
of Progress in the Implementation of the Right to Development Submitted by Mr.
Arjun K. Sengupta, Independent Expert, Pursuant to Commission Resolution
1998/72
and
General
Assembly
Resolution
53/155,
U.N.
Doc.
E/CN.4/1999/WG.18/2, para. 59 (July 27, 1999) [hereinafter Study on the Current
State of Progress in the Implementation of the Right to Development] (stressing
extraterritorial aspects of obligations corresponding to the right to development:
“every State having recognized the right to development is obliged to ensure that
its policies and actions do not impede enjoyment of that right in other countries and
to take positive action to help the citizens of other States to realize that right”).
148 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 35.
149
For a discussion of the difficulties of holding actors accountable for their
non-fulfilment of human rights obligations for sustainable development and
applying adequate corrective measures, see Sengupta, supra note 98, at para. 31.
150
See also Malcolm Langford, Lost in Transformation? The Politics of the
Sustainable Development Goals, 30 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 167, 172 (2016).
151 For an analysis of the inadmissibility of substituting remedial
responsibilities with duties to assist, see Pribytkova, supra note 3, at 258-67.
146
147
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Second, global obligations derived from the 2030 Agenda are
aimed not at transforming the unfair international order, but rather
at undertaking national reforms. As shown above in Section II.A,
the 2030 Agenda purports to embody the principle of universality,
i.e., the SDGs extend to individuals in both developing and
developed societies. For this reason, SDG 17 calls for the
revitalization of the “Global Partnership for Sustainable
Development, based on a spirit of strengthened global solidarity,
focused in particular on the needs of the poorest and most
vulnerable and with the participation of all countries, all
stakeholders and all people.” 152 In addition, Target 16.6 is to
“develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all
levels.”153
However, the 2030 Agenda does not succeed in embodying the
principle of the universality of sustainable development
commitments, since it focuses principally on supporting national
development plans, not on creating a global institutional
framework. In this sense, the SDGs represent a global agenda for
territorial sustainable development. They require, in particular, the
“[e]nhance[ment of] international support for implementing
effective and targeted capacity-building in developing countries to
support national plans to implement all the Sustainable
Development Goals, including through North-South, South-South
and triangular cooperation.”154 In this context, Malcolm Langford’s
assertion that the SDGs embody “a form of institutional
cosmopolitanism” is premature.155 Although the 2030 Agenda has
the potential to promote a cosmopolitan global order, necessary
institutional guarantees have not yet been expressed in the current
sustainable development plan. This lacuna may be filled, in
particular, through the inclusion of targets and indicators specifying

2030 Agenda, supra note 4, pmbl.
Id. SDG 16.6.
154 Id. SDG 17.9.
155
Langford, supra note 150, at 172. Langford also finds that “the universal
targets across the SDGs are often vague”, while “[t]he goals are weak on global
partnership and the corresponding targets are rarely quantified”. Id. at 173.
152
153
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shared and individual obligations of members of the international
community concerning global institutional reforms.156
Thus, the 2030 Agenda, on the one hand, recognizes the injustice
of the global institutional scheme and, on the other hand,
concentrates predominantly on states’ territorial obligations and
does not specify which particular global improvements are
necessary to ensure sustainable development universally. This
contradiction reflects the lack of states’ consensus on questions
concerning the causes of poverty and extreme inequality, which
represent obstacles for sustainable development. These questions
are at the center of ethical, legal and political debates, in which the
Global North and the Global South hold divergent positions. 157
These debates over the causes of poverty and inequality between the
North and the South are cognate with philosophical discussions
between statists (nationalists) 158 and cosmopolitans 159 on the
topic. 160
Developed North countries, the Bretton Woods

156
See Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 86-87. Unlike Pogge and Sengupta,
I consider that these global institutional obligations for sustainable development
are not only of a remedial character and should be allocated not only to developed
states, but to all global actors.
157
It is worth noting that the division between the Global North and the
Global South is rather relative. One often distinguishes a third group of so called
“emerging economies”. In addition, some North representatives, for instance, the
Scandinavian states, explicitly took the side of Global South countries during the
debates. For an analysis of the North-South debates, see SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra
note 13, at 12-16, 35.
158
See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR: NATIONALISM,
MULTICULTURALISM, AND CITIZENSHIP (2001); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE:
A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND THIN:
MORAL ARGUMENT AT HOME AND ABROAD (1994); Robert E. Goodin, What Is So
Special About Our Fellow Countrymen? 98 ETHICS 663 (1988); Thomas Nagel, The
Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113 (2005).
159
See, e.g., SIMON CANEY, JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS: A GLOBAL POLITICAL
THEORY (2005); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY,
NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2006); POGGE, supra note 94; KOK-CHOR TAN,
JUSTICE WITHOUT BORDERS: COSMOPOLITANISM, NATIONALISM, AND PATRIOTISM (2004);
PETER UNGER, LIVING HIGH AND LETTING DIE: OUR ILLUSION OF INNOCENCE (1996);
Richard Arneson, What do we Owe to Distant Needy Strangers?, in PETER SINGER
UNDER FIRE: THE MORAL ICONOCLAST FACES HIS CRITICS (Jefferey Schaler ed., 2009);
Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229 (1972).
160
See Pribytkova, supra note 3, at 248-253.
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institutions, 161 and some Western NGOs are quick to blame poor
countries’
domestic
institutional
shortcomings—such
as
undemocratic regimes, corruption, the lack of human rights
guarantees, and distortions of the free market—for the persistence
of severe socio-economic deprivations. Countries of the Global
South, in contrast, point to injustices of the global order—the
exclusion of developing societies from international decisionmaking, norm-setting and institution-designing, the lack of
transparency of global governance, extreme relational and
distributive inequalities among nations, as well as the unfairness of
the international financial and trade systems—as driving causes of
world poverty.162 Ironically, the same actors from the North that
insist on good domestic governance do not give equal weight to
improvements in global governance. At the same time, the Global
South countries, struggling for their voice to be heard and taken
seriously in the international arena, often do not consider it
necessary to guarantee this right to their own people within their
territory.
I argue that the origins of poverty do not by themselves
determine the existence or absence of global obligations to eradicate
it and to assist poor individuals and societies in the realization of
their basic socio-economic rights. 163 Understanding the causes of
poverty is, however, important for determining what efforts should
be undertaken for its elimination. Each end of the ideological
spectrum identifies a truth concerning anti-poverty measures: both
domestic and international institutional reforms are necessary for
161
The Bretton Woods institutions represent predominantly the developed
North states, while the U.N. puts forward the interests of the Global South. The
OECD “donor club” states are, at the same time, the most authoritative members of
the World Bank, that traditionally grants privileges to the richest states. The socalled “Group of 77” (G-77), which currently includes 135 developing countries, is
a powerful South voting bloc within the U.N. See SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13,
at 35.
162
Fukuda-Parr classifies three types of international obstacles which are
“beyond the reach of national action”: resource constraints, international policies,
and “systemic asymmetry in global governance”. Fukuda-Parr, supra note 18, at
976-78; Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, A Right to Development Critique of Millennium
Development Goal 8, in UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER, REALIZING THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT 201, 206 (2013),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/Pages/RTDBook.aspx
[https://perma.cc/XM7J-DPWC]; see also SALOMON, supra note 10, at 99.
163
See Pribytkova, supra note 3, at 250.
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the implementation of the sustainable development agenda and the
eradication of global poverty. From both standpoints, the tools
proffered by the 2030 Agenda for overcoming territorial obstacles to
sustainable development and to the realization of socio-economic
rights are grossly inadequate.
Based on the classification of global human rights obligations
suggested in my article, What Global Human Rights Obligations Do We
Have?, we can identify three relevant pairs of global obligations for
sustainable development:164 first, institutional obligations that apply
to the organization of global order and interactional obligations that
determine the conduct of global actors towards individuals; 165
second, obligations of result concentrated on the achievements and
outcomes of global actors’ activities (obligations to create a just and
sustainable global order and obligations to ensure a decent and
sustainable standard of living universally) and obligations of conduct
relating to global actors’ efforts to achieve the SDGs (obligations of
global development cooperation and assistance); and, third,
obligations of relational justice that require treating and regarding
individuals and societies as equals, that is, with equal concern and
respect, and as full-fledged partners for sustainable development,
and obligations of distributive justice that call for a fair allocation of
social goods and resources necessary for sustainable development
as well as benefits resulting from it.
All of the three pairs of global obligations are to some extent
envisioned by the 2030 Agenda. They will be addressed in the next
Sections. This part will concentrate on global obligations of result,
including relational and distributive institutional obligations to
create and maintain a just and sustainable global order (Section III.B)
and obligations to secure a decent and sustainable standard of living
universally (Section III.C). The fourth part will address global
obligations of conduct, including obligations to cooperate for
sustainable development (Section IV.A) and obligations of
development assistance (Section IV.B). These Sections will consider
in more detail, first, to what degree these global obligations for
See Pribytkova, supra note 144, at 384.
According to the Human Development Report 2000, human rights have
both interactional and institutional aspects, that is, they are “claims on the
behaviour of individual and collective agents, and on the design of social
arrangements.” UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 2000, at 25 (2000).
164
165
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sustainable development are incorporated in the 2030 Agenda, and,
second, what potential the contemporary sustainable development
agenda and human rights agenda have to solve current problems
and fill existing gaps concerning global obligations.
B. Obligations to Create and Maintain a Just and Sustainable Global
Order
A normative basis for the right to a just global order is Art. 28 of
the UDHR that recognizes a fundamental entitlement of an
individual “to a social and international order in which the rights
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”166
The DRD reaffirms the UDHR entitlement to a social and
international order in which human rights are fulfilled. It stresses
shared institutional obligations for sustainable development and
demands that “efforts at the international level to promote and
protect human rights should be accompanied by efforts to establish
a new international economic order.” 167 The idea of a new
international economic order (NIEO) advocated by the states of the
Global South was designed to empower poor countries and promote
relational justice between them and the countries of the Global
North.168 The DRD demands that “States should realize their rights
and fulfil their duties in such a manner as to promote a new
international economic order based on sovereign equality,
interdependence, mutual interest and co-operation among all States,

166
Following the UDHR, the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of
Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms acknowledges “the right of everyone to a
social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights instruments can be
fully realized.” G.A. Res. 53/144, Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of
Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote Universally Recognized
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 18, para. 3 (Dec. 9, 1998)
[hereinafter Declaration on the Right and Responsibility].
167
DRD, supra note 21, pmbl.
168
See G.A. Res. 3201(S-VI), Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order (May 1, 1974). On institutional obligations relating
to equitable global institutional structure, see ANDREASSEN & MARKS, supra note 17;
SALOMON, supra note 10, at 14, 64.
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as well as to encourage the observance and realization of human
rights.”169
As demonstrated above in Section II.C, the right to development
embodies a human rights-based approach to development and
serves as a normative foundation for human rights obligations for
sustainable development. The High-Level Task Force on the
Implementation of the Right to Development (HLTF) has defined
the right to development as “the right of peoples and individuals to
the constant improvement of their well-being and to a national and global
enabling environment conducive to just, equitable, participatory and
human-centered development respectful of all human rights.”170 In this
interpretation, the content of the right to development has clear
connotations of two human rights: the right to “the continuous
improvement of living conditions” and the right to a just global
order. 171 Although, in the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter the ICESCR), the right to “the
continuous improvement of living conditions” is attached to the
right to an adequate standard of living,172 the DRD does not enshrine
the latter.173 An institutional aspect of the right to development is
the entitlement to a global enabling environment indispensable for
sustainable development and human rights realization.174 The 2030
Agenda recognizes commitments to create “an enabling environment
for sustainable development at all levels and by all actors.” 175 In
particular, it requires “national development efforts . . . to be
supported by an enabling international economic environment,
169
DRD, supra note 21, art. 3, para. 3 (emphasis added); see also Vienna
Declaration, supra note 2, para. 10 (reaffirming that the implementation of the right
to development demands “equitable economic relations and a favourable economic
environment at the international level.”)
170 Human Rights Council, Right to Development: Report of the High-Level
Task Force on the Implementation of the Right to Development on its Sixth Session,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/WG.2/TF/2/Add.2, annex at 8 (Mar. 8, 2010) [hereinafter
Right to Development] (emphasis added).
171 See G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, art. 11, para. 1 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR]; G.A. Res. 217
(III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 28 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter
UDHR].
172
ICESCR, supra note 171, art. 11, para. 1.
173 See infra Section III.C.
174
Right to Development, supra note 170, annex at 8.
175 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 63.
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including coherent and mutually supporting world trade, monetary
and financial systems, and strengthened and enhanced global
economic governance.”176
How do the right to a just global order and the institutional side
of the right to development—the right to a global enabling
environment necessary for sustainable development “respectful of
all human rights”177—interrelate? Are these rights identical, as some
researchers claim?
Arne Vandenbogaerde reduces the right to development to its
institutional aspect and maintains that the right coincides
completely with the right to a just global order. 178 This position
overlooks two important aspects: first, as shown, the right to
development also embraces an interactional entitlement to the
constant improvement of well-being; and second, the particularities
and “added value” of the right to development are determined by
the concept of sustainability.179 Based on the discussion in Section
II.C, the guarantees of a just global order, in which human rights are
realized, represent a minimum fundamental requirement for a
sustainable global environment, or order. 180 A global enabling
environment for sustainable development should not only be just
and “respectful of all human rights,” but also ensure equitable,
participatory and human-centered sustainable development. 181
And, as shown in Section II.A, sustainable development implies that
the enjoyment of the right to a just global order by the present
generation does not compromise the ability of future generations to
enjoy this right. The principle of sustainability requires changing
patterns of consumption that promotes not only economic
2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 63.
Right to Development, supra note 170, annex at 8.
178
On this basis, Arne Vandenbogaerde argues that the right to development
is “doing a disservice to other human rights,” in the first instance, to socio-economic
rights. Vandenbogaerde, supra note 10, at 187, 209.
179 See supra Section II.C.
180
The concepts of “global enabling environment” and “global order” are
used synonymously in this Article. For development of the conception of “human
rights ecosystem,” see César Rodríguez-Garavito, Business and Human Rights:
Beyond the End of the Beginning, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BEYOND THE END OF
THE BEGINNING 11, 12 (César Rodríguez-Garavito ed., 2017), and César RodríguezGaravito, The Future of Human Rights: From Gatekeeping to Symbiosis, 11 SUR—INT’L
J. ON HUM. RTS. 499, 505-506 (2014).
181
Right to Development, supra note 170, annex at 8.
176
177
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development, but also the realization of human rights. Therefore,
the right to development substantially enriches the content and
scope of the right to a just global order, challenging the view that the
former simply duplicates the latter. In this respect, in representing
an institutional aspect of the right to development, the right to a just
and sustainable global order lies at the intersection of the human
rights agenda and the sustainable development agenda, embodies
their characteristics, and calls for the realization of corresponding
human rights obligations and sustainable development
commitments.
An analysis of global obligations corresponding to the right to a
just and sustainable global order should take into account key
distinctions between global obligations of relational justice that require
treating and regarding individuals as equals, that is, with equal
concern and respect regardless of their place of origin, citizenship,
or social status, and obligations of distributive justice that call for a fair
allocation of certain social goods or resources indispensable for
leading a decent life.
I argue that global obligations of relational justice imply two
important guarantees to enable individuals to enjoy equal status and
to act as full-fledged actors in the global domain, i.e., to take part in
creating and maintaining a just global order. The first guarantee is
for the correction of the asymmetries in global decision-making
processes through ensuring developing states’ inclusion as
independent and equal members of the international community,
and for respect of the interests and fulfillment of the human rights
of people they are representing.182 The second is the recognition of
individuals as subjects of extraterritorial relations and promotion of
their ability to claim the realization of their human rights directly or
through their networks and representatives. Individuals should
enjoy access to information about and participation in all decisionmaking processes concerning their human rights, including
182
These requirements were embodied in the norm that states designing
global poverty reduction programs should “ensure that all bilateral and
multilateral decision-making processes are fair, equitable and transparent, and
sensitive to the needs of developing States, especially their disadvantaged and
marginalized individuals and groups, including the poor.” Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Principles and Guidelines for a
Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/06/12,
para. 104(c) (2006).
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participation in ex ante and ex post human rights impact assessments
and human rights due diligence, as well as direct access to effective
and affordable remedies.
Along with relational justice guarantees, obligations to create
and maintain a just global order presuppose certain distributive
arrangements. I showed elsewhere that global distributive justice
does not require an equal distribution of resources, wealth, or
income, whether among states or individuals. It rather demands
ensuring universal access to a decent standard of living.183 Multiple
actors (states, non-state entities, intergovernmental organizations,
and individuals) share global human rights obligations to create an
institutional system necessary for the enjoyment of all components
of the composite human right to an adequate standard of living
universally. In particular, it implies elaborating an international
normative framework and institutions indispensable for enabling a
decent life, including mechanisms for mobilizing resources and
providing development assistance to those in poverty.184
Creating and maintaining a just and sustainable global order
that satisfies the minimum demands of relational and distributive
justice is an important tool for poverty eradication as well as for
achieving the other SDGs.
These two aspects of the right to a just and sustainable global
order—relational and distributive 185 —are central to debates
between the Global North and the Global South. If representatives
of the Global North argue that poverty eradication requires
liberalizing and democratizing governance at the national level, the
Global South sees the solution in reducing local and global
inequality and ensuring a fair distribution of basic social goods.
These arguments of the North’s and South’s development debates
are in accord with their positions in human rights disputes, in
particular concerning the right to development.186 As shown above
in Section III.A, if the Global South suggests a distributive justice
agenda at both the local and global levels, the Global North argues
See Pribytkova, supra note 144, at 445-448.
See infra Section III.C.
185
As Tan notes, “while the demands of political justice are directed primarily
at nonliberal countries, the demands of economic justice are directed primarily at
liberal countries.” TAN, supra note 159, at 8.
186
See Vandenbogaerde, supra note 10, at 189-90.
183
184

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

1076

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:4

mainly for improving domestic governance and does not welcome
guarantees of relational justice in the international domain.187 On
the contrary, some leading developed states make every effort to
preserve their domination in the global institutional system from
which they disproportionally benefit. 188 In this sense, the
democratization of governance should begin with the retraction of
the developed states’ domination of the global order.
A broad ideological conflict between the Global North and the
Global South reinforces their longstanding reluctance to take greater
programmatic steps towards each other:
the demands for
distributive justice are considered to promote socialist values of
equality, while the calls for democratic governance are often seen as
an appeal to neoliberal imperialism. 189 A long struggle for
consensus gave the appearance of successful compromise in the
recognition of poverty reduction as a common denominator and a
fundamental goal. Poverty reduction was suitable for the role of the
common objective for the human rights and sustainable
development agendas because it did not jeopardize the core
interests of either the Global North or South. 190 However, the
compromise between the two political camps, sealed by the MDGs,
intended to reduce neither relational nor distributive injustice. The
MDGs were not aimed at fighting the causes of poverty, but only its
visible symptoms. 191 Since reducing poverty requires structural
institutional changes in the spheres of both relational and
distributive justice at the global and local levels, the MDGs did not
achieve, in substance, their primary goals.

187
While the West “prioritize[s] political inclusiveness and the removal of
discrimination at the domestic level,” the Rest consolidated by the G-77 advocates for
relational justice at the international level, especially for fair trade and developing
countries’ full-fledged representation in international financial institutions.
Langford, supra note 150, at 171; see also SALOMON, supra note 10, at 99.
188
See, e.g., POGGE, supra note 14, at 20-24; POGGE, supra note 94, at 118-22; TAN,
supra note 159, at 25-26.
189
See SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 18-9; Langford, supra note 150, at 171;
Vandenbogaerde, supra note 10, at 189-90.
190
In Seyedsayamdost’s opinion, the focus on poverty succeeded because it
was legitimized by powerful North states that are also the most influential members
of the OECD and the World Bank. SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 60; see also
MOYN, supra note 74.
191
POGGE, supra note 14, at ch. 3; SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 161.
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Does international development law provide for relational and
distributive guarantees of a just and sustainable order? The
preamble to the DRD emphasizes relational and distributive aspects
of development, and demonstrates that development is aimed “at
the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population
and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful
participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits
resulting therefrom.” 192 Arjun Sengupta rightly notes that “equity
and justice are primary determinants of development and the whole
structure of development is shaped by these determinants.”193 He
also shows that the sustainable development agenda envisages
relational and distributive justice guarantees. According to him, the
empowerment of developing states in international economic
relations with developed countries was one of the fundamental
motives to recognize the right to development as a human right.
Partnership relations between the North and South should
guarantee developing states’ equitable treatment and participation
in decision-making as well as their secure access to the benefits of
the development process.194 The HLTF is also sensitive to relational
and distributive aspirations of the right to development,
incorporating the three main attributes of the right:
“[c]omprehensive and human-centered development policy,”
“[p]articipatory human rights processes,” and “[s]ocial justice in
development.”195
To what extent does the 2030 Agenda acknowledge global
relational and distributive obligations as tools for creating and
maintaining a just and sustainable global order? SDG 16 mandates
the development of “effective, accountable and transparent
institutions” 196 and “responsive, inclusive, participatory and
representative decision-making at all levels” 197 as well as the
broadening and strengthening of “the participation of developing

DRD, supra note 21, pmbl. (emphasis added).
Study on the Current State of Progress in the Implementation of the Right
to Development, supra note 147, para. 53.
194
Sengupta, supra note 98, para. 45.
195 Right to Development, supra note 170, annex at 8-15.
196 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 16.6.
197 Id. SDG 16.7.
192
193
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countries in the institutions of global governance.”198 An important
innovation of the 2030 Agenda was the recognition of equality, not
only as a means, but also as a separate goal of sustainable
development. SDG 10 requires reducing relational inequality within
and among countries and ensuring an “enhanced representation
and voice for developing countries in decision-making in global
international economic and financial institutions in order to deliver
more effective, credible, accountable and legitimate institutions.”199
SDG 10 has been reasonably criticized for not requiring systemic
global institutional transformations to achieve this goal.200
The 2030 Agenda also calls for relational justice guarantees to
empower developing states in the global economic order, i.e.,
“broadening and strengthening the voice and participation of
developing countries—including African countries, least developed
countries, landlocked developing countries, small island developing
States and middle-income countries—in international economic
decision-making, norm-setting and global economic governance.”201
SDG 17 has substantially extended the scope of MDG 8 under the
banner of revitalizing the global partnership for sustainable
development. In particular, the former contains the commitment to
ensure a fair-trade global order, that is, to “[p]romote a universal,
rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral
trading system under the World Trade Organization, including
through the conclusion of negotiations under its Doha Development
Agenda.”202
Despite the substantial importance of the 2030 Agenda’s
relational justice commitments to correct the asymmetries in global
decision-making processes by ensuring developing states’
meaningful participation, they remain fragmentary and do not
Id. SDG 16.8.
Id. SDG 10.6. SDG 10 also demands for local domestic institutional
arrangements to empower the most disadvantaged and marginalized individuals
and “promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all.” Id. SDG 10.2.
200
Thomas Pogge and Mitu Sengupta argue that the “SDGs fail to reflect on
the root causes of the huge and persistent poverty-related human rights deficit and
they consequently ignore the structural reforms we urgently need to make national
and supranational institutional arrangements less skewed toward the interests of a
tiny global power elite.” Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 94. For an additional
critique, see Deacon, supra note 13.
201 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 44.
202 Id. SDG 17.10.
198
199
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presuppose any serious reforms of a global institutional order. This
gives ground for Thomas Pogge and Mitu Sengupta to compare the
SDGs with “a smokescreen for extreme global inequalities.”203
In addition, the 2030 Agenda contains several commitments of
global distributive justice relating to poverty and extreme inequality
eradication as well as to guarantees of a decent standard of living.
It is aimed at the fulfillment of the U.N.’s fundamental task to ensure
that poor individuals and societies are not excluded from the
beneficiaries of globalization: “[t]he central challenge we face today
is to ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for all the
world’s people, instead of leaving billions of them behind in
squalor.” 204 Thomas Pogge and Mitu Sengupta emphasize the
important correlation between poverty and distributive inequality:
increasing inequality has deprived the global poor of the
opportunity to benefit from general economic growth. Since income
and wealth inequalities have risen, the global poor have been denied
potential significant dividends of economic growth.205
The right to development entitles individuals and societies to an
equal access to basic resources and a fair distribution of benefits
resulting from development.206 SDG 17 embodies requirements of
institutional improvements in the area of global trade:
to
“significantly increase the exports of developing countries, in
Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 90, 93-4.
U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of United Nations in the
21st Century 6 (2000),
https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/We_The_Peoples.pdf
[https://perma.cc/465Y-F3N3] [hereinafter We the Peoples].
205
The poor’s share in global income amounts to only about 2%. See Pogge &
Sengupta, supra note 1, at 85-86, 94. On the relationship between poverty and
inequality, see also Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme
poverty and human rights, Philip Alston, Twenty-Ninth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/29/31 (2015). For an analysis of SDGs’ potential to reduce inequality, see
Michael W. Doyle & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Eliminating Extreme Inequality: A Sustainable
Development Goal, 2015-2030, 28 ETHICS INT. AFF. 5 (2014); Inga T. Winkler &
Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Leaving No One Behind? Persistent Inequalities in the SDGs,
Special Issue: The Sustainable Development Goals and Human Rights: A Critical Early
Review, 21 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1073 (2017); Ignacio Saiz & Kate Donald, Tackling
Inequality through the Sustainable Development Goals: Human Rights in Practice, 21
INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1029 (2017); Gillian MacNaughton, Vertical Inequalities: Are the
SDGs and Human Rights up to the Challenges?, 21 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1050 (2017); PETER
A.G. VAN BERGEIJK & ROLPH VAN DER HOEVEN, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
AND INCOME INEQUALITY (2017).
206
DRD, supra note 21, arts. 2, 8.
203
204
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particular with a view to doubling the least developed countries’
share of global exports by 2020”;207 and to provide a “duty-free and
quota-free market access on a lasting basis for all least developed
countries.”208
In addition, the 2030 Agenda incorporates requirements to, first,
“create sound policy frameworks at the national, regional and
international levels, based on pro-poor and gender-sensitive
development strategies, to support accelerated investment in
poverty eradication actions”; 209 and second, “ensure significant
mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, including
through enhanced development cooperation, in order to provide
adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in
particular least developed countries, to implement programmes and
policies to end poverty in all its dimensions.”210
As shown, apart from obligations of relational justice, the 2030
Agenda presupposes obligations of distributive justice aimed at
alleviating extreme distributive inequality (see above) as well as at
ensuring a decent and sustainable standard of living universally.
The latter obligations are analyzed in further detail in the next
Section.
C. Obligations to Ensure a Decent and Sustainable Standard of Living
Universally
The internationally recognized right to an adequate standard of
living is aimed at protecting individuals from extreme poverty,
enabling them to lead a decent life, ensuring their involvement in
society and access to shared material and intellectual values, and, in
the final analysis, providing the opportunity for their moral and
intellectual flourishing. 211 The human right to an adequate, or
2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 17.11.
Id. SDG 17.12.
209 Id. SDG 1, 1.b.
210 Id. SDG 1, 1.a.
211
For more details, see Elena Pribytkova, The Human Right to a Dignified
Existence: The Ethical Foundations of the Contemporary Legal Order, in 137 ARCHIV FÜR
RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE, HUMAN DIGNITY AS A FOUNDATION OF LAW 117
(Winfred Brugger & Stephan Kirste eds., 2013).
207
208
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decent, standard of living,212 is embedded in the International Bill of
Human Rights. The UDHR acknowledges that “everyone has the
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being
of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and
medical care and necessary social services.” 213 The ICESCR
reaffirmed both “the right of everyone to an adequate standard of
living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing
and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living
conditions” and the corresponding states’ obligation to “take
appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing
to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation
based on free consent.”214 The ICESCR also enshrines “the right of
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health.”215 Various components of the right to
a decent standard of living are also anchored in the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (hereinafter CRC), the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (hereinafter CRPD), and the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (hereinafter
CEDAW).216

212
The right to an adequate standard of living and the right to a decent
standard of living are interpreted as synonyms.
213
UDHR, supra note 171, art. 25, para. 1.
214
ICESCR, supra note 171, art. 11, para. 1. The ICESCR places emphasis on
the necessity to cooperate internationally for the realization of “the fundamental
right of everyone to be free from hunger” as the core element of the right to an
adequate food. In particular, it requires to “ensure an equitable distribution of
world food supplies in relation to need.” Id. art. 11, para. 2.
215 Id. art. 12, para. 1.
216
See supra notes 217-25. The right to a decent standard of living and its
components are also recognized in regional human rights systems. See Council of
Europe, European Social Charter, ETS 163, arts. 4, 13 (May 3, 1996); European Union,
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012/C 326/02, art. 34 (Oct. 26,
2012); Organization of American States, Additional Protocol to the American
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, arts.
6-7, 9, 12, 15 (Nov. 16, 1999).
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The core components of the composite right to a decent standard
of living embrace the right to adequate food, 217 water, 218
sanitation,219 housing,220 clothing,221 and health.222 Additionally, the
right to a decent standard of living is often considered to include the
following supplementary elements: the rights to transportation,
energy, and communications technology 223 as well as the right to
social services 224 and the right to the continuous improvement of
living conditions.225
It is important to note that international law initially proceeded
from the premise that the right to a decent standard of living should
be realized not only locally but also globally, and that not only the
state, but the international community as a whole, bears obligations
corresponding to the right.226
In the same vein, the 2030 Agenda stipulates that “a world free of
poverty, hunger, disease and want, where all life can thrive” is a
primary goal of the contemporary globalized world.227 It states a
commitment not only “to end poverty and hunger, in all their forms
217
UDHR, supra note 171, art. 25, para. 1; ICESCR, supra note 171, art. 11, para
1; G.A. Res. 44/25, Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 27, para. 3 (Nov. 20,
1989) [hereinafter CRC]; G.A. Res. 61/106, Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, art. 28, para. 1 (Jan 24, 2007) [hereinafter CRPD].
218
CRPD, supra note 217, art. 28, para. 2; G.A. Res. 34/180, Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art. 14, para. 2 (Dec.
18, 1979) [hereinafter CEDAW].
219
CEDAW, supra note 218, art. 14, para 2.
220
UDHR, supra note 171, art. 25, para. 1; ICESCR, supra note 171, art. 11, para
1; CRC, supra note 217, art. 27, para 3; CRPD, supra note 217, art. 28, para 1; CEDAW,
supra note 218, art. 14, para 2.
221
UDHR, supra note 171, art. 25, para. 1; ICESCR, supra note 171, art. 11, para
1; CRC, supra note 217, art. 27, para 3; CRPD, supra note 217, art. 28, para 1.
222
UDHR, supra note 171, art. 25, para. 1; ICESCR, supra note 171, art. 12, para.
1; CRC, supra note 217, art. 24, para. 1; CRPD, supra note 217, art. 25; CEDAW, supra
note 218, art. 12, para. 1.
223
CEDAW, supra note 218, art. 14, para 2.
224
UDHR, supra note 171, art. 25, para. 1; CRPD, supra note 217, art. 28, para.
2.
225
ICESCR, supra note 171, art. 11, para 1; CRPD, supra note 217, art. 28, para
1. Being one of the least explored human rights, the right to the continuous
improvement of living conditions requires a careful analysis, which is beyond the
scope of this Article.
226
UDHR, supra note 171, art. 22; ICESCR, supra note 171, art. 2, para. 1, art.
11, para. 1.
227 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 7.
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and dimensions,” but also “to ensure that all human beings can fulfil
their potential in dignity and equality and in a healthy environment.”228
The SDGs separately and in their entirety are aimed to ensure that
all individuals around the world, especially the most vulnerable,
enjoy an opportunity to “lead decent, dignified and rewarding lives and
to achieve their full human potential.”229
The principle of sustainability requires that the enjoyment of the
right to a decent standard of living by the current generation not
prevent future generations from having secure access to the object
of this right. The 2030 Agenda expresses a commitment to “making
fundamental changes in the way that our societies produce and
consume goods and services.”230 It emphasizes that multiple actors
bear shared commitments to “contribute to changing unsustainable
consumption and production patterns.”231 As shown in Section II.C,
promoting sustainable consumption is important for the realization
of socio-economic rights. The CESCR has adopted the criterion of
sustainability as an essential dimension of the principle of
adequacy.232
There are several important aspects of the guarantees of freedom
from poverty and a decent standard of living that are not fully set
forth in the 2030 Agenda. First, the definition of poverty employed
by the 2030 Agenda is itself highly contested (see below). Second, as
demonstrated above in Section II.B, guarantees relating to poverty
alleviation and securing components of an adequate standard of
living appear to be not human rights obligations, but rather
beneficence commitments.
Third, sustainable development
commitments are extremely minimalistic or “thin” and designed to
ensure a “basic standard of living” rather than a decent standard of

Id. pmbl. (emphasis added).
Id. para. 50 (emphasis added).
230 Id. para. 28.
231 Id. para. 28, SDG 12.
232
See, e.g., U.N. CESCR, General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing,
U.N. Doc. E/1992/23, para. 8 (Dec. 13, 1991) [hereinafter CESCR General Comment
No. 4]; U.N. CESCR, General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1999/5, para. 7 (May. 12, 1999) [hereinafter CESCR General Comment No.
12]; U.N. CESCR, General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2002/11, para. 11 (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter CESCR General Comment No.
15].
228
229
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living.233 The latter is not aimed at enabling a dignified life, but the
mere survival of individuals. In this sense, it is not surprising that
SDG 1 proclaims poverty eradication, but not the promotion of a
“decent,” “dignified,” or “rewarding” life, to be a fundamental goal
of sustainable development. This position is contrary to the
fundamental intention of the 2030 Agenda declared in its preamble.
Fourth, the SDGs are often believed to ensure minimum core
obligations corresponding to the right to an adequate standard of
living (and its particular elements) formulated by the CESCR. 234
However, as mentioned above in Section II.B, the 2030 Agenda deals
predominantly with progressive commitments and, therefore, does
not guarantee the immediate realization of minimum core
obligations. Fifth, a commitment to “end poverty in all its forms
everywhere” is interpreted as a global obligation to enable states to
implement their territorial obligations rather than to change an
international institutional design. The sixth deficient feature is
connected with this: the 2030 Agenda presumes developing
countries’ leadership and “ownership of development priorities”235
and encourages creating national and regional indicators for
assessing the progressive realization of the SDGs,236 but it does not
mandate a certain universal minimum standard of a decent life, nor
a social protection floor, worldwide. 237 This Section further
examines these aspects in more detail.
The SDGs have inherited the World Bank’s definition of extreme
poverty, used earlier by the MDGs, and determined the poor as
those having less than $1.25 of purchasing power parity (PPP). SDG
1 has the objective to: “by 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all
people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less
than $1.25 a day”; 238 and “by 2030, reduce at least by half the
proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty

2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 24.
Regarding the MDGs, this position is expressed by Alston. See Alston,
supra note 78, at para. 164.
235 See infra Section IV.B.
236 See infra Section IV.C.
237
SDG 1 does not imply a commitment to ensure a universal social protection
floor, but merely the call for territorial social protection systems. See Pogge &
Sengupta, supra note 1, at 89.
238 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 1.1.
233
234
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in all its dimensions according to national definitions.” 239 This
poverty definition provoked a lot of criticism from lawyers,
economists, sociologists, philosophers, and politicians.240 They have
contested it for several interconnected reasons: (1) it is ill-defined
and excludes millions of the poor; (2) it contradicts fundamental
moral and legal duties; (3) it does not take into account individuals’
abilities to convert income into guarantees indispensable for leading
a decent life; and (4) it serves the interests of developed states and
powerful non-state actors, rather than those in poverty. The
following subsections will provide a more detailed analysis of these
points of critique.
(1) Many researchers and practitioners criticize the SDGs’ metric
for poverty for being arbitrary and based on the “absurdly low”
purchasing power of $1.25.241 Measuring extreme poverty at this
extremely low level disregards millions of the poor that do not enjoy
a minimally decent standard of living in developing countries as
well as those living below absolute national poverty thresholds in
developed states. 242 As shown above in Section II.A, the MDGs
focused exclusively on developing countries and therefore
disregarded the fate of the poor from developed states. Due to its
extremely narrow definition of extreme poverty, the 2030 Agenda
cannot match its fundamental goal of universal poverty eradication.
Implementing this goal without “leaving anyone behind” requires
the recognition of guarantees of the universal social protection floor
which embodies criteria of adequacy (see below).
(2) The 2030 Agenda has also been rightly criticized for allowing
an unacceptable postponement of the implementation of moral and
legal duties that should instead be fulfilled immediately. Modern
theories of justice underpin the shared moral obligation of members
of the international community to eradicate extreme poverty as
Although the ICESCR applies the
quickly as possible. 243
Id. SDG 1.2.
See, i.e., DEBATES ON THE MEASUREMENT OF GLOBAL POVERTY (Sudhir Anand
et al. eds., 2010); POGGE, supra note 14; Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in
THE QUALITY OF LIFE 41 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993).
241
Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 95.
242
See supra Section II.A.
243
See, e.g., POGGE, supra note 94; TAN, supra note 159; Singer, supra note 159;
UNGER, supra note 159; CANEY, supra note 159; NUSSBAUM, supra note 159; Arneson,
supra note 159.
239
240
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“progressive realization” clause in relation to socio-economic
rights, 244 the CESCR stresses that “minimum core obligations” to
secure access to essential foodstuffs, drinking water, basic
sanitation, primary health care, and basic shelter are of an
immediate character. That is, they should be implemented by states
as a matter of priority and regardless of resources at their disposal.245
States’ inability to fulfill their minimum core obligations with their
maximum available resources246 gives rise to global obligations of
the international community.247
By setting the goals of eradicating extreme poverty,248 ending
malnutrition,249 ensuring access to drinking water and sanitation,250
ending preventable deaths of newborns and children under five,
ending the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, 251 and
ensuring “access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and
basic services and upgrade slums” only by 2030,252 the 2030 Agenda
permits preventable poverty-related deaths as well as severe socioICESCR, supra note 171, art. 2.
See U.N. CESCR, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties'
Obligations, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990) [hereinafter CESCR General
Comment No. 3]; CESCR General Comment No. 12, supra note 232; U.N. CESCR,
General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (Dec. 8,
1999); U.N. CESCR, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable
Standard of Health, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinafter CESCR
General Comment No. 14]; CESCR General Comment No. 15, supra note 232; U.N.
CESCR, General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of
the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic
Production of Which He or She is the Author, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006)
[hereinafter CESCR General Comment No. 17]; U.N. CESCR, General Comment No. 18:
The Right to Work, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/18 (Feb. 6, 2006) [hereinafter CESCR
General Comment No. 18]; U.N. CESCR, General Comment No. 19: The right to social
security, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/19 (Feb. 4, 2008) [hereinafter CESCR General
Comment No. 19]; U.N. CESCR, General Comment No. 21: Right of everyone to take part
in cultural life, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 (Dec. 21, 2009).
246
For a critique of the “maximum available resources” clause, see
Pribytkova, supra note 3, at 292-296.
247
See UDHR, supra note 171, art. 22; ICESCR, supra note 171, art. 2, para. 1,
art. 11, para. 1; CRC, supra note 217, art. 4; see also Vienna Declaration, supra note 2,
art. 14 (reaffirming that the obligations of the international community to alleviate
poverty are high priority and immediate obligations).
248
2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 1.
249 Id. SDG 2.
250 Id. SDG 6.
251
Id. SDG 3.
252 Id. SDG 11.
244
245

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/4

2020]

Global Obligations for Sustainable Development

1087

economic deprivations over the next ten years.253 This contradicts
requirements of both morality and law. In this regard, the 2030
Agenda politically justifies the violation of fundamental human
rights by states and other members of the international community.
Thomas Pogge and Mitu Sengupta notice that during the fifteenyear period of the implementation of MDGs, which also allowed for
the progressive realization of urgent duties to eradicate poverty,
about 450 million people died from poverty-related causes, which is
seven times more than the number of those killed during World War
II. 254 The contemporary sustainable development agenda should
not allow the repetition of this practice.
Against this background, the sustainable development agenda,
which embodies a human rights-based approach to development,
should recognize commitments to eradicate extreme poverty and to
ensure secure access to (the core components of) a decent standard
of living as human rights obligations of immediate nature. The
acknowledgment of the immediacy of these obligations for
sustainable development will limit global actors’ discretion to
decide when to fulfill them. This does not contradict the nature of
the sustainable development agenda which already embodies, as to
certain matters, immediate commitments for sustainable
development. An example may be found in SDG 8, which requires
taking “immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour,
end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the
prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour,
including recruitment and use of child soldiers.”255
(3) The 2030 Agenda’s income-based poverty definition appears
to be insensitive to difficulties of converting income into a minimally
253
The same argument can be applied to SDG 10, which has the target to “by
2030, progressively achieve and sustain income growth of the bottom 40 per cent of
the population at a rate higher than the national average” (10.1) and allows the
income share of the worst-off to decline within the next decade. See Pogge &
Sengupta, supra note 1, at 93.
254
Id. at 85. Pogge and Sengupta also argue that “if we do regard the
eradication of undernourishment and other severe deprivations as a goal to be
slowly approached over several lengthy development goal cycles, thereby
accepting hundreds of millions of poverty-related deaths and deprivations in the
interim, then we are in effect denying that there is a human right to life, a human
right to an adequate standard of living, a human right to be free of hunger.” Id. at
87.
255 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 8.7 (emphasis added).
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acceptable standard of living. The pioneers of the capabilities
approach, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, highlight the
argument that the relations between actual opportunities of people
and means at their disposal are variable. For instance, Sen points to
subjective and objective factors, which generate inequalities in
individuals’ socio-economic positions even if they possess the same
quantitative amount of income or any other resource. These factors
include individuals’ physical or mental features, such as sex, age,
health, and disabilities; non-personal resources, including an
infrastructure, a health care system, and community cohesion;
environmental conditions, such as climate, epidemics, and crime
rates; as well as resources required to enjoy relational equality, in
particular “to appear in public without shame” (as posited by Adam
Smith).256
Sen maintains that “the conversion of income into basic
capabilities may vary greatly between individuals and also between
different societies, so that the ability to reach minimally acceptable
levels of basic capabilities can go with varying levels of minimally
adequate incomes.”257 Following the capabilities approach, Arjun
Sengupta suggests that development programs and projects should
be directed not only against income poverty, but also against
capability poverty as well.258 In light of the capabilities approach,
the sustainable development agenda should take into account the
fact that individual and social factors that affect the financial and
social state of individuals and societies, as well as their ability to
convert income and other resources into valuable opportunities, are
of crucial importance for determining both the measure of poverty
and the scope of social and global guarantees indispensable for the
enjoyment of a decent standard of living.259
(4) The definition of poverty inherited by the 2030 Agenda from
the MDGs serves the interests of developed states and other

Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Capabilities, 6 J. HUM. DEV. 151, 154 (2005).
Sen, supra note 240, at 41; see also MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMAN AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 68 (2000).
258
Sengupta, supra note 98, at para. 12.
259
Amartya Sen delivered a series of lectures at the World Bank that were
later published as a book entitled Development as Freedom (1999). In spite of this, his
ideas were not reflected in the World Bank’s income-based formulation of extreme
poverty.
256
257
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powerful global actors rather than the existential needs of the
poor.260
As noted above, Global South countries actively opposed the
World Bank’s definition of poverty being integrated into the global
development agenda. For instance, the G-77 coalition of developing
states considered that each country should develop its own
definition and criteria of poverty as well as determine their own
targets and timeframe for poverty eradication.261 That is why they
rejected attempts to formulate a universal quantifiable definition of
poverty as part of the global development agenda, in particular its
inclusion in the action plan of the World Summit for Social
Development held in March 1995 in Copenhagen.262 According to
developing countries, the intention to formulate a universal
definition of poverty stood in tension with the principles of priority
of national responsibility for poverty eradication as well as
developing societies’ leadership and ownership in designing,
implementing and assessing the effectiveness of their development
programs. Despite this opposition from developing states, the
OECD “donor club” issued the document Shaping the 21st Century:
The Contribution of Development Co-operation (1996), which contained
six international development goals263 applying the World Bank’s
standard—“$370 per capita in annual income, or about $1 per
day”—as the extreme poverty threshold. 264 The report A Better
World for All (2000) produced by the U.N., the World Bank, the IMF,
and the OECD, which presented international development goals
reflecting the World Bank’s extreme poverty definition, had been
met with strong criticism by representatives of global civil society.265
260
Seyedsayamdost comes to this conclusion regarding the MDGs and
considers that the “global development agenda was initially a construct of the
donor community.” SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 48f, 150. This gives grounds
for arguing that a commitment to reduce poverty was concurrently, in part, a
political instrument for developed states to exercise their control over the national
policies of developing countries. See Eade, supra note 15, at 630; Shah, supra note
15; Frankovits, supra note 9, at 123-124.
261
See SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 162.
262
As Seyedsayamdost notes, the “donor club” states came back from the
Copenhagen World Summit “frustrated and angry.” SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note
13, at 162-163.
263 See supra Section II.A.
264
See SHAPING THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 37, at 9.
265
See SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 179f.
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Nevertheless, just several months later, the OECD international
development goals and the poverty threshold of $1.00 PPP (since
2008—$1.25 PPP)266 were incorporated into the MDGs (along with a
new MDG 8).267 A consensus on poverty definition documented by
the MDGs was imposed by powerful actors and accepted by
developing countries under the condition that the MDGs include a
goal of global partnership, which, as shown above in Section II.A,
appeared to be ineffective. The 2030 Agenda inherited this
controversy. In this context, a combination of measures is necessary
to solve it: on the one hand, determining a universal social
protection floor reflecting the principle of adequacy (see point 1
above) and, on the other hand, taking into account national and
regional absolute and relative poverty lines.
The 2030 Agenda expresses the intention to ensure essential
social, economic, and cultural guarantees that also constitute objects
of basic socio-economic rights.268 This relates, in particular, to the
core and supplementary components of the composite human right
to a decent standard of living—the right to adequate food, water,
sanitation, housing, health, transportation, energy, and information
and communications technology.269 However, as shown above, the
sustainable development commitments do not have the status of
human rights obligations, are territorial rather than global, are
progressive rather than immediate, and are minimalist, that is,
aimed at securing an access not to a decent, but rather to a “basic”
standard of living. In addition, although the SDGs refer to general—
availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality (AAAQ)270—and
266
In October 2015, the global poverty line was updated by the World Bank
to $1.90 a day.
FAQs: Global Poverty Line Update, WORLD BANK,
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/brief/global-poverty-line-faq
[https://perma.cc/XVH5-XTTK].
267
See SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 146-49, 207.
268
On the MDGs, see Alston, supra note 78, para. 48; see also Nankani et al.,
Human Rights and Poverty Reduction Strategies: Moving Towards Convergence?, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT 475 (Philip
Alston & Mary Robinson eds., 2005); CLAPHAM, supra note 78, at 86-87.
269
The 2030 Agenda does not address guarantees of adequate clothing. That
is a task required for the further evolution of the sustainable development agenda.
270
The 2030 Agenda does not explicitly refer to the criterion of acceptability. It
does, however, embody the principle of respect of the cultural diversity of
individuals and societies (paras. 8, 36) that can serve as the basis for the requirement
to ensure that guarantees of various components of the adequate standard of living
are culturally acceptable to individuals.
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specific—nutritiousness, habitability, safety, sufficiency, etc.—
criteria of adequacy there is no consistency in their use throughout
the 2030 Agenda. To elaborate these points, I will briefly discuss
some of the most important elements of a “basic standard of living”
promoted by the SDGs.
SDG 2—to end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition,
and promote sustainable agriculture—is designed to provide secure
access to food that, obviously, is an object of the right to adequate
food.271 Its aim is, by 2030, to “end hunger and ensure access by all
people, in particular the poor and people in vulnerable situations,
including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year
round”;272 and “end all forms of malnutrition, including achieving,
by 2025, the internationally agreed targets on stunting and wasting
in children under 5 years of age.”273 In addition to these territorial
obligations, SDG 2 also comprises global distributive justice
commitments: first, an interactional commitment to increase
investment in rural infrastructure and technology in developing
states to enhance their agricultural productivity;274 and second, an
institutional commitment to “correct and prevent trade restrictions
and distortions in world agricultural markets.”275
Concordant with international human rights instruments, the
2030 Agenda states that ending hunger and achieving food security
is a matter of priority. 276 SDG 2, however, enshrines solely
progressive obligations, which, as shown above, deviates from
international human rights law. SDG 2 codifies only the criteria of
safety, nutritiousness, and sufficiency, 277 corresponding to
characteristics of adequate food proposed by CESCR General
271
See the definition of the right to food provided by Jean Ziegler, the U.N.
Special
Rapporteur
on
the
right
to
food,
at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Food/Pages/FoodIndex.aspx
[https://perma.cc/P4K3-TL5W]. For critique of the 2030 Agenda’s avoidance to
recognize the right to food, see Vivero Pol & Schuftan, supra note 11.
272 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 2.1 (emphasis added).
273 Id. SDG 2.2.
274 Id. SDG 2.a.
275 Id. SDG 2.b.
276
The 2030 Agenda “welcomes” the Rome Declaration on Nutrition and the
Framework for Action. Id. para. 24.
277
The 2030 Agenda expresses a commitment to ensure that “food is sufficient,
safe, affordable and nutritious.” Id. para. 7.
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Comment No. 12.278 Nevertheless, the interactional and institutional
commitments of SDG 2 to end hunger and ensure universal access
to food implicitly rely on some core components of adequacy—
availability, economic and physical accessibility, and quality, 279
while ignoring the criterion of cultural or consumer acceptability.280
In addition, the 2030 Agenda demands that development
commitments concerning food envisioned by SDG 2 satisfy the
criterion of sustainability.281
The 2030 Agenda reaffirms “commitments regarding the human
right to safe drinking water and sanitation” as well as guarantees of
“improved hygiene.”282 SDG 6—to ensure availability and sustainable
management of water and sanitation for all—has common objects with
the human rights to adequate water and sanitation. It demands by
2030 to “achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable
drinking water for all” 283 and to improve the quality of water
globally. 284 In addition, it requires by 2030 the achievement of
“access to adequate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all and [the
end of] open defecation, paying special attention to the needs of
women and girls and those in vulnerable situations.” 285 Global
commitments on water and sanitation, embodied in SDG 6, do not
concern extraterritorial, but territorial reforms, requiring only that
“the participation of local communities in improving water and
sanitation management” is ensured. 286 At the same time, they
mandate obligations of development assistance—the promotion of
“capacity-building support to developing countries in water- and
sanitation-related activities and programmes, including water
harvesting, desalination, water efficiency, wastewater treatment,
See CESCR General Comment No. 12, supra note 232, paras. 1-9.
Id. paras. 7-9, 12-13.
280 Id. para. 11.
281
2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 2.4. According to the CESCR, food
sustainability is “intrinsically linked” to food adequacy and means the long-term
availability and accessibility of nutritious food for both present and future
generations. See CESCR General Comment No. 12, supra note 232, para. 7.
282 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 7.
283 Id. SDG 6.1 (emphasis added).
284 Id. SDG 6.3. On SDG 6’s potential to regulate extraterritorial cooperation
relating to water, see McIntyre, supra note 11.
285 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 6.2 (emphasis added).
286 Id. SDG 6.b.
278
279

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/4

2020]

Global Obligations for Sustainable Development

1093

recycling and reuse technologies.”287 The sustainable development
commitments are exclusively progressive, which should be
corrected with respect to the minimum core obligations
corresponding to the rights to water and sanitation.288 According to
the 2030 Agenda, these commitments should correspond to general
and specific criteria of adequacy, i.e., availability, accessibility,
acceptability, quality, safety, equitability, non-discrimination,289 and
sustainability.290
The 2030 Agenda enshrines a commitment to “achieve universal
health coverage and access to quality health care”291 that overlaps
with obligations corresponding to the human right to health. SDG
3—to ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages—
states an intention to “reduce the global maternal mortality ratio to
less than 70 per 100,000 live births” by 2030; 292 and to “end
preventable deaths of newborns and children under 5 years of age,
with all countries aiming to reduce neonatal mortality to at least as
low as 12 per 1,000 live births and under-5 mortality to at least as
low as 25 per 1,000 live births.”293 SDG 3 is also notable because, in
addition to territorial guarantees, it embodies global obligations to
“support the research and development of vaccines and medicines
for the communicable and non-communicable diseases that
primarily affect developing countries,” and provide universal access
to essential medicines and vaccines.294 It is remarkable, however,
that this commitment does not specify a timeframe for its
Id. SDG 6.a.
See CESCR General Comment No. 15, supra note 232, para. 37. On the
interrelation between human rights obligations and sustainable development
commitments corresponding to the right to sanitation, see OBANI, supra note 11.
289
CESCR General Comment No. 15 on the right to water determines
general—availability, accessibility (physical accessibility, economic accessibility,
non-discrimination, and information accessibility), acceptability, and quality
(paras. 2, 12)—as well as specific—safety, equality, and dignity (paras. 2, 11-14)—
criteria of adequacy.
290
2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 6.4. Cf. CESCR General Comment No. 15
emphasizes that “the manner of the realization of the right to water must also be
sustainable, ensuring that the right can be realized for present and future
generations.” CESCR General Comment No. 15, supra note 232, para. 11.
291 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 26.
292 Id. SDG 3.1.
293 Id. SDG 3.2.
294 Id. SDG 3.b.
287
288
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achievement. Again, international human rights law requires
treating these commitments concerning essential health care as
immediate obligations.295 CESCR General Comment No. 14 on the
right to the highest attainable standard of health determines the
criteria of adequacy—availability, accessibility (including nondiscrimination, physical accessibility, affordability, and information
accessibility), acceptability, and quality296—which are implicitly and
explicitly presupposed by SDG 3: to “achieve universal health
coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential
health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable
essential medicines and vaccines for all.”297
SDG 11—to make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe,
resilient, and sustainable—addresses the object of the right to
adequate housing. It demands, in particular, ensuring by 2030
“access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic
services and upgrade slums.” 298 Bringing these sustainable
development commitments into sync with obligations
corresponding to the right to adequate housing requires recognizing
immediate core commitments to secure access to basic shelter. The
content and scope of this commitment should be determined on the
basis of the criteria of adequacy—availability of services, materials,
facilities, and infrastructure; accessibility; affordability; cultural
adequacy; habitability; legal security of tenure; and location—
formulated by CESCR General Comment No. 4 on the right to
adequate housing.299 The CESCR also assimilates the principle of
sustainability and claims that “disadvantaged groups must be
accorded full and sustainable access to adequate housing
295
CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 245, para. 43. For a critique of
SDG 3 from a human rights perspective, see Chapman, supra note 11; Williams &
Hunt, supra note 11.
296
CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 245, para. 12.
297 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 3.8 (emphasis added).
298 Id. SDG 11.1 (emphasis added).
299
CESCR General Comment No. 4, supra note 232, para. 8. The CESCR warns
against narrow interpretations of the right to adequate housing as the right to “a
roof over one’s head” and demands it to be treated as the “right to live somewhere
in security, peace and dignity.” Id. para. 7. It follows the definition of adequate
shelter suggested by the U.N.-Habitat and embodied in the Global Strategy for Shelter
to the Year 2000: “adequate privacy, adequate space, adequate security, adequate
lighting and ventilation, adequate basic infrastructure and adequate location with
regard to work and basic facilities—all at a reasonable cost.” Id. para. 5.
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resources.”300 As we can see, some of these criteria of adequacy—
accessibility, affordability, sustainability, and safety—are explicitly
expressed in SDG 11.
The SDGs also incorporate other important obligations
indispensable for securing a decent standard of living, that is,
commitments to promote transportation, 301 energy, 302 as well as
information and communications technology.303 The 2030 Agenda
further reaffirms socio-economic commitments to ensure universal
access to social protection304 and education.305
Based on this analysis, it is possible to suggest several significant
improvements to the contemporary sustainable development
agenda relating to distributive commitments to eradicate poverty
and secure a decent and sustainable standard of living. First, the
definition of poverty employed by the sustainable development
agenda should be inclusive, human rights respective, capabilitysensitive and substantively pro-poor. Second, according to a human
rights-based approach, sustainable development commitments
should not contradict—in content, scope and urgency of their
implementation—obligations corresponding to the composite
human right to a decent standard of living.306 In particular, third,
consistent with the 2030 Agenda’s fundamental purpose to ensure
individuals’ access to “decent, dignified and rewarding lives and to
achieve their full human potential,” 307 the sustainable development
agenda should recognize commitments to secure not only a “basic
standard of living,” but also a decent standard of living. Fourth, the
sustainable development agenda should contain not only
300
The CESCR also demands that “all beneficiaries of the right to adequate
housing should have sustainable access to natural and common resources, safe
drinking water, energy for cooking, heating and lighting, sanitation and washing
facilities, means of food storage, refuse disposal, site drainage and emergency
services.” CESCR General Comment No. 4, supra note 232, para. 8 (emphasis added).
301 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 11.
302 Id. SDG 7.
303 Id. SDG 4-5, 9, 17.
304 Id. SDG 1.
305 Id. SDG 4.
306
The Human Development Report 2000 explicates that socio-economic
commitments concerning a decent standard of living represent not only
development goals, but also human rights obligations for development. See UNITED
NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 165, at 8.
307 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 50 (emphasis added).
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progressive duties, but also immediate obligations, including the
minimum core obligations corresponding to the composite right to
a decent standard of living. Fifth, the general and specific criteria of
adequacy used by the 2030 Agenda should be synchronized with
those suggested by the CESCR and other U.N. human rights treatybased bodies. This will harmonize and enrich both the sustainable
development agenda and the human rights agenda. Sixth, global
obligations for sustainable development should be directed not only
to the territorial realization of the SDGs, but also to universally
ensuring a certain minimum standard of a decent life. Seventh, the
sustainable development agenda should comprise not just
interactional, but also institutional obligations of creating and
maintaining a global institutional scheme indispensable for the
realization of the right to a decent standard of living worldwide.308
D. Summary
This part addressed global obligations for sustainable
development embedded in the 2030 Agenda. Section III.A provided
an overview of various types of global obligations for sustainable
development, including global obligations of conduct (obligations
of development cooperation and assistance) as well as global
obligations of result (obligations to create and maintain a just and
sustainable global order and obligations to ensure a decent and
sustainable standard of living universally). The subsequent Sections
concentrated on global obligations of result. Section III.B argued
that institutional obligations for sustainable development should
not be aimed solely at undertaking structural territorial
improvements, but also at reforming a global institutional scheme.
Obligations to create and maintain a just and sustainable global
308
As the Human Development Report 2000 specifies, human rights
obligations for sustainable development correspond to “claims to a set of social
arrangements—norms, institutions, laws, an enabling economic environment—that
can best secure the enjoyment of these rights. It is thus the obligation of
governments and others to implement policies to put these arrangements in place.
And in today’s more interdependent world, it is essential to recognize the obligations
of global actors, who in the pursuit of global justice must put in place global
arrangements that promote the eradication of poverty.” UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMME, supra note 165, at 73 (emphasis added).
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order contain both duties of relational and distributive justice.
Section III.C examined the nature, content, and scope of global
distributive obligations to ensure a decent and sustainable standard
of living universally.
It compared interpretations of these
obligations provided by the CESCR and the 2030 Agenda and
suggested ways to bring them into sync and to improve the
contemporary sustainable development agenda.
IV. GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
A. Cooperation as a Goal and a Means for Sustainable Development
Obligations of international cooperation are a key element of
global obligations for sustainable development. They are justified
for several reasons. First, the SDGs, especially the goals relating to
global poverty eradication and guarantees of a decent standard of
living,309 cannot be effectively addressed by dissociated actors. The
2030 Agenda affirms that “we will not be able to achieve our
ambitious Goals and targets without a revitalized and enhanced
Global Partnership and comparably ambitious means of
implementation.”310
The goal of global partnership is part and parcel of the intention
to reshape an unjust global institutional design and eliminate the
negative consequences of globalization, the costs and benefits of
which are distributed unfairly. The most powerful actors framing
the existing global order benefit disproportionately from it and
impose the global institutional scheme on the less powerful.311 That
See supra Sections III.B-III.C.
2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 60; see also Sengupta, supra note 98, para.
42; SACHS ET AL., supra note 12.
311
See SALOMON, supra note 10, at 1, 45-46; POGGE, supra note 94, at 118-122;
TAN, supra note 159, 29-35; EASTERLY, supra note 12. The World Commission on the
Social Dimension of Globalization (ILO) emphasized that “the weaknesses in global
governance have contributed to the uneven social and economic impact of
globalization. There are two main channels through which this has happened. The
first is the creation of a system of rules governing the global economy that has been
prejudicial to the interests of most developing countries, especially the poor within
them. The second is the failure to put in place a coherent set of international
309
310
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institutional scheme unduly increases poverty, extreme inequality,
and the marginalization of developing societies, violating basic
human rights and preventing individuals’ access to a decent
standard of living.
A global domain characterized by the
domination of affluent actors is similar to the state of nature
described by Thomas Hobbes, in which the rules of natural selection
prevail and the strongest survive. 312 Some experts emphasize a
special responsibility of powerful actors to improve contemporary
global order.313 I would like to suggest that, since the current global
institutional scheme is a product of interaction among various—
dominant and dominated—global actors, all these actors share
obligations to reform it.314
States have recognized their obligations to cooperate through
joining the United Nations 315 and ratifying the core international
instruments. According to the UDHR, the ICESCR, and the CRC,
the obligations to cooperate derive from and correspond to socioeconomic rights. 316 The CESCR specifies global obligations to
cooperate correlating to the core components of the right to an
adequate standard of living (the rights to adequate food, water,
sanitation, housing, and health).317 In addition, some commentators
consider international obligations to cooperate to be a part of
customary international law.318
The DRD recognizes states’ “duty to co-operate with each other
in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to
economic and social policies to achieve a pattern of globalization that benefits all
people.” INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, A FAIR GLOBALISATION: CREATING
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALL, para. 353 (2004).
312
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651).
313
See Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 93-94.
314
For instance, according to Gosepath, collective liability gives rise to
institutional duties to cooperate. See Gosepath, supra note 76, at 281.
315
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 1 UNTS XVI, arts. 1, 55-56
(Jun. 26, 1945).
316 See UDHR, supra note 171, art. 22; ICESCR, supra note 171, art. 2, para. 1,
art. 11, para. 1; CRC, supra note 217, art. 4.
317
See also CESCR General Comment No. 4, supra note 232, paras. 10, 13, 19;
CESCR General Comment No. 12, supra note 232, paras. 36, 38, 40; CESCR General
Comment No. 14, supra note 245, paras. 38, 40, 45, 63; CESCR General Comment No.
15, supra note 232, paras. 30-38.
318
See Alston, supra note 78, para. 48; Alston, supra note 36, at 778; CLAPHAM,
supra note 78, at 86-87.
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development.” 319 The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
extends the obligation to cooperate for the realization of the right to
development to the whole “international community.”320
The 2030 Agenda acknowledges obligations to cooperate as both
a goal of and means for sustainable development.321 SDG 17 has the
aim of “revitalize[ing] the global partnership for sustainable
development” in several spheres, which involves universal,
multilateral, rules-based, equitable and non-discriminatory
cooperation in finance, 322 trade, 323 politics, 324 technology, 325
developing accountability and monitoring processes, and
development assistance. 326 The 2030 Agenda also recognizes that
global cooperation is an important instrument for a successful
realization of the other sixteen SDGs. In particular, the 2030 Agenda
documents commitments to develop cooperation for the
mobilization of resources and the increased investment that are
important for reaching all SDGs.327
A global partnership for sustainable development should
embody several important principles: first, human rights-based
cooperation; second, non-discriminatory participation of all public
and private actors; third, human-centered cooperation; and, fourth,
pro-poor cooperation in the spirit of global solidarity. The rest of
this Section examines these principles in more detail.
(1) As demonstrated above in Section II.C, a human rights-based
approach should be applied to the sustainable development agenda.
What does this mean in terms of global partnership? The latter
should be guided by principles of individuals’ participation and
empowerment, accountability, transparency, equality, and non-

DRD, supra note 21, art. 3, para. 3.
Vienna Declaration, supra note 2, para. 10.
321 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 40.
322 Id. SDG 17.1, 17.3.
323 Id. SDG 17.10-17.12.
324 Id. SDG 17.13-17.14.
325 Id. SDG 17.6-17.8.
326 Id. SDG 17.2, 17.4-17.5. For an analysis of obligations of development
assistance, see infra Section IV.B.
327
See infra Section IV.B.
319
320
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discrimination. 328 The application of a human rights-based
approach entails that: (a) development cooperation programs,
policies and processes in all their phases must respect and promote
the realization of internationally recognized human rights and by no
means contradict human rights standards; (b) development
cooperation must enhance capacities of right-holders to claim their
right to development and basic socio-economic rights and dutybearers to fulfill their obligations; 329 (c) all stages of development
cooperation must be monitored to ensure that human rights are not
abused; (d) independent, objective, competent, and publicly
accessible ex ante human rights impact assessments and human
rights due diligence, with participation of all potential stakeholders,
must be undertaken before introducing any development policies
and programs;330 and (e) when human rights violations are found,
corrective measures must be introduced, and responsible actors be
held accountable.331
(2) One of the main questions in respect of the global partnership
for development is: Who are the global partners? Although human
rights law proceeds from the assumption of the primacy of states’
obligations in the area of socio-economic rights, it recognizes that
obligations to cooperate also bind other actors, such as individuals,
intergovernmental organizations and non-state entities. According
to the UDHR, not only states, but also “every individual and every
organ of society” should strive to promote respect for human rights
328
Sengupta, supra note 98, para. 22; see also Patrick van Weerelt, А Human
Rights-Based Approach to Development Programming in UNDP—Adding the Missing
Link (United Nations Development Programme, Nov. 11, 2015),
https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democraticgovernance/human_rights/a-human-rights-based-approach-to-developmentprogramming-in-undp.html [https://perma.cc/37J3-NAWZ].
329
United Nations Development Group, The Human Rights Based Approach to
Development Cooperation: Towards a Common Understanding Among the UN Agencies
(Sept. 2003), https://unsdg.un.org/resources/human-rights-based-approachdevelopment-cooperation-towards-common-understanding-among-un
[https://perma.cc/E2B7-9QFN] [hereinafter The Human Rights Based Approach
to Development Cooperation].
330
See, e.g., Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, supra note 182, para. 105(b).
331
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Frequently Asked Questions on a Human Rights-Based Approach to Development
Cooperation (2006), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FAQen.pdf
[https://perma.cc/392G-HSC8].
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and to “secure their universal and effective recognition and
observance” through progressive national and international
measures. 332 Although the ICESCR acknowledges only states as
bearers of obligations to cooperate, the CESCR extends these
obligations to other entities, both intergovernmental organizations
and non-state actors.333
It is true that the 2030 Agenda and the DRD—like the human
rights agenda—recognize states’ “primary responsibility” for
implementing the SDGs. Yet, at the same time, the sustainable
development agenda has significant potential for overcoming statecentrism. Thus, the DRD acknowledges individual and collective
obligations of all people and entities. In particular, it stresses
obligations of individuals for sustainable development:
All human beings have a responsibility for development,
individually and collectively, taking into account the need for full
respect for their human rights and fundamental freedoms as well
as their duties to the community, which alone can ensure the free
and complete fulfillment of the human being, and they should
therefore promote and protect an appropriate political, social and
economic order for development.334
The 2030 Agenda calls for developing effective multi-stakeholder
public (especially North-South, South-South and triangular regional
and international cooperation), public-private and civil society
partnerships. 335 The inclusive global partnership for sustainable
development should be based on the rule of leaving no one behind and

332
UDHR, supra note 171, pmbl.; see also Vienna Declaration, supra note 2, para.
13; Declaration on the Right and Responsibility, supra note 166, art. 18, para. 3;
CRPD, supra note 217, art. 32, para. 1. For an analysis of global human rights
obligations of multiple actors, see Pribytkova, supra note 144, at 412-424.
333
See CESCR General Comment No. 12, supra note 232, paras. 36, 38, 40; CESCR
General Comment No. 14, supra note 245, paras. 45, 63; CESCR General Comment No.
15, supra note 232, para. 38; CESCR General Comment No. 17, supra note 245, paras.
61, 82; CESCR General Comment No. 18, supra note 245, para. 53; CESCR General
Comment No. 19, supra note 245, para. 61.
334
DRD, supra note 21, art. 2, para. 2.
335 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 17, 17.16-17.17.
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require equal, non-discriminatory, and adequate representation and
cooperation of “all countries, all stakeholders and all people.”336
According to Arjun Sengupta’s apt insight, the universality of
the sustainable development agenda means not only that it is
applicable world-wide but also that it binds all members of the
international community.
He also defends an idea that
development goals are “absolute,” i.e., all duty-holders should
strive to reach them to the best of their capacity regardless of other
actors’ degree of success in implementing their obligations.337
Relevant actors should be guaranteed not just “formal” or
“nominal” but full-fledged participation in the process of
sustainable development. This calls for correcting innumerable
asymmetries in global governance, democratizing global
institutions, and strengthening the role of Global South countries in
core international organizations, especially international financial
organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO. 338
Developing states should not only enjoy an opportunity to
participate fully, but also to play a key role in agenda-setting and
problem-solving processes concerning their own and global
development. In other words, they should be recognized as agents
of development capable of taking part in and contributing to the
realization of shared global obligations for sustainable
development. In this sense, it is necessary to rethink the role of each
developing society not only in lifting itself out of poverty, but also
in the process of global poverty eradication.339
The 2030 Agenda is rightly criticized for not specifying the global
obligations of various actors. 340 For instance, Pogge and Mitu
Sengupta assert that the 2030 Agenda, and especially SDG 17, has
inherited a “key defect” of MDG 8 to the extent it does not attribute
Id. pmbl. Cf. id. para. 41.
Sengupta, supra note 98, paras. 18, 24.
338
The 2030 Agenda stresses the important mission of the U.N. system and the
international financial institutions in facilitating an intensive global engagement of
academia, philanthropic organizations, and volunteer groups. See also SALOMON,
supra note 10, at 46.
339
In this context, developing societies possess a right to perform their duties
for sustainable development. See Study on the Current State of Progress in the
Implementation of the Right to Development, supra note 147, para. 53.
340
For example, Alston points out that commitments to cooperate are
“generic” and attached to the “undifferentiated international community.” See
Alston, supra note 36, at 777.
336
337
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interactional and institutional obligations to concrete duty-bearers
and, in particular, “shields” powerful global actors from concrete
duties. 341 In this sense, an important step in advancing the
contemporary sustainable development agenda is to specify and
allocate global obligations to concrete actors, including powerful
public and private actors and developing states. At the same time,
the distribution of global obligations should be fair and the tasks for
developing countries and societies should be feasible.342
(3) Cooperation for sustainable development should be humancentered, that is, individuals should be acknowledged as the ultimate
goals and “key actors in their own development, rather than passive
recipients of commodities and services.” 343 Embodying the
principle of human-centricity, which sees an individual as the
ultimate unit of both moral and legal concern,344 an absolute value
and supreme goal of social, legal, political, economic, and cultural
development at both local and global levels is a common objective
of the human rights agenda and the sustainable development
agenda.
Article 1 of the UDHR acknowledges individuals as major rightholders and proclaims that “[a]ll human beings are born free and
equal in dignity and rights.”345 All members of the U.N. agree that
“we must put people at the centre of everything we do.”346 In line
with the principle of human-centricity, people are treated as “the
measure of all ‘development.’”347
Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 93-94.
Pogge and Sengupta assert that the equal distribution of territorial
obligations for sustainable development is unfair, since it burdens the poorest
societies with the largest duties. Id. at 88.
343
The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation, supra
note 329.
344 See Thomas Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 ETHICS 48, 48-49
(1992); TAN, supra note 159, at 1. In addition to individual’s moral status
conceptualized by Pogge and Tan, this Article concentrates on the legal status of a
person. It is important to stress that the principle of human-centricity does not
contradict the recognition of value of the other species.
345
UDHR, supra note 171, art. 1.
346
We the Peoples, supra note 204.
347
U.N. Secretary-General, Promotion of South-South Cooperation for
Development: a thirty-year perspective, U.N. Doc. A/64/504, para. 79 (Oct. 27, 2009)
[hereinafter Promotion of South-South Cooperation for Development]. Human
development itself is determined as “the expansion of capabilities and freedoms of
individuals”. See Sengupta, supra note 98, para. 6.
341
342
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An obvious strength of the sustainable development agenda is
its approach to individuals as members of humanity and not just as
citizens of a particular state. The DRD interprets the right to
development as “an inalienable human right” and stresses that
“equality of opportunity for development is a prerogative both of
nations and of individuals who make up nations.”348 It recognizes
that “the human person is the central subject of the development
process and that development policy should therefore make the
human being the main participant and beneficiary of
development.”349 The right to development entitles individuals to
full, meaningful, and effective participation in all stages of decisionmaking processes concerning their development; to an equal
opportunity in their access to basic resources; and to a fair
distribution of benefits of development.350
The 2030 Agenda also explicitly expresses its commitment to
human-centered development and demands to “empower and
promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all,
irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or
economic or other status” by 2030.351 It does not, however, specify
measures to guarantee individuals’ participation in core local and
global political processes. Arjun Sengupta suggests creating special
mechanisms, including monitoring and accountability mechanisms,
to uncover deficiencies in meaningful participation and adequate
representation of all individuals, especially the most vulnerable, and
to hold responsible actors accountable. He argues that democratic
states can perform this role. In the case of non-democratic societies,
ad-hoc mechanisms and measures guaranteeing the participation
and adequate representation of poor individuals should be
elaborated for particular projects.352

DRD, supra note 21.
Id. pmbl., art. 2, para. 1.
350
DRD, supra note 21, arts. 1, 2, 8. The Vienna Declaration reaffirms that “the
human person is the central subject of development.” Vienna Declaration, supra note
2, para. 10. As shown in Section III.B, the High-Level Task Force on the
Implementation of the Right to Development (HLTF) interprets a human-centered
development policy as one of the main attributes of the right to development. Right
to Development, supra note 170, annex at 8-12.
351 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 10.2.
352
Sengupta, supra note 98, at para. 30.
348
349
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Human rights advocates repeatedly point to the close
interrelation between individuals’ political empowerment and their
ability to enjoy a decent standard of living. 353 In this sense,
individuals’ capacities to be active drivers of and full-fledged
partners for sustainable development, 354 directly or through their
agency in state-based and network-based institutions at various
levels, depend on the realization of the other SDGs.355
In Joachim Monkelbaan’s apt words, “the SDGs have triggered
a renaissance of civil society.”356 Global civil society is increasingly
gaining recognition as a “third force” of the international
community along with states and international organizations,
though its role in global deliberation processes still remains limited.
Both local, regional, and global civil society and its organizations
should be empowered to play an important role in promoting
sustainable development, in particular by mobilizing resources, by
implementing efficient development programs and projects beyond
state bureaucratic channels, and by monitoring these programs and
projects.357 NGOs, as essential actors in civil society, are of crucial
importance for providing international human rights advocacy and
international sustainable development services, and for promoting
full-fledged participation of beneficiaries in decision-making
processes concerning sustainable development. According to a 2018
survey of global sustainability leaders, NGOs and social
entrepreneurs have the most impact on advancing the SDGs, while
national governments have the least.358
353
See, e.g., Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and
Human Rights on the Enjoyment of Civil and Political Rights by Persons Living in Poverty,
U.N. Doc. A/72/502 (2017); Maria Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights on Access to Justice for People
Living in Poverty, U.N. Doc. A/67/278 (2012).
354 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 17.
355 See supra Section III.C.
356
MONKELBAAN, supra note 13, at 71.
357 See Sengupta, supra note 98, at para. 33; see also Sachin Chaturvedi, The
Development Compact: A Theoretical Construct for South-South Cooperation, RIS
Discussion Papers, Discussion Paper #203, 7-8 (June 2016), at
https://ris.org.in/newasiaforum/sites/default/files/Publication%20File/DP203
%20Dr%20Sachin%20Chaturvedi.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LVW-UUMX].
358
See The 2018 GlobeScan-SustainAbility Leaders Survey, at
https://globescan.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/GlobeScanSustainAbility-Leaders-Survey-2018-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3YZ-SEMD].
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The recognition of a person as a major subject of development is
the crucial idea in supplanting state-centrism in both the sustainable
development and human rights agendas. Guaranteeing humancentered development should therefore be one of the major steps in
the further evolution of the sustainable development agenda. My
article, What Global Human Rights Obligations Do We Have?,
addressed the conflict within international law between humancentered human rights law and state-centered public international
law.359 Contemporary international law must make the “quantum
leap”360—through recognizing extraterritorial obligations of global
actors corresponding to human rights of individuals—to a humancentered normative and institutional order. In this sense, the
sustainable development agenda may play a crucial role in
promoting both the shift from a state-centered to a human-centered
global order and, due to its close interrelation with the human rights
agenda, the anchorage of this idea in contemporary international
law.
(4) According to the 2030 Agenda, a global partnership for
sustainable development should “work in a spirit of global
solidarity, in particular solidarity with the poorest and with people
in vulnerable situations.”361 In that light, development cooperation
agreements and programs should focus predominantly on the needs
and be formulated in the interests of the most vulnerable,
disempowered, marginalized, and socially excluded individuals,
especially those suffering from extreme poverty.362 The 2030 Agenda
expresses a commitment to “endeavour to reach the furthest behind
first.”363
The recognition of the urgent necessity to eradicate poverty and
provide secure access to a decent standard of living universally
forms an important element of a solidary vision upon which a global
partnership should be built. As demonstrated, the intention to leave
no one behind presumes adequate representation and meaningful
See Pribytkova, supra note 144, at 397.
See Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Growing Barriers: International Refugee
Law, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS 80-81 (Mark
Gibney & Sigrun Skogly eds., 2010).
361 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 39, pmbl.
362
The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation, supra
note 329.
363 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 4.
359
360
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participation of poor individuals and societies in designing and
implementing pro-poor development cooperation programs and
policies. Additionally, the idea of global solidarity calls for the
realization of global obligations to provide assistance for sustainable
development. That call is the subject of the next Section.
B. Global Development Assistance
Obligations of development assistance are closely interrelated
with obligations of cooperation: the effective realization of
obligations to assist presupposes a global partnership of multiple
actors, while the very opportunity of developing societies and poor
individuals to actively and meaningfully participate in decisionmaking processes relating to sustainable development may depend
on the implementation of global obligations to assist.
International human rights instruments prefer the language of
cooperation to the language of assistance.364 This can be seen in the
example of the DRD, which stresses, “as a complement to the efforts
of developing countries, effective international co-operation is essential
in providing these countries with appropriate means and facilities
to foster their comprehensive development.” 365 As the travaux
preparatoires testify, the original version of this article referred to
“effective international assistance” as a means for the realization of
the right to development, which was later replaced by a broader
concept of “effective international co-operation.” 366
The 2030 Agenda contains several important commitments in
regard to development assistance being an integral part of global
partnership commitments. 367 Since development assistance and
cooperation are two interconnected forms of global partnership for
364
For instance, neither the U.N. Charter (art. 1 para. 3, art. 55-56) nor the
UDHR (art. 22), the CRC (art. 4) nor the DRD (art. 3 para. 3, art. 4 para. 2, art. 6 para.
1), mention obligations to assist but do acknowledge obligations to cooperate. It
should be noted, however, that although it is not explicitly stated in the ICESCR
and the CRC, the CESCR and the U.N. CRC interpret obligations to assist as part of
obligations to cooperate.
365
DRD, supra note 21, art. 4, para. 2 (emphasis added).
366
Report of the working group of governmental experts on the right to
development. See SALOMON, supra note 10, at 77.
367 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 17.
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sustainable development, their targets intersect. 368 If the former
implies relations between donors (developed states) and recipients
of assistance (developing countries), the latter presupposes
interaction between equally empowered actors. For the purposes of
this part—to clarify the nature, status, content, and scope of
obligations of development cooperation and assistance—they are
analyzed separately. This Section seeks to shed light on global
obligations of development assistance.
Like cooperation, assistance for sustainable development is
considered to be both a means for and a separate goal of sustainable
development. SDG 17 specifies targets for international assistance
within global partnership guarantees: first, to assist developing
countries in mobilizing resources from multiple sources on local369
and international levels;370 second, to provide official development
assistance (hereinafter ODA), while reaching the donor’s target of
0.7% of GNI, including 0.15 to 0.20% of GNI for the least developed
states; 371 third, to assist developing states in achieving long-term
debt sustainability through promoting debt financing, relief and
restructuring and reducing debt distress of highly indebted poor
countries;372 fourth, to secure investment promotion regimes373 and
duty-free and quota-free market access 374 for the least developed
states; fifth, to enhance knowledge sharing with and technology
transfer to developing societies as well as their access to science,
technology and innovation, including through a “global technology
facilitation mechanism”; 375 and, finally, to intensify international
assistance to ensure effective and targeted capacity-building and
skills upgrading in developing countries in order to enable them to

See supra Section IV.A.
2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 17.1.
370 Id. SDG 17.3.
371 Id. SDG 17.2.
372 Id. SDG 17.4.
373 Id. SDG 17.5.
374 Id. SDG 17.12.
375 Id. SDG 17.6. The 2030 Agenda stresses a shared obligation of multiple
actors—governments, international organizations, the business sector, as well as
other non-state actors and individuals—to contribute to “financial and technical
assistance.” Id. para. 28.
368
369
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implement their own national sustainable development plans and
achieve the SDGs.376
In addition, the 2030 Agenda emphasizes that development
assistance is an indispensable measure for implementing the other
SDGs, such as promoting inclusive and sustainable economic
growth; full and productive employment and decent work for all;377
reducing inequality within and among countries; 378 and making
cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and
sustainable.379
Development assistance commitments expressed in the 2030
Agenda have the following features. First, they do not represent
claimable and enforceable human rights obligations, but rather
constitute humanitarian obligations of self-identified donors. 380
Second, the 2030 Agenda acknowledges only interactional global
obligations of development assistance and does not demand their
institutionalization. Third, the general state-centrism of the 2030
Agenda is reflected in its approach to development assistance.
Fourth, the 2030 Agenda sees obligations to provide ODA as binding
only on developed states; any rights and obligations of developing
countries to contribute to the realization of shared global
commitments of development assistance are non-existent. Fifth,
according to the 2030 Agenda, obligations of development assistance
are subsidiary and conditional on developing states’ inability to
realize their sustainable development commitments independently.
Let us take a closer look at these features of the 2030 Agenda’s
regulation of global commitments of development assistance as well
as the possibilities for its improvement.
(1) As demonstrated above in Section II.B, the 2030 Agenda
implicates sustainable development commitments that are nonclaimable and non-enforceable humanitarian self-obligations of
states. This also applies to commitments of development assistance.
As shown, the application of a human rights-based approach
requires harmonizing the human rights agenda and the sustainable
development agenda. This will not, however, solve the problem,
376
377
378
379
380

Id. SDG 17.9.
Id. SDG 8.a.
Id. SDG 10.b.
Id. SDG 11.c.
See supra Section II.B.
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since the status of global obligations to assist is disputed in human
rights theory and practice itself. In my dissertation, I argued that
global obligations to assist should be recognized as human rights
obligations.381 The recognition and realization of these obligations,
however, are important tasks for the further evolution of the human
rights agenda rather than a fact of modern legal reality. Perhaps a
closer interrelation of the human rights agenda and the sustainable
development
agenda
will
promote
the
recognition,
institutionalization, and implementation of global obligations to
assist.
Under which conditions and to what extent can obligations of
development assistance be claimable and enforceable? According to
the DRD, the right to development gives rise to corresponding
obligations of the international community to assist developing
countries—as a “complement” to their own efforts. It is possible to
conclude that the right to development implies the right of
developing countries (unable to realize the right to development to
the full extent) to seek development assistance and the correlative
obligations of members of the international community to cooperate
effectively and to provide the former “with appropriate means and
facilities to foster their comprehensive development.” 382 It is
important to note that the right to development, as formulated in the
DRD, presupposes the right of states to seek assistance, but not the
right to receive it. In this respect, according to the contemporary
sustainable development agenda, obligations to provide
development assistance represent beneficence commitments.383
In addition, the right to seek development assistance does not
mean that developing states are entitled to demand assistance from
any particular global actor. 384 It is a right directed against the
international community as a whole. The realization of this right
manifestly requires the institutionalization of obligations of
development assistance, i.e., the creation of a global system of
institutions through which requests for development assistance may
be elicited, collected and considered, obligations to assist may be
assigned to particular actors, necessary resources may be mobilized
381
382
383
384

See Pribytkova, supra note 3, at 222-333.
DRD, supra note 21, art. 4, para. 2.
See supra Section II.B.
See Alston, supra note 36, at 777.
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and distributed, and assistance practices may be monitored (see
below). Thus, the sustainable development agenda must find a way
to specify, allocate and institutionalize obligations of development
assistance. The implementation of these obligations must be
claimable on the basis of the internationally recognized sustainable
development
instruments
and/or
mutual
development
385
commitments between various global actors.
(2) The 2030 Agenda acknowledges only interactional obligations
of development assistance and does not demand their
institutionalization. As shown above, the SDGs place emphasis on
territorial institutional commitments relating to sustainable
development and leaves open the question of global institutional
improvements concerning development assistance. The 2030
Agenda relies on the OECD “donor club” for providing ODA386 and
bypasses the issue of creating a well-coordinated and efficient
system of global institutions for the realization of obligations of
Global institutional reforms
development assistance. 387
indispensable for the realization of obligations of development
assistance should incorporate three interrelated mechanisms:388 (a)
institutions necessary to accumulate means for development
assistance; (b) mechanisms for distributing these means among poor
individuals and societies; and (c) monitoring and accountability

See infra Section IV.C.
2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 17.2.
387
The OECD itself recognizes that financing the “ambitious” SDGs calls for
the reflection of “the vast and ongoing transformation of the international
development finance landscape.” ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., MEASURING
TOTAL
OFFICIAL
SUPPORT
FOR
SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT,
at
http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainabledevelopment/TOSSD%20flyer.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MM9-TS6E].
On the
inadequacy of the existing OECD mechanism for the realization of global
obligations of development assistance, see SACHS ET AL., supra note 12, at 22-24.
388
Among the most promising global projects that propose solutions for
designing these mechanisms one can mention, e.g., the World Development Fund
(Brandt Commission), the World Solidarity Fund (U.N.), the Global Fund for Social
Protection (Olivier De Schutter & Magdalena Sepúlveda), the Global Resources
Dividend (Thomas Pogge), the Health Impact Fund (Aidan Hollis & Thomas Pogge),
the Unconditional Basic Income (various authors); and a global initiative Move
Humanity (Jeffrey Sachs et al.). For an analysis of some of these proposals, see
Pribytkova, supra note 3, at 323-29.
385
386
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mechanisms for holding multiple actors responsible for breaches of
their obligations of development assistance.389
(3) The state-centrism of the 2030 Agenda relating to
development assistance commitments manifests itself in two ways.
First, it designates governments of developing states, rather than
poor individuals or social groups, as the recipients of development
assistance. 390 Second, despite its emphasis on the necessity to
develop a multilateral and multilevel partnership inclusive of all
global actors,391 it sees developed states as the principal providers of
development assistance.392
The 2030 Agenda presupposes state-centered international
assistance, which is aimed at enabling states to fulfill their territorial
human rights obligations and sustainable development
commitments. It does not guarantee, however, human-centered
global assistance that flows expressly to individuals or social groups
in need (even if it is provided through their states or other entities
domiciled in their states’ territory).
Thus, contemporary development assistance does not aim to
directly help the most vulnerable individuals and social groups, but
rather to support their state in implementing its obligations. A statecentered character of development assistance does not, therefore,
allow poor individuals and their non-state representatives to submit
a legitimate request for assistance. Since recipients of ODA are
developing countries, the majority of which are undemocratic,
people in these countries cannot effectively control their
governments’ activities related to seeking, receiving, and
distributing assistance. The lack of mechanisms for effective control
over development assistance administration and for direct global
See also Dann (2006), supra note 9.
The SDGs recommit to “providing focused and scaled-up assistance to
least developed countries and other countries in special situations, in line with
relevant support programmes.” 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 16.
391
2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 17; see also United Nations, Sustainable
Development Goals, Goal 17: Revitalize the global partnership for sustainable
development,
at
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/globalpartnerships/
[https://perma.cc/5UAC-Z22Y].
392
According to the OECD, “while private sector investment will be
fundamental, official development assistance (ODA) will continue to play a crucial
role, particularly for countries most in need.” ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV.,
supra note 387.
389
390

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/4

2020]

Global Obligations for Sustainable Development

1113

assistance enables states to abuse their representational functions.
Instead of using assistance to promote sustainable development and
support the poor, corrupt recipient governments only drive their
population into debt.393
I argue for the necessity to shift from state-centered
development assistance to a human-centered one.394 Two measures
are required to overcome state-centrism of contemporary
development assistance.
First, creating mechanisms for individuals’ participation in and
control over the process of the implementation of international
assistance, including the administration of international assistance
by their government. States should be recognized as bearers of
obligations to facilitate the implementation of their people’s right to
seek international assistance rather than as the holders of the right.395
The inability of a certain state to provide social support to their
residents promptly and in full should give rise to the obligation of
the state to seek international assistance.396 In the role of a facilitator
of the right to international assistance, the state would per se
“redirect” a request of its residents for social support to the
international level. 397 The recognition of this obligation would
393
The CESCR has indicated many cases of “mismanagement of international
cooperation aid,” “unbalanced budgetary allocations” (especially “low budgetary
allocations to the social sectors”), and “the limited effectiveness of the use of foreign
funds” that constitute “serious breaches” of states’ human rights obligations. See
U.N. CESCR, Concluding observations on the Second Periodic Report of Georgia, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.83, para. 11 (Dec. 19, 2002); U.N. CESCR, Concluding
observations on the Combined Second to Fourth Periodic Reports of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/COD/CO/4, para. 16 (Dec. 16, 2009); see
also ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., PARIS DECLARATION ON AID EFFECTIVENESS
art. 4, para. 5 (Mar. 2, 2005) [hereinafter PARIS DECLARATION]; ORG. FOR ECON.
COOPERATION & DEV., BUSAN PARTNERSHIP FOR EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION art. 33 (Dec. 1, 2011) [hereinafter BUSAN PARTNERSHIP]; POGGE, supra note
14, at 49f; MOYO, supra note 12, at ch. 4.
394 See Pribytkova, supra note 3, at 276-82.
395 See SALOMON, supra note 10, at 114f.
396 See ICESCR, supra note 171, art. 2, para. 1, art. 11. The Maastricht Principles
claim the recognition of the obligations of states to seek international assistance.
ETO CONSORTIUM, supra note 145, at princ. 34.
397
Though international human rights law has not yet acknowledged this
obligation, the CESCR often encourages states to seek international assistance. See,
e.g., U.N. CESCR, Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Yemen,
E/C.12/YEM/2, para. 4 (2011); U.N. CESCR, Concluding observations on the second
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require the creation of mechanisms which allow individuals to claim
the implementation of the obligation to seek international
development assistance by their state, and to call the latter to
account for its failure to fulfill this obligation.
Second, elaborating non-state, non-bureaucratic and inclusive
mechanisms for direct global assistance (or improving and
expanding already existing private and public channels of direct
support, for instance, conditional and unconditional cash transfer
programs), which would enable poor individuals and their
democratically representative communities to submit a request for
global assistance. This implies the recognition of individuals as
independent full-fledged subjects of diagonal extraterritorial legal
relations and their right to formulate a legitimate request for
assistance, to control the behavior of global actors providing
assistance and to hold them accountable for their failure to fulfill
global obligations to assist. This measure does not demand
abolishing international assistance, but rather supplementing it
through global assistance.
Recent research draws attention to the fact that the state is
incapable of solving all sustainable development problems. 398 In
now-widely accepted views of governance, states should transform
from power “monopolists” and major “problem-solvers” to
“managers of political authority” articulating pressing social
problems and promoting multilevel and multi-stakeholder
partnerships for finding appropriate solutions.399 This also applies
to obligations of development assistance. Overcoming the statecentrism of development assistance also presupposes the
acknowledgement that not only states, but all members of the
international community, as elaborated in Section IV.A, are bearers
of shared global obligations of development assistance.
periodic report of China, including Hong Kong, China and Macao, China,
E/C.12/CHN/CO/2, para. 12 (2014).
398
SACHS, supra note 12, at 496f; SACHS ET AL., supra note 12, at 1-2;
MONKELBAAN, supra note 13, at 58.
399
See MONKELBAAN, supra note 13, at 58, 79; Philipp Genschel & Bernhard
Zangl, Transformations of the State. From Monopolist to Manager of Political Authority,
76 TRANSTATE WORKING PAPERS 1 (2008); Jorge Soto, The Weakening of Representative
Democracy, Outlook on the Global Agenda 2015, WORLD ECON. F. (2016),
https://widgets.weforum.org/outlook15/05.html
[https://perma.cc/7PQFPYAV].
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(4) According to the 2030 Agenda, obligations to provide ODA
bind only the OECD developed states, 400 while the right and
obligations of developing countries to contribute to the realization
of shared global commitments of development assistance are not
specified. As shown above in Section IV.A, the dominant pattern of
development assistance cooperation must be changed from the
traditional bilateral donor-recipient relations 401 to a multistakeholder partnership.
According to the principle of the “ownership of development
priorities by developing countries,” 402 the latter should be
empowered to become equal and full-fledged co-authors of the
global development assistance agenda as well as co-equal actors in
its implementation. All development assistance programs should
be designed and realized in partnership with poor communities and
authorized representatives acting in their interests in order to ensure
that the voices of the poor are heard. Global actors, especially
NGOs, should collaborate with poor communities in building
arenas in which the latter can formulate their authentic demands for
development assistance, to understand and claim the realization of
their human right to development and other basic socio-economic
rights, as well as use current local, regional, and international
mechanisms for holding global actors accountable.403
400
In 2019, ODA amounted only to $152.8 billion, which is extremely
insufficient for achieving the SDGs, and only a small portion of it was directed to
least developed countries ($33 billion). See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV.,
AID BY DAC MEMBERS INCREASES IN 2019 WITH MORE AID TO THE POOREST COUNTRIES,
at
https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/
development-finance-data/ODA-2019-detailed-summary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KY7X-44HL].
401
This feature is inherited from the MDGs that interpreted “global
partnership” as relations of development assistance, that is, bilateral donorrecipient relations between developed and developing countries. See supra Section
II.A.
402
See BUSAN PARTNERSHIP, supra note 393, art. 11(a). Contemporary (soft) law
instruments requiring the recognition of developing countries as partners and
leaders in assistance cooperation are still based on the traditional distinction
between donors and recipients. See, e.g., PARIS DECLARATION, supra note 393, art. 14;
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., THE ACCRA AGENDA FOR ACTION paras. 8, 1214 (Sept. 4, 2008) [hereinafter AAA].
403
Cf., e.g., Gay J. McDougall, A Decade of NGO Struggle, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 12
(2004); Heena Shah Phillips, A Rights-Based Approach to Lawyering: Legal
Empowerment as an Alternative to Legal Aid in Post-Disaster Haiti, 10 NW. UNIV. J. INT’L
HUM. RTS. 7 (2011).
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To ensure that the contemporary development assistance
agenda is truly global, cross-culturally legitimate and pro-poor
oriented, several important steps are required: the democratization
of international institutions 404 as well as guarantees of nondiscrimination, non-domination, and the active and meaningful
participation of developing states and poor communities in the core
international agenda-setting relating to global assistance. This will
also allow developing societies to realize their right to contribute to
global poverty eradication.405
Assistance is not limited to financial support but includes also
other forms, such as legal, social, technical, informational, scientific,
and educational assistance as well as the protection of interests in
the international arena.
Every developing community has,
therefore, the capacity to promote, to varying degrees, the
implementation of shared obligations of development assistance.
This is empirically proven by the fact that in recent times, many
middle-income and even low-income countries are involved in
various assistance programs through South-South and triangular
cooperation. 406 Even developing states that require support for
themselves often take on obligations to assist other poor
communities. On top of that, they share their valuable experience
concerning efficient strategies of poverty alleviation.407
(5) The U.N. stresses that the primary responsibility for states’
sustainable development lies on them.408 In line with contemporary

404
SALOMON, supra note 10, at 46; Ralph Wilde, Dilemmas in Promoting Global
Economic Justice through Human Rights Law, in THE FRONTIERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 127
(Nehal Bhuta ed., 2016).
405 See supra Section IV.A.
406 See infra Section IV.C.
407
See AAA, supra note 402, art. 5, art. 19(b); BUSAN PARTNERSHIP, supra note
393, art. 14.
408
Promoting self-help and self-reliance of developing states is considered to
be one of the major methods of fighting poverty. At the same time, the U.N. General
Assembly acknowledges that “however great their own efforts, these will not be
sufficient to enable them to achieve the desired development goals as expeditiously
as they must unless they are assisted through increased financial resources and
more favourable economic and commercial policies on the part of developed
countries.” G.A. Res. 2626, International Development Strategy for the Second
United Nations Development Decade, para. 11 (Oct. 24, 1970).
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human rights law,409 sustainable development agenda introduces a
two-level model of sustainable development commitments. As
mentioned above in Section III.A, the DRD and the 2030 Agenda
embody the principle that international obligations for sustainable
development are secondary obligations, which are complementary
to the home state’s primary obligations for sustainable
development. 410 The 2030 Agenda reaffirms the obligation to
“respect each country’s policy space and leadership to establish and
implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable
development,” 411 while “remaining consistent with relevant
international rules and commitments.”412 In this context, obligations
of development assistance are portrayed as conditional and
subsidiary commitments.
In other words, the provision of
development assistance is conditioned on a developing state’s
inability to fulfill its territorial obligations for sustainable
development.413
Taking into account the variety of obligations of development
assistance analyzed above—international and global obligations as
well as interactional and institutional obligations to assist—this rule
must be reshaped. While international assistance directed to states is
indeed conditional on these states’ inability to guarantee the
409
The ICESCR interprets socio-economic rights as claim-rights primarily
addressed to the state and secondarily to the global community. ICESCR, supra
note 171, art. 2, para. 1, art. 11. On subsidiarity of international obligations to assist
in the realization of socio-economic rights, see, e.g., Ashfaq Khalfan, Division of
Responsibility between States, in GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 299, 331
(Malcolm Langford et al. eds. 2013); Wouter Vandenhole & Wolfgang Benedek,
Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations and the North-South Divide, in GLOBAL
JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 332, 338 (Malcolm Langford et al. eds.
2013).
410
See DRD, supra note 21, art. 4, para. 2; the 2030 Agenda also states that “each
country has primary responsibility for its own economic and social development.”
2030 Agenda, supra note 4, paras. 41, 63.
411 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 17.15.
412 Id. paras. 21, 63. The 2030 Agenda also stresses the importance of “regional
and sub-regional frameworks” which “can facilitate the effective translation of
sustainable development policies into concrete action at the national level.” Id.
para. 21.
413
Conditionality of global obligations of development assistance should not
to be confused with conditionality of assistance. For a discussion of conditionalities
of assistance, see Pribytkova, supra note 3, at 310-12, 320-21.
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realization of the right to development to the full extent, this
principle cannot be automatically applied to both interactional and
institutional global obligations of development assistance.
As
demonstrated, all individuals have the right to a just and sustainable
global order in which their right to development and corresponding
obligations of development assistance may be realized. 414 Global
institutional obligations to create and maintain a fair and sustainable
global institutional scheme indispensable for providing global
development assistance are primary and not conditioned on states’
inability or unwillingness to fulfil their territorial sustainable
development obligations.
Global interactional obligations of
development assistance may be conditional on individuals’ initial
requests for support from their state and, thereby, subsidiary in
relation to states’ territorial obligations. In emergency situations,
however, parallel requests for national and global development
assistance must be permitted.415
In my dissertation, I defended the idea that the scope of global
obligations to assist should be determined by the principles of
sufficiency and a decent minimum sacrifice. The principle of
sufficiency establishes an external border for global actors’ freedom
to dispose of their funds. The right to development implies that
global actors align their priorities with the obligations to contribute
to the creation of a fair and sustainable global order and provide
development assistance. At the same time, the role of an internal
criterion of the scope of global development assistance should be
played by the principle of decent minimum sacrifice. This means
that the burdens of development assistance should be generally
consistent with public and private actors’ fundamental interests,
goals, human rights and obligations. Requests for development
assistance that overreach this decent minimum level of sacrifice do
not correspond to the criteria of human rights-based obligations or
strong beneficence commitments and their satisfaction should be left
to the discretion of global actors. The convergence between the
principle of sufficiency and the principle of a decent minimum
sacrifice may be achieved through the fair distribution of the

414
415

See supra Section III.B.
See Pribytkova, supra note 3, at 272-74.
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burdens of development assistance among all members of the
international community.416
The U.N. target for ODA, which currently amounts to 0.7% of
GNI and is designed to be gradually increased to 1% of GNI, may
serve as an example of this convergence, since it is considered to be
both sufficient for progressive eradication of poverty (combined
with other public and private actors’ contributions)417 and not too
burdensome for states.418
Contemporary mechanisms and practices of development
assistance are targets of strong and justified criticism for being
insufficient, inefficient and violating human rights of recipients of
assistance. 419 Since development assistance and cooperation are
essential for reducing extreme poverty and inequality, empowering
the most vulnerable individuals and societies, and realizing both
human rights and sustainable development agendas, the
recognition, institutionalization, and implementation of obligations
of development assistance and cooperation are tasks of
extraordinary importance.
Institutional obligations of development cooperation and
assistance aimed at creating and maintaining a just and sustainable
global structure call for the substantial transformations of
contemporary global order. Some of them will be discussed in the
next Section.

Id. at 293-96.
According to Move Humanity’s initiative, in addition to ODA, which should
be increased through the engagement of all high income and upper middle-income
countries, financing for SDGs calls for new forms of taxation of multiple actors and
enhanced philanthropy by world’s richest individuals. See SACHS ET AL., supra note
12, at 24-26.
418
See Shah, supra note 15. In 2019, however, only 0.30% of the “donor club”
countries’ combined GNI was reached. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV.,
supra note 400. Apparently, the same reasoning of a decent minimum sacrifice
underlies the Move Humanity’s proposal of 1% SDG wealth tax of the world’s
billionaires and “ultra-high-net worth individuals,” which would bring additional
$420 billion per year (ca. 2.7 times more than the current ODA rate—$152.8 billion).
SACHS ET AL., supra note 12, at 26.
419 See Pribytkova, supra note 3, at 305-315.
416
417
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C. Institutionalizing Global Partnership
Globalization brings about various institutionalization processes
in the extraterritorial domain. 420 The need for institutionalizing
sustainable development commitments for global partnership has
been widely stressed by researchers and practitioners.421 A human
right-based approach to development advocates for the shared
obligations of all members of the international community to
contribute to creating and maintaining a just and sustainable global
institutional scheme, which includes mechanisms for accumulating
and distributing means for sustainable development programs,
allocating duties to multiple actors, governing and monitoring the
performance of those duties, and holding actors responsible for
violations of their sustainable development obligations. 422
However, as shown, the 2030 Agenda places emphasis on territorial
institutional reforms, while the task remains to significantly extend
global institutional changes in order to fully realize a more robust
normative program of sustainable development.
There is no single way to institutionalize the sustainable
development commitments contained by the 2030 Agenda. On the
contrary, there are numerous traditional state-centered and
alternative, more informal and non-bureaucratic institutional
solutions for global partnership that are intensively discussed by
scholars and practitioners.423 This Section briefly reviews some (the
most promising) of these solutions, brings into sharp focus their
strengths and weaknesses, analyzes to what extent they correspond
to the principles of global partnership, and examines what further
improvements are desirable.
State-centered avenues to institutionalize global partnership for
sustainable development are represented by two models of
development compacts, comprising two sets of mutual
commitments between North-South and South-South countries.
420
See, e.g., Andreas Rasche & Dirk Ulrich Gilbert, Institutionalizing Global
Governance: the Role of the United Nations Global Compact, 21 BUS. ETHICS: EURO. REV.
100, 104-105 (2012); TAN, supra note 159, 29.
421
See MONKELBAAN, supra note 13; SACHS ET AL., supra note 12; Pogge &
Sengupta, supra note 1.
422 See supra Section III.B.
423
See Rasche & Gilbert, supra note 420, at 104-105.
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Arjun Sengupta proposes “development compacts” as an
instrument to apply a human rights-based approach to development
and the implementation of the right to development.424 At the heart
of this idea lies the concept of “development contracts” suggested in
1989 by Thorvald Stoltenberg, who, at that time, served as the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway. Stoltenberg proposed that
short-term and ineffective adjustment programs “be replaced with
more comprehensive ‘Development Contracts,’ which could be
defined as a comprehensive instrument for the financing of a
medium- and long-term development plan prepared by a
developing country itself (with outside technical support where
Sengupta maintains that North-South
appropriate).” 425
development compacts should be concluded between developed
and developing countries and provide a normative basis for their
collaborative development programs, as well as for their mutual and
“callable” obligations. He suggests that obligations imposed on
developing states on a unilateral basis should be counterbalanced
by reciprocal obligations of the international community. 426
Developing states would be required to realize their territorial
human rights obligations relating to sustainable development to the
maximum of their capacities, while developed countries and
international organizations would be responsible for providing the
former with resources necessary for the fulfillment of their
obligations.
Sengupta suggested creating “a focal organization where
members of the international community can meet and work with
those developing countries willing to enter into development
compacts.” In his scheme, this focal organization coordinating
collaboration between donors and developing countries would be
424
Arjun Sengupta, Aid and Development Policy in the 1990s, 37 ECON. POL.
WKLY 453 (1993); see also Study on the Current State of Progress in the
Implementation of the Right to Development, supra note 147, paras. 65-66;
Sengupta, supra note 98, at paras. 56-74.
425
Thorvald Stoltenberg, Towards a World Development Strategy, in ONE WORLD
OR SEVERAL?: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY SYMPOSIUM OF THE O.E.C.D. 241242 (Louis Emmerij ed., 1989); see Chaturvedi, supra note 357, at 5.
426
In Sengupta’s plausible opinion, “one lesson that has been learnt from the
experience of international cooperation is that one-sided conditionality imposed on
a party, even if in principle it is beneficial for the party, seldom works and is
honoured more often in the breach than in the observance.” Sengupta, supra note
98, at paras. 53-54.
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based on the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC).
Each developing country willing to gain international support in the
realization of the right to development would submit a request for a
development compact to the DAC. It would also elaborate and put
forward a country-specific sustainable development plan
designating particular measures to be undertaken for implementing
the SDGs, identifying its own commitments as well as its needs for
international assistance. Members of the international community,
especially U.N. agencies and international financial institutions
(including the World Bank and the IMF) and independent external
experts, would provide developing countries with technical
assistance in designing their sustainable development plans.
Developing states’ obligations would consist of ensuring the fullfledged and meaningful participation of all individuals and social
groups, especially the most vulnerable, in the process of formulating
the sustainable development program.
In Sengupta’s proposal, the DAC would establish a special
“support group” composed of self-identified donor countries,
regional development agencies and banks, as well as representatives
of international organizations (including: the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, FAO, UNICEF, WHO, IMF, and
World Bank) and NGOs. The support group’s mandate would be to
review and approve the development plan suggested by a
developing state, allocate concrete obligations to the group’s
members, specify methods of providing sufficient ODA, and
“monitor and adjudicate on the fulfilment of the obligations and
conditionalities accepted by the developing countries.” The burden
of financing the realization of development compacts would fall on
OECD donors. The support group would create a “new financing
facility called the Fund for Financing Development Compacts”
replenished through the deduction of 0.7% of GNI for ODA. 427
This general type of North-South development compact
represents a toolkit to enshrine mutual obligations of developed and
developing states, giving rise to the entitlement of the latter to the
assistance of the former. On the basis of development compacts,
developing countries that have fulfilled their obligations to the best
of their abilities would submit a legitimate request for developed
countries’ assistance in the realization of their territorial obligations.
427

Sengupta, supra note 98, paras. 58-67.
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In this sense, North-South development compacts are designed to
guarantee the developing states’ full realization of their sustainable
development programs and projects and, therefore, the enjoyment
of the right to development by their residents and citizens will not
be jeopardized by the lack of sufficient resources.428
Sengupta stresses that development compacts should embrace
not only resource transfer, but also other types of international
support, such as securing fair trade conditions and market access for
developing states, ensuring debt rescheduling and financial
restructuring, and promoting investment, technology transfer and
knowledge exchange.429 These important measures were specified
in the 2030 Agenda.430
It is important to emphasize that for Sengupta, the
implementation of development programs is inextricably linked
with the realization of human rights. The Commission on Human
Rights Working Group on the Right to Development reaffirms that:
[T]he logic of a development compact rests on the acceptance
by and a legal commitment of the international community
to pursue, individually and collectively, the universal
realization of all human rights and, on their part, for the
developing countries to follow explicitly a development
strategy geared towards the universal realization of human
rights.431
The idea of the North-South development compact was taken up
in the Human Development Report 2003. The report set out a
Millennium Development Compact as a partnership between
developing and developed states aimed at implementing the MDGs
and assigning obligations for sustainable development “squarely on
428
As Sengupta notes, the major intention of North-South development
compacts is “to assure the developing countries that if they fulfil their part of the
bargain and carried out their obligations, the programme will not be derailed
because of the lack of international cooperation.” Id. paras. 64-65.
429
Sengupta also proposes that in cases where these measures are efficient,
the provision of ODA may not be needed. See Sengupta, supra note 98, paras. 6465; see also POGGE, supra note 14, at 20.
430 See supra Section IV.B.
431
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Review of progress and obstacles in the
promotion, implementation, operationalization, and enjoyment of the right to development,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/WG.18/2, para. 36 (Feb. 17, 2004).
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both sides: requiring bold reforms from poor countries and obliging
donor countries to step forward and support those efforts.” 432
Through this global compact the “world community can work
together to help poor countries achieve” the MDGs, since it
demands all stakeholders—rich and poor countries, public and
private international actors and civil society organizations—to
combine their efforts to implement their shared mutual obligations
for sustainable development and, in return, entitles them to claim
their realization from other parties. Being parties to development
compacts, developing states may insist that developed countries
provide them with increased international financial and
technological assistance, debt relief, and better market access; poor
individuals can demand that their governments accumulate and
manage resources more effectively and hold them accountable for
reaching poverty reduction targets within a certain timeframe; and
developed countries can claim that developing states implement
effective, equitable, and accountable use of international
assistance.433
Many of the North-South development compact’s institutional
arrangements comply with the principles of partnership set out in
the 2030 Agenda. However, this development compact model has a
number of evident shortcomings. First, although the obligations of
developing and developed states are mutual and reciprocal,
relations between them are still unequal (vertical) relations of
dependency between donors and recipients that contradict the
principle of partnership sealed in the SDGs.434 Second, though they
are presumed to be concluded in the interests of developing states,
North-South development compacts are often constructed
disproportionately in the interests of donors states.435 Third, they
432
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
2003, MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: A COMPACT AMONG NATIONS TO END
HUMAN POVERTY, at V (2003).
433 Id. at 15, 20, 145.
434
Besides exacerbating already poor practices of inequality, relations of
dependency proved to be inefficient. See, e.g., ACTIONAID, REAL AID: ENDING AID
DEPENDENCY 17-18 (2011); MOYO, supra note 12, at ch. 4-5.
435
See Clair Apodaca, Foreign Aid as a Foreign Policy Tool, in OXFORD RESEARCH
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS (2017); Chaturvedi, supra note 357, at 4;
Richard Manning, Aid as a Second-Best Solution: Seven Problems of Effectiveness and
How to Tackle Them, 21f (World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
24, 2012).
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authorize or permit excessive interference by developed states in the
internal affairs of developing states, on the ever-available pretext
that effective use of international assistance demands “good
governance.” 436 Fourth, conditionalities imposed by developed
states and international financial institutions on developing
countries in many cases violate human rights and may “have more
adverse consequences than the initial problem itself.” 437 Fifth,
despite the declared commitments to promote the participation of
all stakeholders, the North-South development compacts remain
primarily state-centered.
Another development compact model emerged, partly as a
response to the inadequacy of the North-South cooperation pattern,
through relations among actors from the South. Through SouthSouth partnerships, developing countries have demonstrated their
unwillingness to be dependent exclusively upon developed states’
assistance as well as their strong intention to support each other in
getting out of poverty. 438 Global South countries’ common
experience and views on efficient development strategies, their
mutual sympathies and sense of solidarity, and their strategic goal
of countering the power of Global North states, catalyze SouthSouth cooperation.439 Contributions of South-South cooperation to
sustainable development and, in particular to poverty eradication,
have substantially increased in recent years. 440 Some emerging
economies (for instance, Brazil, China, India, Qatar, South Africa)
have become major donors of development assistance to developing
countries. 441 South-South partnership embraces not only direct
436
See ERIC POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 61 (2014); ISSA G.
SHIVJI, SILENCES IN NGO DISCOURSE: THE ROLE AND FUTURE OF NGOS IN AFRICA 14-16,
41 (2007); Wilde, supra note 404, at 143-45.
437
See Chaturvedi, supra note 357, at 4; see also Edmar L. Bacha, IMF
Conditionality: Conceptual Problems and Policy Alternatives, 15 WORLD DEV. 1457
(1987); Milindo Chakrabarti, Development Compact—The Cornerstone of India’s
Development Cooperation: An ‘Externalities’ Perspective, 53 INT’L STUD. 6 (2017).
438
See e.g., Chaturvedi, supra note 357, at 1.
439 See, e.g., G.A. Res. A/64/L.37, Nairobi Outcome Document of the HighLevel United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation, paras. 17-18 (Dec.
21, 2009) [hereinafter Nairobi Outcome Document].
440 See G.A. Res. 71/244, South-South Cooperation, para. 7 (Dec. 21, 2016)
[hereinafter South-South Cooperation].
441
See Chaturvedi, supra note 357; Chakrabarti, supra note 437; Shailly Nigam,
The Challenges Faced Across South-South Cooperation, 4 J. WORLD ECON. RES. 27 (2015).
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development assistance, debt forgiveness or cost-sharing projects,
but also capacity-building training programs and scholarships,
duty-free trade regimes and investment programs, technology and
knowledge exchange, as well as joint scientific projects.442
The South-South development compact model is characterized
by several important strengths over the North-South development
compact pattern: first, it initiates horizontal relations, in which
participants are equal and full-fledged partners and agents of
sustainable development, promoting developing states’ selfreliance; second, it presupposes a win-win collaboration that
embodies a principle of reciprocity not only in the sense of reciprocal
obligations, but also of mutual gain and growth opportunities; third,
it respects the principles of national sovereignty and noninterference in domestic affairs; and fourth, it does not impose
conditionalities on recipients of assistance. 443
South-South
development compacts strive to embody principles and good
practices of global partnership for sustainable development,
including the primacy of national responsibility and ownership,
independence, self-reliance, respect for sovereignty, nonconditionality, equality, solidarity, mutual accountability,
transparency, and effective cooperation.444 It is true, however, that
an objective assessment of the South-South development compacts’
effectiveness and positive contribution to the achievement of the
SDGs requires deep empirical study that is beyond the scope of this
Article.445
Broadening and deepening South-South cooperation catalyzes
positive changes within the framework of the global partnership for
sustainable development, in particular influencing practices of
442
Sachin Chaturvedi distinguishes between five areas of arrangements
within South-South development compacts, which correspond to the main aspects
of development assistance specified in the 2030 Agenda (see Section IV.B): capacity
building, trade and investment, development finance, grants, and technology
exchange. Chaturvedi, supra note 357, at 10, 13; see also Chakrabarti, supra note 437,
at 11; Nairobi Outcome Document, supra note 439, para. 15.
443
See Chaturvedi, supra note 357, at 1.
444 Nairobi Outcome Document, supra note 439; South-South Cooperation,
supra note 440, para. 5; see also Chakrabarti, supra note 437, at 6.
445
On problems of domination and other bad practices within South-South
cooperation, see, e.g., KRISTOFFER NILAUS TARP & SIGNE MARIE COLD-RAVNKILDE,
ADDRESSING THE DILEMMAS IN SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION (2015); Apodaca, supra
note 435.
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North-South cooperation. The U.N. General Assembly stresses,
however, that “South-South cooperation is not a substitute for, but
rather a complement to, North-South cooperation.”446 Participants
in South-South cooperation patently continue to require
international support to overcome poverty within their territory and
enhance their capacities.
A partial solution may be found in triangular cooperation that
combines a (vertical) international assistance model with
(horizontal) collaboration projects.
Paying attention to the
asymmetries in Global South states’ development, the U.N. calls for
two different types of development assistance, the first aimed “to
meet the basic survival needs of those at the bottom rungs of
development,” and the second, to answer “the needs of those who
are advanced in the development scale.”447 At the same time, the
role of the U.N. as a whole and its particular agencies is to facilitate
South-South and triangular cooperation, “while collecting,
analysing and disseminating best practices and lessons derived
from its ongoing development programmes.”448
A substantial deficiency of prevailing partnership patterns,
represented by North-South and South-South development
compacts, is their state-centrism and hierarchical top-down
approach, which ignore full-fledged agency, obligations, and
accountability of non-state actors, and above all the leading role of
civil society for achieving the SDGs. There is a wide consensus that
the “command-and-control” model of state-based governance is
ineffective in the contemporary context of multi-level, multi-agent
extraterritorial relations.449
In accordance with the principles of global partnership
formulated in Sections IV.A and IV.B, several important measures
should be undertaken. First, multi-stakeholder and multi-level
cooperation should be promoted, which involves not only North
446
On “the complementary nature of South-South to North-South
cooperation”, see, e.g., South-South Cooperation, supra note 440, paras. 5, 9.
447 Promotion of South-South Cooperation for Development, supra note 347, at para.
89.
448 South-South Cooperation, supra note 440, paras. 14, 17.
449
Rasche & Gilbert, supra note 420, at 102; MONKELBAAN, supra note 13, at 40;
see also Guido Palazzo & Andreas Georg Scherer, Globalization and Corporate Social
Responsibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 415
(Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008).
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and South states, but also non-state actors, including NGOs, private
entities, civil society, and academia, as full-fledged partners for
sustainable development. 450 In order to be efficient and avoid
becoming “closed-clubs,” global partnerships should embrace all
actors and provide mechanisms for symmetrizing power in
prevailing relations of domination and subordination among states,
non-state organizations, and individuals. 451 Second, individuals
should be recognized as both major right-holders, beneficiaries and
duty-bearers of sustainable development, that is, both their claimrights to which global obligations of multiple actors correspond and
their own global obligations for sustainable development should be
acknowledged. Third, the accountability of multiple actors for
breaches of their global obligations for sustainable development
should be enhanced; this is an essential precondition for the effective
realization of the sustainable development agenda.
Diverse alternative approaches to global governance underscore
a fundamental defect of the hierarchical, top-down and statecentered approach of the 2030 Agenda. Achieving the SDGs as well
as harmonizing and coordinating universal goals and local needs,
extraterritorial and territorial structural changes, top-down and
bottom-up initiatives, centralized and decentralized programs, and
binding obligations and voluntary commitments, requires both
traditional and innovative approaches to governance and
accountability.
Among innovative approaches, polycentric governance,
network-based governance, experimentalist governance, and
metagovernance deserve special mention. Polycentric conceptions
stress that “effective global governance institutions are necessarily
polycentric in nature,” 452 i.e., decision-making and institutiondesigning relating to the SDGs should be spread among various
independent centers at different levels. A network-based approach
functions through multiple autonomous agents acting in various
national and transnational arenas and linked by shared goals rather
than legal obligations.453 Experimentalist forms of governance shift
450
Nairobi Outcome Document, supra note 439, para. 19; South-South
Cooperation, supra note 440, para. 24; Rasche & Gilbert, supra note 420, at 102-04.
451
Rasche & Gilbert, supra note 420, at 107.
452
MONKELBAAN, supra note 13, at 32.
453
Rasche & Gilbert, supra note 420, at 104.
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the burden of responsibility for the elaboration, implementation,
and monitoring of general norms (resulting from a universal
political overlapping consensus)454 to local levels, while activating
the inclusive, participatory and non-hierarchical collaboration
among various national and global actors pursuing the SDGs in their
own way and sharing their valuable experiences and lessons
learned.455 Addressing multilevel interactions of public and private
sectors as well as civil society, a metagovernance approach intends to
integrate and coordinate hierarchical, network and market
governance modes and employ their advantages to increase the fullfledged participation of multiple actors and make highly
fragmented and complex global governance more coherent.456
These governance approaches partly overlap and complement
each other in such important aspects as polycentricity, diversity,
decentralization, multi-levelness, deliberation, power-sharing,
inclusiveness, participation, bottom-up orientation, voluntariness of
commitments, as well as informal and non-bureaucratic agendasetting and institution-building. All of them should be engaged,
integrated, and balanced to both create new and modify the existing
multi-level and multi-actor institutional architectures indispensable
for reaching the SDGs. 457 Though these alternative governance
454
According to John Rawls, a universal overlapping consensus may be
reached only politically, i.e., “each of the comprehensive philosophical, religious,
and moral doctrines accepts justice as fairness in its own way.” John Rawls, Justice
as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 247 (1985).
455
Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin define experimentalist governance as
“a machine for learning from diversity.” Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin,
Experimentalist Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 169, 175
(David Levi-Faur ed., 2012); see also Gráinne de Búrca, Robert O. Keohane, &
Charles Sabel, New Modes of Pluralist Global Governance, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
723 (2013); Gráinne de Búrca, Robert O. Keohane, & Charles Sabel, Global
Experimentalist Governance, 44 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 477 (2014); Gráinne de Búrca, Human
Rights Experimentalism, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 277 (2017).
456
See LOUIS MEULEMAN, PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND THE METAGOVERNANCE OF
HIERARCHIES, NETWORKS AND MARKETS: THE FEASIBILITY OF DESIGNING AND
MANAGING GOVERNANCE STYLE COMBINATIONS 11 (2008); MONKELBAAN, supra note
13, at 27-32.
457
For an excellent overview of alternative approaches to institutionalizing
the SDGs and suggestions of ways on how to integrate them, see MONKELBAAN,
supra note 13. Examples of institutions aimed at facilitating global partnership for
sustainable development are numerous and include but are not limited to the U.N.
Sustainable Development Solutions Network, the U.N. Global Compact, the World
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models rely on common goals and commitments rather than on
human rights-based obligations, 458 this does not exclude the
possibility that they become a platform for concluding specific
multilateral cooperation agreements, following, even while
modifying, the general schema of North-South and South-South
development compacts.
In conclusion, a few lines should be devoted to issues
surrounding accountability for the SDGs. As mentioned, periodic
monitoring is the only form of accountability required by the 2030
Agenda. This must be greatly strengthened.
The U.N. High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable
Development should play a key role in reviewing the realization of
sustainable development commitments at the global level.459 SDG
17 requires developing measurements of progress on sustainable
development.460 The global indicator framework, which currently
embraces 247 (231 unique) indicators for the SDGs, was elaborated
by the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators (IAEGSDGs), and, after agreement with the U.N. Statistical Commission,
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly (2017).461
On the one hand, SDGs’ indicators represent definite strengths
of the 2030 Agenda, because they determine firm benchmarks for
monitoring the progressive realization of global obligations for
sustainable development.462 On the other hand, the SDG monitoring
processes are targets of extensive criticism for several reasons. First,
the redundancy of global, regional and local indicators significantly
complicates the monitoring process. This issue may be resolved by
formulating a set of key global indicators. Second, there is no
Business Council for Sustainable Development, the B20, the Global Sustainability
Network, and the Global Business Alliance for 2030.
458
For an analysis of alternative governance modes for human rights, see de
Búrca, supra note 455.
459
See High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, UNITED NATIONS,
at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/hlpf [https://perma.cc/48TQ-WSS9].
460 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 17.19.
461 Work of the Statistical Commission pertaining to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, General Assembly Resolution, U.N. Doc. A/RES/71/313, annex (Jul.
6, 2017); UNSTATS, SDG Indicators, Global indicator framework for the Sustainable
Development Goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, at
https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/indicators-list [https://perma.cc/Z9H898XS].
462
SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 32-33.
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common approach to identifying the content, scope and number of
national indicators to monitor the realization of the SDGs, which
range from 34 in Belgium to 244 in Canada. Eurostat has identified
100 indicators to monitor the E.U.’s implementation of its SDGs
obligations. 463 Bringing (where possible) national and regional
indicators in line with key global indicators, while leaving enough
space for country-specific metrics, would be a solution to this
problem and establish a necessary balance between the principles of
the “ownership of development priorities” and universality of
sustainable development commitments. Third, the process of
elaborating global indicators on the SDGs is still incomplete and
many important indicators and targets are still missing, preventing
timely and quality monitoring. 464 The process of the creation of
relevant global indicators should be intensified and made more
inclusive for all stakeholders. Fourth, since much of the data
necessary for a full and unbiased assessment of the SDGs’
realization is currently lacking, there is a tendency to choose those
indicators for which measurable data is available instead of those
that give a correct picture of the progress of sustainable
development. 465 Strengthening accountability for sustainable
development is impossible without promoting the collection of data,
which is necessary for SDGs monitoring, by both public and private
actors. Fifth, states and international organizations are often a
biased source of SDG implementation reports, in light of obviously
distorted incentives. 466 In order to establish independent and
credible monitoring mechanisms which assess the effectiveness of
development programs and projects and their accordance with
human rights, one should guarantee the inclusion of civil society,
NGOs and independent experts as part of the monitoring

463
See BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SOLUTIONS
NETWORK, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 6-7 (2019).
464
Additions and refinements of indicators are annually made to the official
indicator list. See UNSTATS, supra note 461.
465
For an analysis of problems surrounding the unavailability of data and
measurability of sustainable development indicators, see, e.g., Sakiko Fukuda-Parr
& Desmond McNeill, Knowledge and Politics in Setting and Measuring the SDGs:
Introduction to Special Issue, 10 GLOBAL POL’Y 5 (2019); Fukuda-Parr et al., supra note
14, at 9-10; SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 237.
466
Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 94.
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processes. 467 Sixth, the voluntary nature of the monitoring of the
SDGs is heavily criticized. One should recognize that all global
actors involved in partnership for sustainable development share
obligations of SDGs’ monitoring. 468 Seventh, mechanisms for
monitoring the realization of the SDGs, beyond the (weak)
aspirations of the 2030 Agenda, are lacking. Periodic monitoring
should be complemented and coordinated with other traditional
and innovative forms of accountability, including legal (both
judicial and non-judicial), economic, and political.469
As shown, global obligations to create and maintain a just and
sustainable global order, and to ensure a decent standard of living
universally represent an area of intersection between the human
rights agenda and the sustainable development agenda. In this
sense, one possible solution to the problem of monitoring may be
combining efforts of both the sustainable development and human
rights agendas in terms of synchronizing the criteria and indicators
of assessment as well as using common monitoring and
accountability mechanisms for sustainable development.
As demonstrated above in Section III.C, this is already
happening in relation to the common criteria of assessment. For
instance, the 2030 Agenda relies on the CESCR’s general (AAAQ) and
specific criteria of adequacy, though the application of the latter is
quite inconsistent. 470 The CESCR, in turn, uses the criterion of
sustainability as a significant dimension for determining whether
the realization of human rights is adequate.471 At the same time,
indicators developed for the SDGs may be useful for assessing the
progressive realization of basic socio-economic rights, especially the
Alston, supra note 36, at 815.
Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 94.
469
See Langford, supra note 150, at 172.
470
The intention to synchronize indicators was already demonstrated during
the preparation of the MDGs. Michael Doyle, who, as Assistant Secretary-General
and Special Adviser to U.N. Secretary-General, was responsible for the elaboration
of the MDGs, remembers the discussions of the possibility of including human
rights indicators in the sustainable development agenda. This idea was, however,
rejected by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson,
because no universal set of indicators for human rights existed. In Doyle’s words,
“[T]hat was discouraging. Having failed on human rights where I saw a lot of
promise and aware of the enormous amount of work involved with the MDGs, I
said let’s just stick with what we have.” SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 204.
471
See supra Section III.C.
467
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right to a decent standard of living.472 Such common indicators will
help ensure the consistent implementation of minimum human
rights obligations for sustainable development and help avoid
contradictions between the sustainable development agenda and
the human rights agenda.
In addition, we should intensively explore ways of using the
international human rights machinery, including the CESCR and
other relevant U.N. treaty-based monitoring and accountability
bodies, to ensure the implementation of the SDGs.473 Some of these
bodies already monitor the realization of sustainable development
commitments by states, including their commitments of global
partnership. 474 Since these bodies are increasingly paying more
attention to states’ extraterritorial obligations in the area of socioeconomic rights, 475 their jurisdiction may embrace monitoring
472
The CESCR already uses some SDG indicators in its periodic reporting
procedure to assess the performance of obligations by states, including obligations
related to development assistance. In particular, it uses the U.N. 0.7% target for
ODA to determine the scope of states’ obligations to assist. See, e.g., U.N. CESCR,
Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Spain, E/C.12/ESP/5, para. 10
(2012); U.N. CESCR, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of France,
E/C.12/FRA/CO/4, paras. 7-8 (2016); U.N. CESCR, Concluding observations on the
sixth periodic report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
E/C.12/GBR/CO/6, para. 14 (2016); see also U.N. CRC, General Comment No. 5:
General measures of implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N.
Doc. CRC/GC/2003/5, para. 61 (Nov.27, 2003); U.N. CRC, General Comment No. 15:
On the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health (art.
24), U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/15, para. 89 (Apr. 17, 2013).
473
For debates on the theme, see Alston, supra note 78, pt. 7; Alston, supra note
36, at 814f; Judith Bueno de Mesquita et al., Monitoring the Sustainable Development
Goals through Human Rights Accountability Reviews, 96(9) BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG.
627 (2018).
474
See, e.g., U.N. CESCR, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of
Ecuador, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/ECU/CO/4, para. 65 (2019); U.N. CRC, Concluding
observations on the sixth periodic report of Hungary, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/HUN/CO/6,
paras. 6, 16, 19, 24, 33 (2020); U.N. CEDAW, Concluding observations on the fifth
periodic report of Pakistan, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/PAK/CO/5, paras. 7, 16, 22 (2020).
475
See, e.g., CESCR’s, CRC’s and CEDAW’s concluding observations. U.N.
CESCR, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Switzerland, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/CHE/CO/4, paras. 11-19 (2019); U.N. CRC, Concluding observations on the
combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of Austria, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/AUT/CO/5-6,
paras. 13-14 (2020); U.N. CEDAW, Concluding observations on the eighth periodic report
of Australia, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/AUS/CO/8, paras. 29-30 (2018). Relevant
documents
are
collected
by
ETO
Consortium,
https://www.etoconsortium.org/en/main-navigation/library/documents/
[https://perma.cc/U4Z6-48HF].
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North-South, South-South and triangular development compacts as
well as states’ obligations to regulate the conduct of non-state actors
regarding their sustainable development commitments.
Thus, the global partnership for sustainable development
envisioned by the 2030 Agenda requires creating an institutional
framework in which various state-centered and alternative modes
of cooperation and assistance are interconnected and which
provides opportunity for the joint elaboration of solutions for
pressing problems of global poverty eradication.
D. Summary
The final part of this Article addressed global obligations of
conduct, i.e., obligations to cooperate for sustainable development
(Section IV.A) and obligations of development assistance (Section
IV.B).
Section IV.A argued that all global actors—states,
intergovernmental
organizations,
non-state
actors,
and
individuals—possess shared global obligations to cooperate for
sustainable development.
Whereas global obligations of
development assistance are often seen as duties of developed states
towards residents of poor countries, Section IV.B suggested shifting
discussions to the rights and duties of developing societies to take
part in and to contribute to the realization of shared global
obligations to assist. Further, obligations of development assistance
should be seen not only as interactional obligations, but also as
institutional obligations to create and maintain a global institutional
structure indispensable for providing development assistance.
Section IV.C discussed institutional guarantees of global
partnership for sustainable development. In particular, it focused
on traditional state-centered and alternative, more informal and
polycentric, institutional solutions for global partnership and
opportunities to promote their complementarity.
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article sought to provide a general outline of the conception
of global obligations for sustainable development. The main theses
of the study can be capsulized as follows:
(1) Although the 2030 Agenda has been significantly improved
compared to the MDGs, it still contains many substantial gaps, such
as: (a) insufficient attention to human rights and corresponding
obligations; (b) non-recognition of remedial extraterritorial
obligations for sustainable development; (c) concentration
predominantly on territorial rather than global institutional
guarantees of freedom from poverty; (d) employment of an
inadequate definition of poverty; (e) state-centrism; (f) lack of
attention to institutional obligations of development assistance; and
(g) inadequate specification of institutions for the realization of the
SDGs, including independent and efficient monitoring and
accountability mechanisms (Section II.A).
(2) The human rights agenda and the sustainable development
agenda should be brought into sync. This requires: (a) the
recognition of the human rights framework as a normative basis for
certain global obligations for sustainable development, the objects
of which coincide with the objects of internationally recognized
human rights; (b) the acknowledgement that global obligations
corresponding to basic socio-economic rights indispensable for
leading a decent life represent minimum core obligations for
sustainable development; and (c) the development of monitoring
and accountability mechanisms for evaluating the progress of the
realization of global obligations for sustainable development and for
holding global actors responsible (Sections II.B-II.C).
(3) Global obligations for sustainable development include
obligations of conduct (obligations of development cooperation and
assistance) as well as obligations of result (obligations to create and
maintain a just and sustainable global order and obligations to
ensure a decent and sustainable standard of living universally), all
of which are embedded, to a greater or lesser degree, in the 2030
Agenda (Section III.A).
Global institutional obligations for
sustainable development should be aimed not solely at undertaking
structural territorial improvements, but also at reforming a global
institutional scheme. Obligations to create and maintain a just and
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sustainable global order embrace both duties of relational and
distributive justice (Section III.B).
(4) Complementary to and specifying significant general steps
mentioned in points (2)-(3), essential measures to guarantee the
realization of distributive obligations to ensure a decent and
sustainable standard of living universally presuppose:
(a)
embracing commitments to secure not just a “basic standard of
living,” but also a decent standard of living; (b) recognizing not only
progressive, but also immediate human rights obligations for
sustainable development; (c) applying a poor-centered, inclusive,
human rights respective, and a capability-sensitive concept of
poverty; (d) synchronizing general and specific criteria of adequacy
suggested by the U.N. human rights treaty bodies, especially the
CESCR, with those used in the 2030 Agenda; (e) guaranteeing the
enjoyment of a minimum standard of a decent life universally
(Section III.С).
(5) Human rights-based, non-discriminatory, human-centered
and a pro-poor global partnership for sustainable development
presupposed by the 2030 Agenda calls for the fair distribution of
shared global obligations of development cooperation among all
members
of
the
international
community—states,
intergovernmental organizations, non-state actors, and individuals
(Section IV.A).
(6) State-centered international development assistance should
be supplemented through a human-centered global development
assistance.
Interactional and institutional obligations of
development assistance should not be seen solely as duties of
developed states towards residents of poor countries. Developing
societies have both rights and duties to take part in and to contribute
to the realization of shared obligations of development assistance
(Section IV.B).
(7) A global partnership for sustainable development requires
creating and maintaining an institutional framework in which
various traditional (top-down and state-centered) and alternative
(bottom-up and polycentric) governance and accountability modes
are interconnected and coordinated. It should involve multistakeholder and multi-level North-South, South-South and
triangular cooperation, while recognizing private and public nonstate actors as full-fledged partners for sustainable development
(Section IV.C).
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